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PREFACE 
This study represents an attempt to apply some of the concepts of 
mathematical logic to the analysis and description of English syntactic 
structure. A major reason for this attempt has been the author's 
feeling that some means must be found that will enable grammarians to 
determine more precisely the relationship of form to meaning. While 
the analyses in this work often raise as many questions as they answer, 
it is hoped these questions will be the impetus to a long and continuing 
discussion among logicians, linguists, philosophers of language, and 
psycholinguists. Language is incredibly complicated, and the insights 
of scholars with varying viewpoints is needed if the web of language 
is ever to become untangled. 
The intellectual inspiration for this study can be found in the 
works of Gottlob Frege, Hans Reichenbach, and George Hemphill. The 
works of Richard Montague and M. J. Cresswell have also been quite 
instructive. 
The author wishes to express his gratitude to two members of his 
dissertation connnittee, Dr. Judson Milburn and Dr. John Battle, for 
encouraging him to write this hybrid work--hybrid in that it combines 
theory and research with materials which, hopefully, will be the basis 
of a future textbook. The author owes much also to other members of 
his committee, Dr. Robert Radford and Dr. Dennis Bertholf. Dr. Radford 
contributed cogent suggestions concerning the philosophical basis of 
this work as well as some invaluable advice pertaining to stylistic 
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format. Dr. Bertholf devoted much of his time to me and patiently 
inaugurated me into the mystic realm of precise mathematical thinking. 
Of course, the author alone is responsible for any shortcomings in 
this study. 
~The author's wife deserves special mention. She has been a 
constant, unfaltering source of encouragement. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Background, Purpose, and Method 
Auctorial Information 
Before a writer introduces his subject to a reader, he should 
first introduce himself to the reader. The reader is entitled to 
obtain whatever insights he can, in a somewhat informal manner, about 
the writer's development and the reasons for which the book was 
written in the first place. It is the place where the general tenor 
of the whole book should be laid bare, including the author's feelings, 
biases, and predilections. 
Though the author's primary interest is in linguistic theory, this 
effort is not intended, for the most part, to be a theoretical work. 
Its purpose is mainly didactic. The reason for this decision is 
simple. Like many students of grannnar, the author has often felt that 
many of the analyses and descriptions given in the standard handbooks 
were inadequate or incorrect. Categories seemed to overlap unneces-
sarily; certain rules appeared to be quite arbitrary; analyses were 
tailored to particular senten,ces instead of generalizations being 
sought that would explain many cases. Since language is basic to all 
human endeavor, these are grave allegations. But perhaps the gravest 
allegation is the illogicality which one finds inherent in many 
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analyses offered in the schoolroom grammars. The reason schoolroom 
grammars work as well as they do is because the sentences chosen for 
analysis are carefully hand-picked; many common sentences or everyday 
speech which defy analysis by the standard schoolroom procedures are 
simply ignored on the criteria that they are unpolished vulgarizations 
anyway, and hence are, in some sense, ungrammatical. The purpose of 
this work is to investigate a significant portion of English syntax 
using an eclectic approach. That is, ideas and methods will be borrowed 
from various schools of grammatical thought: traditional, structural, 
and transformational. The main innovation will be to subject the 
analyses to techniques borrowed from modern mathematical logic. This 
logical approach will be restricted to a fairly elementary level, 
however, for the ultimate intention is (after the author has received 
sufficient "feedback" from his readers) that the essentials herein 
contained be re-written in a format suitable as a handbook for students 
at the secondary level of school. 
Conceptual Considerations 
Since the audience for this work in its present form will consist 
mainly of scholarly people, theoretical comments will be interspersed, 
along with abundant discussion, here and there in the text wherever 
they seem appropriate. This work, however, will not be heavily docu-
mented unnecessarily, for many traditional concepts have been so widely 
known and used for several hundred years that allusion to a few key 
works utilizing these concepts should be sufficient. Some basic con-
cepts, however, may be noted immediately. This is a work on syntax, 
not semantics. Nevertheless, recourse to semantics will be frequent so 
that syntactic structures may be established, for it is a contention of 
this work that, while there is a dividing line between the two levels, 
the line is not absolute; the one merges into the other. That is, 
meaning often seems to supply a foundation for syntax. This statement 
should be considered as a rejection of the generative semantics school 
of thought, which is based on the theory that deep structure is 
semantic structure, that the levels of syntax and semantics are indis-
tinguishable from each other. (To what extent the logical arguments, 
terms, functions, and relations--as they are represented by English 
words in this text--may be semantic primitives, I leave for the reader 
to decide.) The definition of "syntax" used in this work agrees with 
Chomsky's original formulation;! that is, that "grammatical" and 
"meaningful" are not synonymous terms. As he notes, reliance must be 
put on the native speaker's intuition for the knowledge that only the 
first of the following pair of sentences is grammatical: 
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Colorless green ideas sleep furiously (1.1) 
*Furiously sleep ideas green colorless (1.2) 
The asterisk on (1.2) therefore indicates ungrammaticality. Some 
authors use the asterisk to mark mere semantic tmacceptability (it will 
not be so used here) as in a sentence such as *The book fainted. The 
fact that fainted requires a conscious being for a subject does not 
seem to fall within the realm of grammatical syntax. It represents 
incorrect lexical insertion--a psychological fault, not a grammatical 
fault. Wittgenstein, in dealing with the related notion of "under-
standing, 112 seems to imply the same conclusion when he asks, "Do we 
understand .•• Lewis Carroll's poem 'Jabberwocky 1 ? In his ensuing 
discussion it becomes clear that what he means is that Carroll's poem 
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has a "grammatical sense" (somewhat akin to the structural grammarian's 
idea of sentence meaning as opposed to lexical meaning), but not a 
semantical referential sense. When one speaks of "nonsense sentences" 
(as in much of Carroll's children's literature), one does, in fact, 
mean grammatical sentences; they, at the very least, sometimes indicate 
category "meanings," such as noun, verb, etc. 
On the other hand, a string of words may be semantically meaningful 
and ungrammatical at the same time: 
*John and I jumps over wall and we shoots he. 3 (1. 3) 
In this case, it can be seen that incorrect inflectional usage and 
incoreect word order are what make the sentence syntactically ungram-
matical. Thus, from this and the foregoing examples, it can be 
concluded that syntactic grammaticality is largely a matter of accept-
able order in a purely mechanical sense. There is a "gray area," 
however, where it is difficult to distinguish between mere preferential 
usage and grammatical syntax. (Considerations of inflection--concord, 
number, and the like--will be omitted in this work because this work 
will concentrate mostly on exocentric constructions, not endocentric 
constructions, and the majority of constructions to be considered will 
be non-deviant--at least in everyday speech.) An important qualifi-
cation must be made now, however. "Acceptable ordering" in this work 
is taken only in a "statistical" sense, not necessarily in any arbi-
trary sense, as regards the gross exocentric forms. Studies of the 
world's languages and recent studies in child language acquisition (of 
English) make it clear to the writer that sentences begin on a more or 
less disordered level as far as syntax is concerned.4 What people do, 
it appears, is acquire a vocabulary in their day-by-day experiences; 
and the vocabulary items refer to each other and to things tangible 
and intangible in terms of a social context. Then these things are 
"related" in a logical sense (the explanation of which makes up the 
body of this work). Surface sentence patterns are thus a result of 
social interaction. With the passage of time, the frequency of word 
orders in certain sentential formulations (due to imitation, etc.) 
become somewhat habitual, thus settling into social patterns, just as 
other forms of human behavior do. But it must be remembered in 
speaking of the importance of word order in syntax, that this is only 
true of ~nalytical languages such as modern English; in a highly 
synthetic language such as Latin, a word can occur vi.rtually anywhere 
in the sentence without changing the basic intended meaning of the 
sentence. And though patterns in modern English will be discussed 
later, these are just the usual "statistical" formulations; for one 
can easily find "exceptions" to most so-called patterns, which never-
theless are accepted by native speakers as meaningful and grannnatical. 
Some obvious examples are: (1) the third slot in simple statements 
(N-V-N, N-V-V, N-V-Adj., N-V-Adv.); (2) the extreme mobility of many 
adverbials and indirect objects; and (3) the subject in predicate 
position in passive and expletive sentences. 
If grammatical word order turns out to be merely a matter of 
frequency and convention, with "exceptions" (e.g., in poetical and 
other elevated speech), then, in a sense, only the "logical order" is 
what matters; and if this claim is true, then the attainment of a 
universal linguistic theory seems within reach. One should note, 
however, that no pretense is made in this paper to a knowledge of 
mental processes, universal or otherwise; that is, the idea of 
s 
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universal is not meant to be taken in a psychological sense. The term 
is used here in the mathematical sense--i.e., that a theory (here a 
portion of mathematical logic) which can encompass all the special cases 
of a topic is considered to be a universal theory. 
Levels of Analysis 
One important question that results if the above ideas happen to 
be true concerns the validity of the distinction between deep and sur-
face structural levels--an idea that has gained a great following among 
linguists since the publication of Noam Chomsky's Aspects of the Theory 
of Syntax (1965). On this theory, one obtains a "surface derivation" 
by means of transformations of various sorts applied to a deep structure. 
(The contention of t~is paper is that there is no structural level in 
any syntactic sense below the surface; transformations are applied only 
on the surface rather like the manipulation of brackets, parentheses, 
and braces in the various steps of solving an algebraic problem.) The 
fact that Chomsky's system does not work well quite often is evidenced 
in the arising of various splinter groups such as the case-grammar 
school of Charles Fillmore and the school of generative semanticists 
associated with the names of George Lakoff, John Robert Ross, and James 
Mccawley. Noteworthy is the fact that both these schools are more and 
more resorting to ideas and techniques emanating from extra-linguistic 
disciplines such as logic and philosophy of language. The problem is 
that they find they must extend the level of deep (semantic) structure 
deeper and deeper, and there seems to be no end in sight. Ross, for 
example, in his recent work (unpublished) has tried to apply the 
"speech acts" theory of the philosopher J. R. Searle, with dubious 
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success. He has failed to note that many of the reasons which motivate 
a philosopher to study language are not identical with a linguist's 
motivations. A linguistic theory of language focuses on the activity 
of communication and need not be the same as a philosophic theory of 
language which deals with language in its total socio-cultural setting, 
though the two approaches do, of course, converge eventually. The 
stumbling-block appears to be the question of meaning; and, while 
scholars are far from understanding it, many would agree that meaning 
is generated by factors relating to worldly experience (including 
linguistic experience), neurology, and psychology. As a second-order 
(i.e., higher-order) study, philosophy has need of data from all these 
(and other) areas in order to frame a general theory of language. But 
linguistics, as a first-order study, is more specific; it could solve 
many of its problems by restricting itself to trying to frame a theory 
of communication. Tilis is an approach of which Searle himself seems 
to approve, for he says, "And, of course, for most purposes in the 
science of linguistics it is not necessary to speak of acts at all. 
One can just discuss phonemes, morphemes, sentences, etc. 11 5 Instead 
of searching for deeper and deeper levels of structure (which no one 
has been able to define and the existence of which no one has been 
able to prove), why not accept surface structures with their attendant 
meanings as the beginning place for linguistic studies? After all, 
one need not assume that there are levels of semantic derivation which 
strangely correspond to Freud's id, ego, and superego; but it is just 
such ideas that are suggested by the interpretations of "deep structure" 
on the part of many modern linguists. One need not try to determine 
just where the deepest level is at all. Chemists, for example, explain 
the composition of matter ultimately in terms of an underlying atomic 
... 
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level which they explain by diagrams and other symbols; but they do not 
' insist that the symbols or structural diagrams are themselves on a 
series of levels comparable to the matter they are describing. There 
is therefore no pressing reason to believe that linguistic: symbols 
(words, concepts) or the notation which explains them derives in any 
ordinary sense of the term "deep" as it has been so widely and 
variously used by modern linguists. These suggestions may seem like 
a step backward to some linguists, but it is a contention of this 
writer that it is a step in the right direction. 
Chomsky, in many of his works, makes a supposedly important dis-
tinction between competence and performance (e.g., in Aspects, pp. 3-15). 
But if, say, two different orders of the same conununication are 
essentially a difference of focus or stress (e.g., active/passive), and 
such focus or stress is often important to the speaker, what sense does 
it make to posit an underlying fonn of different focus or stress from 
that intended by the speaker? Since performance is actual speech and 
competence is an idealized model of speech, any idealized surface model 
which posits a different idealized underlying form is circular, for 
its assumption is, in fact, based on a surface form to begin with. 
(An account, for example, of the passive transformation in many hand-
books posits an underlying form which is identical or nearly identical 
to the simple active voice form which often occurs on the surface.) 
Chomsky is tight, of course, when he says that such aberrations of 
performance as stuttering, pauses, interruptions, lapse of memory, 
and the like should be deleted from a linguist's model of grammar. 
Linguists, like all scientific investigators, must deal in idealized 
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mo(j,els. The point is that all idealized models of syntax should be of "' 
surface structures--and therefore in some sense performance •. What may 
be underlying in Chomsky's sense of innateness (Asp~cts, pp. 47-59) is 
a logical device which enables man to categorize certain sorts of 
meaningful relationships attaching to words that he has learned through 
experience, but this logical device is not to be construed in any 
Freudian-like way. In this work, it is maintained that, in Chomsky's 
terms, the logical arrangement of categories is competence, while the 
actual surface arrangement of morphemes and sounds is performance. The 
different arrangements of morphemes (etc.) in sentences containing the 
same logical proposition (i.e., the basic intended meaning) can be 
viewed as transformations involving changes in surface sentence 
patterns. 
Propositions and Paraphrasing 
Closely related to matters of transformations is the practice of 
paraphrasing. For example, the logician speaks of two sentences, say 
active/passive, but what concerns him is the proposition which is the 
"same" in both sentences. So, meaning is not ignored by any means; it 
is merely taken for granted in specific cases. Paraphrasing in this 
work will, however, be "close," wherever this is possible, to the 
wording in the sentence under consideration because of the importance 
attributed above to the normal social interaction process of vocabulary 
accumulation. Since it is a main contention of this work that simple 
sentence patterns are only mechanical formulations into which people 
try to force their thoughts, and therefore are conventional to a great 
extent, not conceptual entirely, no assumptions will be posited for 
• 
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relating different structures that surface considerations do not 
warrant. That is, while some of the analyses herein often seem similar 
to the work being done by the generative semantics school of thought, 
every effort will be put forth to avoid some of the extremely dubious 
interpretations which that school has suggested--dubious because they 
depend more and more upon conceptual interpretation, and tend quite 
often to forget the grannnatical structures with which they are working. 
For example, the two phrases Bob's brother-in-law and Bob's wife's 
brother, may indeed mean essentially the same thing, but the difference 
in their structures is partially due to extralinguistic criteria which 
in this case are largely irrelevant, namely kinship relationships 
expressed in legal terms in the first case, and not to structural change 
of focus, style, etc. An example of true structural change would be to 
take the second sentence above and convert it to The brother of Boh's 
wife; it may be now that The brother is being stressed rather than Bob 
(or Bob's wife) , but in any case the "basic" meaning remains unaltered. 
It is not wrong in principle to consult extralinguistic criteria when 
trying to solve a syntactic problem; it is wrong to forget that surface 
structures, how and why they change, are what an explanation is sought 
for. 
As can be seen, the theory gradually being sketched here is a 
.return to a more empirical point of view--a view which, nevertheless, 
does not lose sight of the many real contributions that have been made 
by modem grannnarians. In much of what follows, the careful reader 
will find ideas that first had their beginnings in traditional, 
structural, and transformational grammars. 
No attempt is made in this work to provide a generative procedure. 
One reason is that space does not permit it, for there are many other 
things that must be done before a generative procedure can be estab-
lished; this task is left for others to accomplish. Another reason 
is that each (presumably) well-formed sentence is taken more or less 
11 
as it is, i.e., in its present, "linear" form, rather than assuming 
that it results from the application of certain rules to an underlying, 
deep structure. When explicating by paraphrase, of course, that two 
sentence forms (e.g., active/passive) say essentially the same thing, 
the suggestion is bound to arise in some minds whether or not the two 
variations do, in fact, come from some common, underlying form by 
rules of various sorts. And, indeed, much such transformational method-
ology could be applied to the examples in this work. But the emphasis 
herein is on the logical structure of propositions and their relation-
ships to surface grannnatical forms. The various sentence patterns 
which could be used to express a single proposition are a matter quite 
often of rhetorical style and focus and are not directly related to 
the purpose of establishing correlates between logical and grammatical 
structure. The scope of this work, therefore, does nqt permit a com-
plete developmental comparison of the logical structures with all their 
possible sentence patterns correlates. Anyway, as intimated earlier, 
it is probably true that no underlying order exists; order is a surface 
phenomenon which "derives" from unordered logical primitives. Nothing 
else is certain. Wittgenstein, for example, in discussing how one 
understands the sense of a sentence, points out the problem of decoding 
(translating) sentences. He asks: "At what moment of translating into 
English does understanding begin?" That is, is the process of sentence 
understanding related to the where and when of se~tence production? 
No one knows for certain if it begins with the first words, in the 
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middle, or at the completion of a sentence; nor is it known whether 
meaning precedes, accompanies, or follows speech (writing). A 
reasonable place to begin sentence analysis, then', appears to be at the 
' 
beginning of the sentence as uttered (or written)~ once one has worked 
one's way through a sentence and grasped its "propositional" meaning 
(i.e., its intended bas:t.c meaning or logical "form"), one can decide on 
a grannnatical analysis. 
Linguistic Units 
The question now arises: what is the primary linguistic unit--the 
word or the sentence? To say anything significant, people must use 
sentences; and the "same" words in different sentences often mean 
different things; hence, the sentence would seem to be the primary 
unit. "Meaning is use" is the expression Wittgenstein made popular in 
twentieth century philosophical circles, and that idea is adhered to 
in this work. But it was the German mathematical philosopher, Gottlob 
Frege, to whom Wittgenstein was indebted for this idea, although 
Wittgenstein developed the idea on somewhat different lines than did 
Frege. It is Frege's nineteenth century concept (not known to many, 
however, till the twentieth century) which will be employed here. In 
Frege, one finds that a sentence and the words which compose it re-
garded as a kind of continuum. That is, both are primary, but from 
different points of view. According to Frege, as his greatest ex-
positor Michael Dunnnett points out, "in the order of explanation the 
sense of a sentence is primary, but in the order of recognition the 
sense of a word is primary. 11 7 While it is true that the specific 
sense of any word can only be known by its use in a particular 
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sentence, nevertheless the word in isolation often does contain a 
general meaning which is based on its specific usages in various sen-
tences. And so it must be that a sentence, in a certain social 
context, is meaningful only insofar as its component words in some way 
contribute to its total'meaning, even though the "tones" of the words 
are somewhat altered (sometimes) from their dictionary definitions. 
By "tone" is meant a semantic variation which has no logical basis, 
though it may have an aesthetic basis--such as substituting the meaning 
"cur" for "dog" in a particular sentence. 8 Therefore, because of the 
problem of "tone," says Dummett in his great work on Frege, 9 
We cannot grasp the sense of a word otherwise than by refer-
ence to the way in which it can be used to form sentences; 
but we understand the word independently of any particular 
sentence containing it. Our understanding of any such par-
ticular sentence is derived from our understanding of its 
constituent words, which understanding determines for us 
the truth-conditions of that sentence; but our understanding 
of those words consists in our grasp of the way in which 
they may figure in sentences in general, and how, in general, 
they combine to determine the truth-conditions of those 
sentences. 
So, in order to avoid the obvious circularity of such a continuum-
conception, the total sentence meaning cannot be explained without 
reference to its truth-conditions--i.e., those conditions which must 
exist for the sentence to have meaning, to be either true or false. 
(These remarks refer, primarily, to assertive sentences; but it must 
be noted that even some assertive sentences do not seem to fulfill 
truth requirement conditions.) But this latter condition takes one 
too far afield--into the domain of philosophical !problems and 
questions concerning the very nature of reality and the like. As in 
most works on grammar, the examples herein will be assumed to be true 
or false (or "neutral") in some possible world or situation. This 
statement is not meant to imply, however, that occasional excursions 
into the realm of philosophical considerations will not occur in this 
work. They will, if they seem directly relevant to the logico-gram-
matical problem at hand. 
Terminology and Procedure 
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Because they have become established by long usage, the grammatical 
terms used in this work will, in general, accord with the usage found 
in traditional grammars. However, a few additional terms from logic 
and mathematics must be introduced as well. The meaning of the term 
"function," for instance, has been interpreted in various ways as the 
notion has been developed during the history of logic and mathematics. 
The term is here used in its Fregeau sense to refer to a logical predi-
cate or attribution or property; a function can be viewed as a process 
which is said to operate on (i.e., to relate to) an "argumant" (a 
referent, name). Thus, in Fish swim, fish is an argument which finds 
its specification in the function swim. Likewise, in Mary is beautiful, 
~ is an argument which is operated on (specified) by the function 
is beautiful. These are nothing more than examples of simple, Aristo-
telian subject-predicate logic found in one form or another in most 
grammatical explanations. It seems that no one considered the notion 
seriously, till Frege's work became known in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, that there are other ways to explain how 
human reason works. In spite of the keen interest accorded Frege's 
work by logicians, especially since World War II, little impact had been 
made on grammatical theory by his thoughts on language until recently. 
Frege's big advance in the logical analysis of language was that he 
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conceived a difference between the idea of a "function" and the idea of 
a "relation." A relation, he claimed, can be viewed as a function with 
more than one argument; conversely, a function can be viewed as a one-
place predicate relation (in grammar, an intransitive sentence). For 
example, in John hit the ball, the two-place predicate relation is hit 
and the two "terms" are the relata, both of which are specified by hit; 
in grammar, the two terms are the subject (referent) and the direct 
object (relatum). Such an example is called a two-place or dyadic, 
relation. In theory, relations may be of any number: dyadic, triadic, 
tetradic, and even many-place relations; but in practice anything 
beyond triadic is rare in English and the other ludo-European languages. 
In polysynthetic languages, however, the number of relations may be 
quite large. Grammatically speaking, dyadic relations are direct 
object sentences; a connnon triadic relation is a sentence containing 
both a direct object and an indirect object. 
Logical predicates (functions and relations) are seen in this 
system of analysis to be central; they form the core around which 
cluster the arguments and terms. A distinction is made between 
argument and function on the one hand and terms and relations on the 
other hand for the practical reason that terms have a tendency to fall 
into an ordering process. The distinction will sometimes be blurred 
in certain analyses in this paper, however, in order to gain notational 
consistency. George Hemphill was the first person ~ho tried to apply 
Frege's insights to purely grammatical problems. In his recent 
pioneering work on this subject, he said that "perhaps the greatest 
intellectual liberation in Frege is the liberation from the dominance 
of subject-predicate thinking. This was achieved by making a distinction 
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between functions and relations. 11 10 This has been the present writer's 
contention for several years, but no time was taken to see if it could 
be applied in a consistent and deep sense to grammatical problems. In 
this regard~ Hemphill has paved the way, and the present work may be 
considered as an extension of his insights. Hemphill's little book 
(111 pages) devotes only some twenty-five pages to syntax; the remainder 
deals with applications of his system to phonology and morphology. 
Thus, Hemphill's book is just a brief sketch. The present work goes 
far beyond Hemphill's efforts in syntax, and in many cases disagrees 
violently with his conclusions. The great merit of Hemphill's book 
for the present writer is that it has proved to be a very suggestive 
base for further enquiry, not only in the area of complicated sentences, 
which are entirely ignored by Hemphill, but also in the area of improved 
grammatical explanation. In his coverage of syntax, Hemphill is 
especially remiss in that his analyses are mostly just what one finds 
in any traditional grammar, except that he incorporates his logical 
symbolism to label logically significant parts of sentences. 11 
The primacy of predication in sentence analysis (as opposed to 
putting equal weight on subject and predicate) has sometimes been 
appreciated by certain modern grannnarians. Langendoen, for instance, 
says: 12 
We can appreciate this most easily by considering that we 
can substitute meaningless terms, for example, numerals 
or letters of the alphabet, for the subject and objects 
of any core sentence . • . • If, however, we retain 
the lexical content of the subject and objects, but re-
place the predicate with a letter of the alph~bet, the 
result communicates next to nothing: · 
.!_ disappeared·. 
.!_ lived in y. 
x were giving y out to z. 
My bicycle x • 
George Washington ~ in that house. 
The hippies were .!_-ing flowers 
out to the passers-by. 
x are ripe. 
x is the wife of y_. 
x is aware that y_ is fond 
of x. 
x realizes that Y.. is doomed. 
The bananas are x. 
Princess Grace is the x of Prince 
Rainier. 
Harriet is x that the boss is y of 
her. 
Snoopy is .?!. that he is Y..· 
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Langendoen thinks such formulations only reveal how many variables 
a predicate may have and some information about complex sentence 
formation.13 The contention of the present work is that such a view is 
extremely short-sighted; much additional insightful information can be 
obtained by applying a little effort. It is hoped that these remarks 
prepare the way for an answer to a question that may still be uppermost 
in the reader's mind, namely, why do a logical analysis of grammar at 
all? The answer is that it may clarify matters concerning the logical 
structure of langauge, and this aspect of language has largely been 
ignored by grammarians. The thesis of this work is that language is 
first of all logical; and that a grannnatical analysis, strictly speaking, 
should follow a logical analysis. The former merges into the latt~r, 
however, and a person should not be too dogmatic about where one leaves 
off and the other begins. 
In dealing with language, logicians have learned that, to avoid 
confusion, one must try to separate the analytical tools from the thing 
being analyzed. That is, they realize that when linguists use language 
to study language, there are obvious built-in hazards. Hence, 
logicians use a formalized language to study an object language (in 
this book, English). Since this work, however, is only an introduction 
to the possibilities of the logical analysis of E~glish, and since the 
writer does not wish to alienate his non-logician readers by using too 
much abstract symbolism·, the symbols and methods of the formal language 
(mathematical logic) will be kept at an absolute minimum. For now, 
all that the reader need know is that in order to carry out a logical 
analysis of English, one must set up a tripartite classification of 
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the "parts of speech." That is, as noted earlier, words will be 
classified as (1) arguments (or terms) and (2) functions (or relations); 
in addition, a few (3) logical symbols (to be introduced as needed) 
representing such logical words as and and or etc. will be employed 
because they affect the logical structure of sentences. 
Using words to discuss words inevitably causes some problems in the 
use.of puunctuation. In order to avoid over-punctuation, this work 
(unlike most books on logic) follows the practice of most grammars in 
that when referring to a word in a context simple underlining will be 
used. Quotation marks will only be used when the meaning of the word 
is being stressed as opposed to the actual word choice itself. Other-
wise, quotes will be used to indicate abnormal or questionable meaning 
or use, and underlining will be used to stress discussed comments. 
Some symbols used in the object language will also be used, though 
sometimes differently, in the logical language. Their use, if not 
clear from the context, will be explained when they are used. In this 
regard, any mathematicians who may read this paper should note that the 
writer makes no distinction herein between equality and equivalence 
(= and =). (!30th terms are used synonymously in this work to avoid 
stylistic monotony.) This distinction seemed to be an unnecessary 
complication to add to a work whose readers will be mostly non-mathe-
maticians and non-logicians, and the format also largely obviates the 
need for this distinction. In the logical language, only (=) will be 
used. 
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Finally, two crucial questions need mentioning, though the body of 
this work is taken up with their explication. They are (1) How does 
one know when he has arrived at a correct analysis of a given sentence? 
and (2) How can one determine a sentence type? These questions are 
difficult, one might say impossible, to answer with any degree of 
precision. (The answer to both questions, to be quite honest, is prob-
ably in terms of the personal convictions of the analyst, based on some 
theoretical framework.) That is why grammatical analysis is at once 
frustrating and fascinating to the professional linguist. Before one 
can establish a sentence type, one must first attempt to define the 
term "sentence," and this is not an easy task either. Traditional 
grammarians define a sentence as a written or spoken expression of a 
"complete thought," though they do admit that some sehtences are only 
complete if one allows for tacitly "understood" elements; a case in 
point is the understood you in imperative (command) sentences such as 
(You) listen to me! However, traditional grannnarians are obdurately 
selective; understood elements are only allowed in the interpretations 
of certain kinds of sentence structures, whereas they might be use-
fully employed (with caution) also to interpret those sentences in 
which understood elements are disallowed. Of course, when one is so 
arbitrary and dogmatic about what is or is not a sentence (or a sen-
tence constituent), it becomes possible to discern patterns, because the 
theory itself is so designed that, in a manner of speaking, it deter-
mines the patterns. That is, the patterns are not just "out there" 
in the world of speech; they come into being as a result of some 
strange mental processes of the analyst. 
Rejecting such traditional notional ideas as "complete thought" 
(impossible to define), "subject" (agent, topic, or theme), "object" 
(receiver), etc., structural grammarians go to the other extreme. 
Influenced by psychological behaviorism, they insist on empirical 
adequacy, which for them means that a sentence is the largest lin-
guistic unit amenable to a more or less precise analysis. Though 
they often do not practice what they preach, structural grammarians 
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do not believe that a linguistic analyst should resort to considering 
presuppositions, understood elements, nuances, and the like. For them, 
only the data are important; a linguistic description is just an account 
of a mechanical, overt system. Transformational-generative grammarians 
do accept covert entities; they also insist on "empirical adequacy"; 
both goals are achieved by reviving and modernizing Cartesianism. They 
posit "phrase structures" (rather akin to the traditionalists' "simple 
sentence patterns" discussed in Chapter II); thus, the "sentence" is 
also for them the highest linguistic unit, but any uttered sentence 
may be the final result of a series of rules and transformations 
applied to the phrase structures. Since 1965, transformational 
theorists have posited phrase structures which exist at deeper and 
deeper levels of "mental consciousness." This trend has been carried 
even further by the school of generative semanticists, who claim that 
deep structure is not syntactic, but semantic. In so claiming, they 
often have to resort to presupposition, understood elements, logical 
deduction, and extralinguistic information. In ~ sense, they are 
like the tagmemic grammarians, who claim that the sentence is not the 
highest linguistic unit, but lies intermediary between the clause and 
the paragraph. However, the tagmemic analyst sees language in a total 
cultural sense. Theoretically, a linguistic analysis does not stop 
at the leveil of the paragraph, nor at larger discourse levels; it 
contains all the socio-cultural data which are conducive to language 
usage. 
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The analytic procedure used in this work employs some elements of 
all these approaches. The basic syntactic unit is the simple sentence. 
For explanatory adequacy, the sentence may be said to consist of var-
ious sub-categories (see Chapter II). The basis of any simple sentence 
is the proposition (similar to the traditionalist's "complete thought") 
which it conveys. "Proposition" is a primitive, undefined term; and 
since simple sentences (as will be shown later) can occur in a bewil-
dering variety of forms (even though they usually occur in some 
half-dozen mechanically stereotyped forms), they may be said, in some 
sense, to be "formless," and the term "sentence" is thus tantamount to 
a primitive, undefined entity just like the proposition it conveys. 
Thus, in the final analysis, the question of sentence type, while not 
meaningless, is somewhat beside the point. A sentence may convey more 
than one proposition, and sometimes a proposition may be conveyed by 
a part of a sentence; other times a sentence may seem to be conveying 
more than one proposition when only one proposition is, in fact, 
intended by the speaker. Every sentence needs to be interpreted within 
a socio-cultural context insofar as this is possible. Many complicated 
sentence patterns seem obviously to be manipulations (transformations) 
of simple patterns or parts of patterns; therefore, transformations 
are used or alluded to in this work, but every effort is made to use 
constraint. Transformations such as deletion, addition, and substi-
tution, for example, should not diverge too far from the words in the 
si:mtences being transformed, thereby maintaining a degree of empirical 
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adequacy. Sentences are used in socio-cultural contexts, and thus, in 
themselves, have little meaning; hence, a too drastic change in the 
lexical content of a transformation tends to make the interpretation 
suspect. The propositional content must always be borne in mind. In 
this regard, it would be better, perhaps, to call propositions "basic 
thoughts," and the larger contexts of discourse might then more appro-
priately be called "complete thoughts." For it will be shown in 
Chapter IV that there is no exact boundary which separates sentences 
from paragraphs and even larger stretches of discourse. Neither can 
there be an exact boundary which separates propositions from sentences, 
but just exactly how they are related is still a subject of much debate. 
In some quarters, the term "proposition" is out of fashion, or at 
least very suspect, but the present writer maintains that without this 
"conceptual tool" many sentences could never be convincingly explained, 
only described. (As an analogy, it might be noted that electrons, 
neutrons, and protons are suspect in the same way that propositions are; 
but where would the modern chemical industry be if it did not operate 
on the assumption that they do exist? Like propositions, such entities 
as electrons will do nicely as theoretical tools until something better 
comes along.) Of course, to a great extent, a grannnar is a description; 
but mere description is a sterile activity. Descriptive adequacy, 
which is necessarily a linguistic activity, must depend on tools that 
are not entirely linguistic themselves. Otherwise, it is a case of the 
cat chasing its own tail. Sentence analysis must be in terms not only 
of language, but of people in a living, thinking context of com-
munication. 
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CHAPTER II 
BASIC SENTENCE PATTERNS 
Pattern One--Simple Subject-Predicate Sentences 
Unmodified S-V Sentences 
Schoolroom grammars unanimously cite as the simplest sentence 
pattern that form which possesses a subject (with or without modifi-
cation) and a predicate (in which only the verb may be expanded), as 
in the following cases: 
John sleeps. 
NP VP (2 .1) 
The small boy is sleeping. 
NP VP (2.2) 
Practically speaking, with regard to (2 .1) , this is a sound way to 
begin categorizing sentences, if one is to avoid th¢ problem of deciding 
whether or not such forms as Oh? (=Do you think so?), Yes! (=I agree 
with you!), Ah ha! (•So that's the way it is!), and the like are sen-
tences. However, (2.2) is more complex; it is a combination of (2.1) 
and another pattern yet to be discussed. Likewise, all the other so-
called "simple" and complex patterns are actually expansions of the 
first case above. Conversely, the pattern rep;esented by John sleeps 
can be viewed as the pattern to which all other patterns may be 
reduced. The verb phrase in each case above is, in a sense, incom-
plete (i.e., there are possible presuppositions or implications which 
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are left unexpressed). One could, for example, ask How does John 
sleep?; and one answer might be John sleeps soundly or John is sleeping 
soundly, a NP-V?-ADV sentence pattern. A sentence such as Mary sings 
implies something like the following: Mary sings well (poorly) , a NP-
VP-ADV form, or Ma;y sings songs, a NP1-VP-NP2 (subject-verb-object) 
form. Thus, the John sleeps type of sentence pattern might be cali.ed 
the most primitive form, since it is really a part of the remaining 
sentence patterns. 
This pattern, nonetheless, affords an opportunity to apply logical 
insights. In John sleeps, John is the argument (symbolized by a lower-
case letter from the beginning of the alphabet) and sleeps is the 
function (logical predicate) which specifies a property or attribute 
of John. That is, one can say of John that he sleeps. The function 
is symbolized by a capital letter from the early part of the alphabet. 
The whole sentence, then1 is symbolized as 
John sleeps (2. 3) 
a F 
In logic, (2.3) would ordinarily be symbolized as either F(a) or Fa, 
and if the formula had other complications in it, parentheses would 
enclose the whole: (F(a)). Often brackets, braces, and the like 
replace one or more sets of parentheses to obtain better visual per-
spicuity. Since the main examples in this work will usually be set 
off (centered) on the page, it will often be possible to dispense with 
these logical symbols. Thus, in (2.3) spacing and labeled vincula per-
form the same services as parentheses. Logically speaking, the order 
of these symbols is immaterial because, by the conventions adopted, 
the juxtaposition of .!! and E. reveals the logical, abstract structure, 
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whether written as Fa or aF. Both usages will occur from time to time. 
j 
because by so doing the grammatical ordering can also be shown (some-
times) with the same symbols. 
Adjectival Modification 
The second sentence example (2.2) cited above, The small boy is 
sleeping, poses an added problem, for it is !!:£!:_ possible to label it 
the way (2. 3) was labeled--!. e., the subject as an a and the predicate 
as an F. The reason is that the sentence contains not one proposition, 
but two. They are: The boy is small (a predicate adjective sentence) 
and The boy is sleeping. The latter sentence is logically equivalent 
to both The boy sleeps and The boy does sleep, in that all three would 
be symbolized as aF• (The semantic differences are being ignored here; 
only logical form is meant.) In fact, the sentence The boy is asleep 
could also be dealt with in the same manner, for it is not really a 
predicate adjective (as some might claim) in that sleeping and asleep 
both tell what the boy is doing. In any case, it make no difference, 
for the verb forms and the predicate adjective form are all predicates 
which specify the attribute of sleep for the argument boy. Tense, 
aspect, and emphasis are not considered because they are not essential 
to the problem at hand, and there is no satisfactory way yet available 
for dealing logically with them. (Some pioneering work in logic on 
matters of tense, mood, and voice is now going on, but so far the work 
has no immediate possible application to the grammatical analysis of 
sentences.) Thus, S-V sentences (e.g., John sleeps) and predicate 
adjective sentences (e.g., John is asleep and The boy is small) all 
have the same logical form, for the predicate in each specifies 
something about the subject. Traditional grammar is incqnsistent in 
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this matter. The standard schoolroom handbooks claim that in a S-V 
sentence the subject is doing something; in the predicate adjective 
sentence, the adjective complements the subject in that it qualifies 
or describes the subject; the idea that the verb also qualifies or 
describes something about the subject is ignored. The single, most 
important element in a sentence is its logical predicate; everything 
else in the sentence relates to it. 
From the foregoing it can be seen that The small boy is sleepin_g_ 
is a case of one proposition being embedded in another. The resultant 
formula should be more complicated, for the subject itself is a complete 
proposition acting as an argument with a logical function, thus com-
posing a complex proposition. These facts may be schematized as 
follows: 
The small boy is sleeping. 
( F a) 
'---v"--' 
G (2. 4) 
b 
The outer parentheses (i.e., the sentence boundaries) can be deleted 
for simplification. What the analysis more specifically shows is that 
a complex predicate is operating on the argument boy. 
If there is multiple adjectival modification, naturally there is 
even more complication. For example, the following sentence indicates 
four degrees of modification: 
_T_h_e~-s~m~a_l_l__._,~s~t_u_r_d_y~,~~h~.an~d_s_o_m_e~_b_o~y~ _i_s~_i_l_l. 
(F3 (F2 (F1 a))) F4 
(2.5) 
The grammatical ordering here is rather arbitrary, since all the adjec-
ti ves (except, perhaps, ill) could replace each other distributionally. 
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The positioning of adjectives relative to one another in multiple 
modification is largely a matter of intuition (if one omits quantifiers 
and demonstrative words from consideration); at least, linguists have 
not clarified· this situation much. The notation in (2.4), the first 
complex case above, could have retained an F2 for is sleeping, just as 
various F's have been used iri. the second complex exarhple (2. 5); but 
the switch to Q focuses on basic differences--i.e., verb versus 
adjective. 
A more interesting example of the ordering of adjectives occurs 
when ambiguity is involved. Here, again, one must rely on intuition 
if no extralinguistic context is available. Willard Quine, the 
logician, notes the following case in which the ordering of the words 
is not the key.factor: 1 
Erettl'.: little girls' ca!!!E A girls' camp which is (2.6) 
F2 ( Fl ( a )) little and pretty. 
12rett~ little girls' camE A camp for little girls (2. 7) 
F2 (( Fl ) a ) that is pretty. 
Eretti little girls' ca!!!E A camp for little girls (2. 8) 
( F2 ( Fl )) a who are pretty. 
In passing, it might be noted that using vincula to label signific:ant 
parts of a sentence has limited utility; the parentheses perform the 
task much better, if one wishes to avoid double underlining and the 
like. More importantly, the above examples indicate the primacy of 
speech over writing, for if the stress markers and intonation contours 
had been supplied, the ambiguities would have been resolved. That is, 
stress and intonation perform the same service in speech that paren-
theses do here. Most schoolroom granunars ignore such factors and 
treat sentences as though they were somehow already understood; 
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little or no attention is paid to speech signals and the social context 
.. 
of an utterance. For example, the ambiguity of the following pair is 
easily resolved by indicating the facts of speech even though the word 
order remains the same : 2 
2' ~3 
' Comic strip artist /l dies. (2. 9) 
(F ( a )) G 
2 A 
' 
\ 3 ... 1 (2 .10) Comic striE artist dies. 
a F 
In (2.10), of course, there is no adjectival modification at all, for 
comic striE artist is functioning as a compound noun argument; in (2.9) 
striE artist is the· compound noun modified by comic. From these 
examples it is clear that the ordering of stress and intonation per-
form the same service as word order does in other cases. Of course, 
only recourse to context can explicate some sentences--written or oral; 
an example is The rabbit is too hot to eat. 
Existence 
Before closing this section, it is necessary to make a decision 
about a very knotty problem: the function of the copula in simple 
subject-verb patterns. It has already been noted, in The boy is 
slee12ing, that the copula serves no logical purpose except that it 
might be regarded as a substitute for parentheses which signal the 
onset of a predicate function. Of course, the copula does perform 
certain grammatical functions in that it indicates tense, person, 
progressive aspect (with -ing), and number, but not necessarily any 
or all of these in any particular case. Thus, the copula often seems 
to have no lexical meaning. But what of a sentence such as God is? 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, such a sentence seems 
to be unfinished. One would expect that it implies something like 
God is good (a simple aF form), God is everywhere, God is Jehova, 
and the like. Nonetheless, such an expression as God is occasionally 
occurs where no specific modification, apparently, is intended; i.e., 
the sentence is regarded as coUJplete. For this reason, in this text 
existence will be assumed to be a logical predicate (for in saying 
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that God is, one is saying God exists), in spite of the fact that many 
logicians refuse to acknowledge existence as a predicate. Their argu-
ment would be that to say of something that it exists is, in fact, to 
say nothing about it; that is, if one agrees that there is some object, 
one has not said anything about that object until he predicates some-
thing of the object. Intuitively, however, most speakers of English 
and many other languages would disagree. The logician has a point, 
though; take, for example, the expressions God is everywhere and God 
lives; some speakers might possibly translate these, respectively, 
as God exists and God is (alive), yet both of these are simple aF forms. 
It is possible, of course, to interpret God is everywhere as God lives 
everywhere; such locative expressions will be discussed later. Those 
logicians who do accept exister;ice as a predicate have developed a 
rather elaborate and abstruse symbolism to express it, which results in 
formulas that are too formidable for the purposes of this paper. The 
solution adopted here, with some misgivings, is to follow the lead of 
English and just label existence verbs (e.g., be, seem, appear, become) 
with!_, or some other function symbol, as long as no further predication 
occurs. Even these verbs are often used otherwise; hence, the problem 
of existence will seldom be encountered in its "pure" form. The sentence 
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God is is formalized as 
God is, 
a F 
(2. 11) 
if no further predication occurs. 
Pattern Two--Predicate Adjective Sentences 
The Standard Form 
Sentences of this pattern are called predicate adjective sentences 
in traditional grannnar. Such sentences are symbolized exactly like 
pattern one sentences for the reasons set out in section one. Hence, 
a sentence with a predicate adjective is of the form 
Max is tall. 
a F (2.12) 
The copula is not considered separately as a category because it per-
forms no logical service; it could be considered as a kind of symbol 
whose purpose is to separate the subject from the predicate, but this 
does not seem to be the intention. The intention seems to be to pro-
vide a word which can carry the necessary grannnatical information--in 
this case, number, person, and tense. Some languages, such as Chiriese, 
merely juxtapose the two elements: Max tall; such a procedure is often 
used by very young children who are just learning to speak English; and 
the so-called Black Dialect of American Negroes also exhibits this 
phenomenon. These facts plus the fact that traditionalists also treat 
the subject and predicate adjective as being in complementation leaves 
the copula stranded semantically--it has no meaning except, perhaps, 
for existence; so, in essence, one may regard pattern two as a very 
slight extension of pattern one. 
Definition, Categorization, ahd Incomplete Predicatioh 
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The reader may wonder why one should establish a predicate adjec-
tive pattern---that is, from a logical point of view. The answer, which 
the rest of this section embodies, is that the copula is often a 
reduced form of a longer sentence from which the true verb has been 
deleted; the copula in such cases can be said to stand for the lost 
verb. Furthermore, many sentences which have traditionally been clas-
sified as predicate adjective forms are not predicate adjective 
sentences at all. But if one is going to depart from tradition, one 
must, nevertheless, depart from familiar territory. For this reason, 
there will be much in this section that takes off from the idea of a 
predicate adjective, but which extends in various logical directions. 
In the process, it will be fotmd that many so-called predicate adjective 
sentences are misconceived from a definitional point of view; and since 
the definition is wrongly applied in many cases, that means that the 
traditional analysis is chaotic. Hence, several sentence types will 
be distinguished and discussed in this section and will be referred 
to innocuously as "pattern two" types, which the traditionalist 
associates with the predicate adjective pattern, and in this manner 
a certain degree of unity may be attained. 
Over forty years ago George Curme, in an eminent, scholarly, 
traditional grammar, pointed out that the copula (and certain other 
copula-like verbs) often are verbs of incomplete predication,3 as in 
The dog is ( = is lying) on the porch. (Of course, this is not a 
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predicate adjective sentence.) So, we see that be can be used exis-
tentially and as a substitute for a deleted verb. Thus, when one 
symbolizes the above (ignoring the prepositional phrase for now) as 
The dog is on the porch, (2. 13) 
a F 
which accords with the schema at the end of section one, one is 
actually symbolizing 
The dog is lying on the porch. (2 .14) 
a F 
One can thus see very easily why many logicians regard the concept of 
existence with suspicion. 
Besides be, other verbs often serve to establish a bridge between 
the subject and its predicate adjective modifier. Compare the 
following: 4 
He became ill. 
He appeared ill. 
He remained ill. 
He grew ill. 
He is (= ranks) high in 
the community. 
This fur is soft. 
The cow was (= ran) dry. 
He is still. 
The offer is still good. 
He fell ill. 
He was taken ill. 
He seemed ill. 
He waxed ill. 
He stands high in the 
conununity. 
This fur feels soft. 
The cow became dry. 
He keeps (= remains) still. 
The offer still holds good. 
(2 .15) 
(2. 16) 
(2.17) 
(2.18) 
(2 .19) 
(2.20) 
(2. 21) 
(2.22) 
(2.23) 
These types are hard to analyze logically. The linking verbs, in many 
cases, aside from indicating the grarmnatical properties of tense, 
number, and person, seem to carry meanings of their own like be in 
its existential aspect. This assumption, however, may be illusory. 
For example, in He appeared ill, the sentence may 9e interpreted as 
meaning: someone looked at him, and his looks (features) had all the 
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properties one usually associates with illness; i.e. , .His looks were 
bad or He looked ill (to someone), both aF forms. Similar reasoning 
can be applied to the other cases above, and this technique will be 
used in later examples. Thus, the aF form is assigned to these types, 
just as it was to the standard form in (2.12), Max is tall. 
Adjectival Modification of Direct Objects 
Traditional grammarians sometimes, mistakenly, also classify a 
direct object modifier as a predicate adjective, as in It made him 
angry.5 (Other make-sentences will be handled differently than this 
one; see Chapter III.) The proposition in the above sentence is 
equivalent to It angered him. The word make seems to be functioning as 
a quasi-auxiliary (of which more will be said later); aside from 
carrying the grammatical burden of indicating tense (and number and 
person in the present tense), it appears to indicate the semantic idea 
of causation. The main verb, though, is clearly to anger. It made 
him angry is a transformational extension of It angered him. This 
example affords an opportunity to introduce the symbols for terms and 
relations, for this sentence has two arguments, it and him. (.!,!and 
him are, of course, themselves variables in English standing for nouns 
just like the logical symbols used here; but one can easily substitute 
meaningful words for these variables, so no confusion arises.) Angered 
is a relation (as opposed to a function) because it not only specifies 
the source of the anger, but it also specifies a quality of the direct 
object him, which is easily seen when the sentence is transformed to 
It made him angry. This sentence, then, is not a predicate adjective 
pntll'nl; l.t Is H different type of the form indicated below: 
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angered 
2R 
(2. 24) 
The subscripted ! indicates a two-place predicate relation; the two 
t's indicate the terms upon which the relation operates. 
Grannnarians often ignore the logic of a sentence in favor of 
comparing, as it were, words to words. The reader, perhaps, has not 
been offended too much by the analysis above because, fortunately, the 
verb to anger exists in the language. It is when one cannot find such 
a fortuitous circumstance that one is tempted toward the linear, word-
by-word approach. For example, essentially the same sentence from 
another book may be noted. 6 Here, the author, David Conlin, substitutes 
for the variables, respectively, the news and me; and made happy 
replaces made angry. Note that the only significant change is a 
semantic one concerning opposites--anger versus happiness. According 
to the author, "the adjective happy is a complement not of the subject, 
. . . ' but of the object me. 117 
. -
Yet, the proposition must, in an 
abstract sense, be of the same form as that for It angered him. Just 
because no one has seen fit to derive a verb from happy does not mean 
that the essential concepts do not follow the same reasoning and 
ordering. This is not an argument in favor of an underlying order of 
thoughts; it is an argument for simplification (economy) in analysis. 
In all of science, it is a rule of thumb that, generally speaking, 
that theory which can explain the most facts of a case with the least 
amount of supposition and methodological paraphernalia is the best 
theory. Conlin's explanation above (and Curme's which is essentially 
the same), it is here maintained, is too circuitous; it lacks explana-
tory power. The explanation here proposed, it is believed, is simpler 
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and accords with the concepts contained in the proposition. Thus, !! 
made him angry and The news made me happy, as shown above, are both of 
the form ti 2R t2• 
The reader has noticed earlier how there was a certain amount of 
overlapping between sentence pattern one and sentence pattern two. Now, 
it can be seen that sentence pattern two, likewise, overlaps into a 
pattern that remains to be discussed--namely, the subject-verb-direct 
object pattern. It is contended that if this sort of thing continues 
(and it will) as the remainder of the patterns are taken up, then the 
evidence will be highly suggestive of a cohesive, well-knit system 
which one is, of necessity, forced to study pieceme~l, pattern by 
pattern. 
Predicative and Attributive Adjectives 
It has been shown in various examples how adjectives may be 
expressed attributively and predicatively. In trying to contrast these 
two modes of expression, Hemphill notes that they may be distinguished 
by Fa for attribution and aF for predication, respectively, as follows: 8 
Lear's marriageable daughters (2.25) 
F a 
and 
Lear's daughters are marriageable. (2.26) 
a F 
But he then notes that an argument may be flanked on both sides by 
attributive expression: 
the marriageable daughters of Lear. ( 2. 2 7) 
F1 a F2 
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This is a serious blunder, for Hemphill has failed to note that there 
are two operations implied: The daughters are LeA~ operates on the 
proposition The daughters are marriageable, both in themselves aF 
predicates. Thus, a more correct formulation would be the complex 
predicate 
Lear's daughters 
( Fl a ) 
~
are marriageable, 
G 
(2.28) 
b 
where the whole proposition, Lear's daughters, behaves as if it were 
an argument operated upon by the function G. 
Comparison 
Adjectives also serve to indicate degrees of comparisons. It 
has been noted that a sentence like Bryan is young is of the form aF. 
What of a sentence such as Bryan is younger? This is not a predicate 
adjective sentence, as it superficially seems to be, nor is another 
clause implied, as traditional theory would claim. Since this sen-
tence looks in form like a predicate adjective sentence, this section 
is a more or less appropriate place in which to discuss it. The first 
thing to note is that the propositional structures of the young and 
younger sentences are not the same. This can easily be seen when one 
recognizes that the latter sentence makes no sense (is not a sentence) 
unless one knows who is older than Bryan. Actually, the same objection 
could be said of Bryan is young, for it might have been said of Bryan 
(age sixty-five) by his ninety-year-old uncle. (This observation is 
due to Professor R. T. Radford.) In conversation where the speakers 
Hre aware of the total topic of discussion, it is, of course, 
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permissible to delete obvious information. If the information is 
supplied, the elliptical nature of the sentence disappears: 
Bryan is younger than Mark. (2.29) 
tl 2R t2 
Thus, the sentence above is actually a two-place predicate relation. 
(Without knowledge of Mark, a zero symbol, ~' would replace Mark in 
this notation.) Such an analysis is superior to those usually given 
in traditional grammar (and elsewhere) because it implies a greater 
degree of equality between the words represented by the terms. That 
is, both Biyan and Mark may be considered as subjects or objects. 
The relation says something about both of them: that Bryan is not as 
old as Mark, and, by implication, that Mark is older than Bryan. 9 
The usual analysis is that the sentence is made up of two clauses where 
the second one is reduced: Bryan is younger than Mar~ (is young), which 
makes very little sense to this writer because he believes that few, 
if any, native speakers of English would accept this string of words 
as a sentence. In addition, such an analysis seem~ to attach a somewhat 
secondary importance to Mark. Mark is (or could be, at least in certain 
contexts) just as much a primary topic of discussion as Bryan, con-
sidering the fact that little or no sense exists unless the comparison 
between the two is made. A major fault of traditional grannnar is that 
it views all sentences as being cast into the subject-predicate mold. 
Consequently, the following sentences are all logically equivalent: 
Bryan is younger than Mark, (2. 30) 
t1 2R t2 
Br~an is not as old as (is not older than) Mark, (2. 31) 
-( t1 2S tz) 
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and this implies the reverse 
Mark is older than Bryan. (2. 32) 
t2 2s t2 
In (2.31), a dash is used to symbolize' logical rtegation of the entire 
proposition. Expressed in English, this would translate as It is not 
the case that Bryan is as old as Mark. In comparing (2. 31) and (2. 32), 
it can be seen that the reason they are logically equivalent is due to 
the manipulation of the dash and~; thus, in English the comparative 
sign -er functions as a logical sign (just as does not) in addition 
to its grammatical function indicating equivalence semantically with 
more. 
Class Membership and Class Inclusion 
Two final examples are of some interest. Traditional grammar 
would classify the following two sentences as predicate adjective 
patterns: 
Socrates is mortal. (2.33) 
All men are mortal. (2.34) 
These two sentences, however, are not the same. In (2.33), mortal is 
not being used (at least primarily) to specify a property or attribute 
of Socrates. It refers, rather, to a class of things which themselves 
have a connnon property, namely that of dying; and this sentence there-
fore refers to a member of this class. Thus, the proposition is: 
there is a man called Socrates and he is a member of the class of 
entities which must die. This relationship can be symbolized: sC M. 
The episilon is the logical sign of class membership. The small s 
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represents a certain member, and the capital M represents a class. In 
(2 .. 34), the situation is different because of the logical word all 
whose scope in the sentence covers just men. That is, All men refers 
to the class of men (all its members). Therefore, in this case what 
is being posited is that one class is contained in another class, 
which can be symbolized as XCY, where ! and ¥_ refer to All men and 
mortal, respectively, and the 'horseshoe" refers to proper class 
inclusion, often read as "X is a proper subset of Y." If it were the 
case that men were the only mortal things, then the horseshoe would 
be underlined to indicate absolute inclusion and would be read as "X 
is a subset of Y"; this reading refers to a kind of equality in the 
trivial sense that a set is always a subset of itself. Adding the 
proper logical symbolism, these two sentences are represented thus: 
Socrates is mortal 
s e M (2. 35) 
All men are mortal (2. 36) 
x c y 
Note that it is a peculiarity of English that (2. 36j' could also be 
worded Men are mortal or Man is mortal (where all is implied). 
It is a remarkable fact that these important distinctions have 
been known and discussed in logic and mathematics since the time of 
the publication of Frege's Begriffsschrift in 1879, but they have made 
little impact on grannnatical theory. In fact, the examples noted 
above appear in almost all logic textbooks. So far, four usages have 
been noted for the copula: (1) existence function, (2) predicate 
adjective function, (3) class membership relation, and (4) class 
inclusion relation. There is still another relation indicated 
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by the copula, and that is identity (or equality), which is taken up 
in the next section. 
Pattern Three--Predicate Nominative Sentences 
Equality 
In traditional granunar this sentence pattern is called subjective 
complement in the subcategory of predicate nominative form. In this 
kind of sentence, the copula logically relates an identity (equality) 
existing between things on either side of the copula; i.e.' the copula 
indicates that the words which flank the copula are in some sense 
equal--have the same referent. In mathematics the equality sign is 
used to indicate this relation as in the equation 2+2=4. The equality 
sign will be borrowed here to indicate formally the structure of 
predicate noun sentences. This is easily done as is seen in the 
following example: 
Mark Twain was Samuel Clemens. (2. 37) 
tl = t1 
Actually, as in mathematics, since two different words are used to 
indicate the referent, two different logical terms should also be 
employed. This degree of sophistication is unnecessary when the 
sentence occurs labeled logically as above; if only logical formulae 
were being cited for sentences, then the added sophistication would be 
mandatory. In later examples when two or more formulas occur in a 
larger construction with terms in co-reference, separate terms will 
sometimes be used to display the logical structures of the separate 
formulas. In the above formula, the equal sign is redundant, for 
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equality is shown by the identical subscripted numerals on the terms. 
It will prove useful; however, to retain this redundancy. Alternatively, 
one could have written the above formula with just the equal sign, 
deleting the subscripted nt.nnerals. The reason for using both the equal 
sign and identical subscripted numerals can be seen in the following 
pair: 
He himself was Samuel Clemens. (2. 38) 
ti ti = ti 
He sent a letter to himself. (2. 39) 
ti 2R t2 ti 
In (2.38), the equality relation is a predication of identity among 
the terms.. In (2. 39), there is no equality relation involving _.!! 
letter. 
Other copula-like verbs may be formalized in the same way as (2.37): 
He became (=remained) Mark Twain (to his readers). (2.40) 
t1 = ti 
Pattern Ambiguities 
Occasionally, sentences that are predicate nominative in gram-
matical form are actually predicate adjective propositions. For 
example, in He was fool enough to believe her, fool seems to be a 
noun. Wha:t is logically meant, however, is 
He was foolish. . . ' (2.41) 
a F 
if one ignores the remainder of the sentence. 
As seen in (2.37) and (2.40), the predicate nominative sentence 
pattern is easy to deal with. But (2.41) shows that what is, in fact, 
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a predicate nominative sentence pattern is not always easy to recognize. 
Indeed, most of the examples of the predicate nom~.native pattern cited 
in the standard handbooks on grammar are not predicate nominative 
relations at all. The definition usually given agrees with that offered 
at the beginning of this section, but there is confusion in application 
of just what ~onstitutes equality. For example, in a book described as 
' 
an "enlightened traditional gra.nimar," the authors cite He turned 
plumber as a case where a verb not usually considered to be copulative 
has, in fact, become so. They also cite He has gone Democrat/Socialist 
as another case.10 While their discussion of the semantic peculiarities 
of the verbs in these sentences is reasonable and enlightening, the 
fact remains that the relation of identity or equality between subject 
and complement is simply not maintained. Both sentences are cases of 
the relation of class membership. If one juxtaposes Mark Twain was 
Samuel Clemens with Sam was a plumber, and reflects carefully, the 
distinction should be clear. The terms in a logical formulation of 
the first sentence would be identical, while the terms designating Sam 
and plumber in the second sentence would be different. 
The situation is not improved in a book devoted to a structural 
linguistic approach (with transformational insights added at times); 
the author, in one example, cites The Indians were the winners.11 This 
is clearly a case of class inclusion, for what it implies is that all 
Indians involved in a certain contest (e.g., a battle or a football 
game), as a result of their victory, entered the ranks of the winners. 
But winners is a larger class which includes all those people who 
ever win anything (not necessarily battles or football games). Even 
if winners only implies a single, specific contest, it is difficult 
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to see how the properties that comprise being Indians is equal to 
those properties that belong to winners. If one insists that Indians 
and winners designate the same referent, this still leaves open the 
question of the relations~ip between the subject and the complement. 
In other words, Indians does not equal winners in the same sense tnat 
Twain equals Clemens. In the latter case, there is only a change of 
name for exactly the same thing. 
The same mistaken ideas occur even in recent grammars purporting 
to teach the "New English." As an instance, in one transformational 
textbook that introduces Charles Fillmore's case-grammar approach, 
the first example of a predicate nominative pattern that is given is 
Ruby is a soprano.12 Here again is a case of class membership relation-
ship; i.e., Ruby is one of those people who sing Soprano. A more 
interesting example cited by the same source, however, is Alcohol was 
Harry's downfall. 13 Equality does not seem to be meant here at all in 
any sense; again.the grannnarian is paying too much attention to the 
grammatical form and not enough attention to the propositional content. 
What the sentence seems to mean is that Alcohol caused Harry's downfall; 
thus, this sentence, logically speaking, would fall into the category 
the grammarians call subject-verb-object formulation, which will be 
taken up in the next section. Its symbolization is quite straight-
forward; ignoring the problem of modification, it is 
Alcohol was (=caused) Harry's downfall. (2. 42) 
ti zR t2 
It has been noted earlier that the copula can often stand for a deleted 
predicate. The passive form, Harry's downfall was (caused) by alcohol, 
would also seem to support this analysis. The passive form of the 
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sentence may be symbolized as 
Harry's downfall was caused by alcohol, 
t2 ~R t1 
(2. 4 3) 
where the starred R indicates that the passive transformation has been 
performaed. (The asterisk is used to label deviant forms in the 
object language; in the logical language--i.e., the logical symbolism--
it denotes passivity.) 
Just as some so-called predicate nominative sentence pattern forms 
are actually direct object forms, so, conversely, some seemingly direct 
object forms are rather similar, but not identical, to predicate 
nominative forms. Indeed, using these granrrnatical terms causes some 
problems as far as the description of the propositional content is 
concerned. In a sentence such as He hit himself, the objective case 
of the masculine reflexive pronoun seems to reveal the native 
speaker's intuition that subject and object may both designate the 
same referent--i.e., the subject may act on itself. But this line of 
reasoning is shaky because the nonstandard form *He hit hisself uti-
lizes a reflexive pronoun to indicate possession (which is semantically 
possible) and, apparently, also object. Logically, forgetting 
momentarily about such concepts as "subject" and "object," the sentence 
can be said to predicate a relationship between he and himself, namely 
that of hitting, which is of the form 
He hit himself. (2.44) 
---
t1 2R ti 
Thus, logically, what is indicated in the symbolism is a two-place 
relation Lnvolvlng identical terms. No equality or identity (=) is 
.. . 
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indicated in the predication, but only in the terms (which proves 
~ ; 
the earlier contention that such "redundancy" can be useful). The use 
of identical terms reveals that this is not a subject-verb-object 
sentence. All talk of "subject" and "object" and the like seems 
merely to cloud the issue: (Note that grannnarians accept as standard 
possessive forms such as I hit myself, yet not *He hit hisself; they 
accept He hit himself, but not *I hit meself.) The logical formulation 
above seems to reveal more adequately the major syntactic and semantic 
ideas than does a strictly granimatical analysis which tries to explain 
these pronoun us ages in terms of "case." 
The above examples and explanations seem to support Frege's and 
Wittgenstein's contentions that a word's meaning, in the final analysis, 
is indicated by the way it is ~sed in a sentence logically. Grammarians 
try to explain the variant pronoun usages above by recourse to seman-
tics and grannnatical case; obviously, it often simply does not work. 
A good case is the instance where the form I'm him is gradually 
replacing I'm he. Although both of the sentences mean exactly the same 
thing--i. e. , a predicate nominative equali ty--some grannnarians are 
beginning to accept the formerly nonstandard hd.m form on the semantic 
basis that speakers think of the pronoun as an objective referent. 
This is strange reasoning since the same grammarians still do not 
accept the possibility of the speaker meaning possession in *He hit 
hisself. Again, it is the propositional content as a whole which must 
be considered, for it comes closer to explicating the true syntactic 
nature of the sentence than does an analysis which begins with attention 
first to the outer form. It is rather a case of a native speaker 
saying: "I know what I mean, and so do you, even though I know that 
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the form of my utterance makes very little, if any, sense." Patterns 
change; it does little good to analyze a sentence or word sometimes 
only in terms of its changed form, if the meaning has not changed 
appreciably. One form has simply replaced another form. If one chooses 
to use It's me instead of It's I, it is not a case of grammatical 
change; it is a matter of usage only. It could be, of course, that 
speakers are coming to interpret the focus or stress somewhat differently 
(conceptually) in these cases, but there is no convincing evidence that 
this is so. Even if it were true, it is still more a matter of rhetori-
cal style than it is either of grammatical or logical change; after all, 
what essential difference is there in the semantics of, e.g., He hit 
himself and *He hit hisself? 
A case similar to those above is the sentence That is mine, which 
grannnarians also classify as a predicate nominative form.14 But this 
sentence clearly does not say that the referent is equal to the relatum; 
it says, rather, that whatever the referent is, it belongs to me; 
hence, this sentence deals with the relation of belonging (possession): 
That is mine. (2.45) 
t1 2R t2 
If constants are substituted for the variables, this becomes obvious: 
That book belongs to me. (2.46) 
t1 2R tz 
or 
I own that book. (2. 4 7) 
ti zR tz 
What results, then, in grammatical terms, is a subject-verb-object 
.. 
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sentence pattern. The copula is substituting for a verb indicating a 
relation of possession between a term of ownership and a term of that 
which is owned. If this analysis seems unconvincing, the only other 
logical possibility is 
That is mine, (2.48) 
a F 
which corresponds to the child-language expression, That mine (or That 
book mine or simply Book mine). Now, the copula has reverted. to its 
usual tasks of indicating only tense, person, and number. In any event, 
whichever logical analysis one prefers, it is superior to the predicate 
noun analysis or the predicate adjective analysis (if one believes that 
possession only is being stressed); for the predication in both logical 
formulations indicate the thing possessed and the idea of ownership. 
The predicate noun sentence Boys will be boys poses an interesting, 
though trivial, problem. Ignoring tense, this sentence can be viewed in 
two ways. It is, of course, a case of class inclusion--the trivial case 
where any set is a subset of itself (all boys is the implication in both 
the subject and the predicate). But it is also a case of equality, for, 
obviously, all boys=all boys. Hence, the choice of symbol should be 
dictated by exactly what is being stressed. This sentence shows the 
probable reason for grannnarians having included these two different 
sentence types in one category, for they overlap when the logical 
word indicating universal quantification occurs. 
A more interesting case similar to the above can be illustrated 
by the following pair: 
Wardens arc gunrdfunH (2. l~9) 
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and. 
Policemen are guardians. (2.50) 
In both instances, of course, one observes cases of class membership. 
However, what interpretations should be assigned to the following pair? 
Wardens are policemen (2. 51) 
and 
Policemen are wardens. (2.52) 
The problem is purely semantic, perhaps, but one ~anders. In some 
sense, wardens ~policemen, and so this would be a case of a class 
relation of membership, but are policemen wardens? Certainly, they are 
guardians of the law (hence, society), but they are not guardians of 
a prison. This is a good example of what the logician means when he 
says a sentence's interpretation depends upon its truth conditions--
1.e., a situation in the world or possible world (e.g., mythological) 
which would establish its truth or falsity. This is not a trivial idea 
if one, as does the present writer, believes that (1) truth conditions 
establish the possibility of logical structure, (2) logical structure 
precedes and to a great extent establishes the foundation of possible 
syntactic structures, and (3) syntactic choices are largely a matter 
of social conditioning. For example, in English one can say Policemen 
are gua7dians (=class membership), but one cannot say Policemen are 
wardens, even though wardens are guardians (unless one is considering 
wardens of a prison to be policemen; even then, however, the statement 
is false because not all policemen are wardens; some walk beats. Hence, 
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since.wardens is a subset of guardians, they are unequal and therefore 
not a true predicate nominative in Wardens are guardians; and since 
(all) Guardians are wardens is obviously false, this sentence is hot 
only not a predicate nominative, but absurd; for these reasons, one 
must conclude that Policemen are wardens is not a sentence at all and, 
thu.s, is not amenable to analysis! The problem exists because the 
universal quantifier, ~' is implied with both nouns. The point of all 
this is that if the grammarian insists Policemen are wardens falls into 
a certain sentence pattern (predicate nominative), then what means did 
he use to establish this conclusion? Form alone seems to be the answer, 
for it is not true to say that All policemen are all wardens, nor is 
the converse true either! If neither of the referents refer to each 
other, then how could such a sentence be a predicate nominative 
according to the traditional defini·tion? How could it be a sentence 
at all, since no rational thought is conveyed by it? If form alone 
establishes a sentence pattern, then the view that meaningful utterances 
are simply forced into common, existing patterns seems justifiable.· A 
compromise seems advisable: logical form helps to establish syntactic 
form, but it is also probably true that visible cause-effect relation-
ships in the world help to establish syntactic and logical structures 
(e.g., subject-object, argument-function); "nonsense sentences" or 
careless locutions are just "adjusted" to fit into one or more of the 
commonly used patterns, which were themselves developed according to 
the more normal procedures that are being outlined in this work. As 
an example, one may co~sider the so-called "idiom," They danced rings 
around us. It is probably true that the object rings derives from the 
form, physically, of the activity of dancing itself, as in They danced 
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in rings around us, where in rings would traditionally be interpreted 
as a locative adverb clos~ly modifying (describing) something about 
the dancing itself; the phrase could, of course, be a manner adverbial 
according to traditional theory. But the form of the first version, 
traditionally, is simply subj:ect-verb-object~locative adverb. Logically 
speaking, the true verb idea is danced rings or danced rings around, 
for the activity (hence its meaning). is dancing and ringing and 
rounding, all simultaneously, of course. Thus, logically, the sentence 
is a traditional subject-verb-object (or adverb, depending on how one 
interprets us): They+danced rings around+us or They+danced rings+ 
around us. 
Paraphrase and Metaphor 
In sentence analysis, it is often difficult to see how one is to 
avoid paraphrasing. It is a temptation to restrict one Is analysis 
to form almost entirely in order to maintain an empirical basis, 
classifying careless locutions and idioms as just "deviant," but this 
will not do; for, as has been seen numerous times, so-called standard 
sentences often pose just as many problems as do deviant ones. Some-
where midway between standard and deviant lies the "metaphor" sentence, 
which is quite coI!llllon in everyday speech and which is exploited to the 
nth degree in literary forms. A sentence may be entirely metaphoric, 
as in the title to the recent book by the movie actor, David Niven: 
The Moon's a Balloon (N.Y.: Dell Publishing Col, 1974). Not only does 
the title not make sense (in the usual meaning of "sense"), but nothing 
in the book supports a rational interpretation of the title. Yet, 
there is a (humorous) sense of sorts which defies logical explanation. 
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If one wishes to analyze such a sentence grannnatically, form seems to 
be the only "reasonable" recourse; though calling. such a sentence a 
predicate nominative pattern, or equality, certainly seems to be 
stretching things. Forttillately, most metaphoric sentences are only 
partly metaphoric, as in Ambrose was an ass, where Ambrose refers to 
_, 
a human male. This sentence, like the former one, is usually classified 
as a predicate nominative pattern. However, the meaning, paraphrased, 
seems to be Ambrose was a fool. If this is the case, then the same 
analysis (predicate nominative = class membership) applies. But con-
sider the meaning in its social context. One could say that since an 
ass often seems foolish to humans (in a particular ass-like way), 
people have just taken to substituting the word ass for fool. Yet, 
it was noted earlier in this paper that fool seems to carry the force 
of the adjective foolish. That is, paraphrasing, one could say 
equivalently that_Ambrose was a foolish person. Since, in this sentence, 
Ambrose is clearly a member of a class of persons (fools), and since 
this information is not important to the meaning of the sentence; a 
more reasonable interpretation would appear to be that 
Ambrose was foolish, (2.53) 
a F 
a traditional predicate adjective pattern, where the force of, all that 
is meant in the predication is foolish. The assumptions seems to be 
that there is a person of whom it may be said that he displays the 
properties of foolishness (foolish in the way an ass is). Thus, Ambrose 
was an ass is of the form of class membership logically, but of the 
predicate adjective form semantically. If ~ (or fool) are merely 
reduced forms of asslike (or foolish), then it may be that Ambrose was 
. 53 
an ass (or Ambros.e was a fool) are derived by transformations which con-
vert nouns to adjectives or adverbs (cf. The chimpanzee was manlike 
in his actions and The man trotted doglike down the street). If one 
wishes to argue the case more "logically," then transformational feature 
analysis may be used to explain the metaphor; one can say that ~ is 
"marked" semantically and grannnatically--e. g., [+ metaphor, + foolish 
+ adjective, +human, - noun] and so on. Such an analysis does not 
seem advisable in terms of the theory operating in this work, namely 
· that no such forms as nouns or adjectives exist in the so-called deep 
structure; if there is a deep structure, only ideas exist there, 
suggested by surface experience; those forms which one identifies as 
noun; adjective, etc. are surface methods of distinguishing meaning 
usage overtly; it seem absurd, e.g., to insist that -ish (suffixed on 
fool) exists in deep structure. If [+ noun] had been inserted above, 
the sentence would have been written as Ambrose was an ass in which the 
proposition indicates that· there was a thing called Ambrose, and that 
thing was a person, and that person was a fool or foolish; as the reader 
can see, when one tries to state the proposition, either the noun fool 
or the adjective foolish comes to mind; this in itself would seem to be 
evidence against the theory of underlying nouns and adjectives as 
distinct parts of speech, in any formal sense, that is. 
Pattern Four--Direct Object Sentences 
Form Versus Meaning 
This type of sentence is usually called the subject-verb-direct 
object (S-V-0) form, though, as will be seen, this category comprises 
several rather different types of sentence patterns when considered 
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from the logical point of view. The name "object" derives from the 
fact that the verb is said to act upon something, and this something 
thus receives (is the object of) the action of the verb. This type of 
analysis leaves a lot to be desired logically, for not all verbs express 
action, nor when they do is it necessarily the action of the subject. 
Such a sentence is Mary hears Jack; ~ is the passive recipient of 
Jack's acting (talking). The confusion arises from the granunarians 1 
insistence on classifying the so-called object as part of the predicate, 
but not realizing that something is also being predicated of the so-
called subject. A sentence which would accord with the grammarians' 
intuitions and definition is 
People 
tl 
(2.54) 
Grammarians are correct in classifying such a sentence as being of the 
same form as Mary hears Jack, for they are both two-place relations, 
but the grammarians' conceptions of subject and object reveal inadequate 
explanatory power in their theory of grannnar. And since structural and 
transformational grammarians also speak (often) of subjects and objects, 
their theories are similarly lacking in explanatory power. 
Subject-predicate thinking, in the traditional Arist"otelian sense, 
tends to make a grammarian see a sentence, more or less, in the way 
in which it is written--i.e., from left to right, linearly, (in all 
modern European languages). Thus, the purely abstract character of 
logical propositions becomes confused with syntactic patterning. Hence, 
one ordinarily looks for a direct object after the verb in an affirma-
tive sentence; consequently, that which occurs before the verb has to 
be the subject (plus possible modification). The fallaciousness of 
this kind of thinking is illustrated in the following sentence: 
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The rest of my suggestions you have heard in class. (2.55) 
tl tz 3R t3 
The above sentence is one which the writer 
Composition student's theme, when thoughts 
recently'. wrote on a Freshman 
~ 
of the present work were the 
farthest things from the writer's mind. In traditional definitional 
terms, surely ti is the object and tz is the subject, and both occur 
before the verb. Yet, due to the left-to-right thinking imposed by 
subject-predicate analysis, many would conclude that t 1 is the subject. 
From the standpoint of psychological focus, perhaps it is, since it 
stands first in the sentence and could be construed as the major topic, 
but definitionally it is not. Furthermore, tz is not logically the 
subject! For this is a kind of "passive" in that the object you occurs 
first in the second half of the sentence, and the covert subject (from 
me) would occur last in the sentence if it were present. (Grammatically 
speaking, of course, have heard is in the present perfect tense.) 
These facts can be proven by recourse to the (transformed) active voice 
form: I have told the rest of these suggestions to you in class. Thus, 
t 1 is the direct object and t 2 is the indirect object. Just as in the 
case of the "understood" you in imperative sentences, the subject here 
is clearly inferred from the context. Strangely enough, the traditional 
grammarian recognizes the fact that in passive sentences with direct 
and indirect objects, if a suitable context exists, either the indirect 
object or the subject may be deleted without altering the definition of 
the same pattern--e.g., The books were given to Jane (by Tom) and The 
books were given by Tom (to Jane). Yet, the traditionalist will not 
accept the idea that a "passive" in fonn (here a present perfect tense, 
the confusion with which will be dealt with later) may take have, not be. 
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Reciprocation and Reflexivization 
Another example of the confusion in gratmnatical theory, not rtecessarily 
confined to the traditional school, concerns the analysis of reciprocal 
sentences. True predicate nominative sentences (equality relation) 
such as Twain was Clemens (cited earlier) are traditionally called 
subjective complement forms because the noun in the predicate completes 
the subject and is not acted upon by the verb. That is, the subject 
and the predicate nouns have the same semantic referent. Therefore, 
according to this definition, the sentence, He hit himself, would also 
be a predicate nominative, but, as everyone knows, grammarians classify 
the noun in the predicate in such a sentence as an object because of 
its case form, and because the object is acted upon by the subject--
which in this case are identical. However, logically speaking, Clemens 
can ·no more be said to "complete" the subject than himself does in 
their respective sentences. The analyses of the two sentences are 
repeated here for convenience: 
Twain was Clemens. 
ti = ti 
He hit himself, 
ti 2R ti 
(2. 56) 
(2. 5 7) 
These two formulations seem to express, basically, the traditional ideas 
without encountering the definitional dilennnas of "completer of the 
subject" and "object of the verb, but still co-referential with the 
subject." The problem one incurs when talking about subjects and 
objects can be brought into sharp relief by simply pluralizing the term 
variables in the second sentence above: 
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They hit themselves. (2. 58) 
The above sentence is ambiguous, for it may mean that· each member of 
the group hit himself, in which case it would be symbolized as: 
themselves. 
ti 
(2. 59) 
In (2.59), the subjects~ the objects in traditional theory! On the 
other hand, the sentence might mean that the members of the group(~) hit 
each other. In this case, the symbolism would be different, as indicated 
below: 
themselves. 
t2 
(2.60) 
In (2.60), the subjects are at one time true subjects for they are 
hitting, and at another time true objects for they are being hit. The 
symbolism is, therefore, .still not wholly adequate, but this will be 
remedied soon, after other important considerations are disposed of. 
Problems With Prepositions 
For some grammarians, the problem would be compounded if prepo-
sitions were introduced. For example, the sentence, They fought 
themselves, is of the same logical form as They hit themselves. If 
the former is altered to read 
They fought with each other, (2. 61) 
ti 2R t2 
some grammarians would accept the analysis offered here, but others 
would insist that with belongs with each other. This latter analysis 
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is not accepted here for the author agrees in this instance with 
traditional theory. Yet, if the fighting had been done with, say, 
knives, the above sentence might be considered to be equivalent to 
They stabbed each other. The point being made here is that there is 
no necessarily compelling reason why so-called prepositions could not 
be postpositions (with the verb) in some instances; and which option 
to take in particular instances is not a straightforward procedure; 
it depends on meaning, which is often quite slippery. It is interesting 
to note that traditional terminology, which speaks of "objects of 
prepositions," is quite suggestive sometimes on this point, but for 
some strange reason many t:ir.aditionalists are loath to carry through the 
idea of "objectivalhood" in all its ramifications to a logical conclu-
sion. For instance, they would classify a simple S-V-0 sentence 
pat tern such as 
as 
Mother is fond of flowers 
ti 2R t2 
Mother is 
subject cop. 
fond 
adj. 
of flowers. 
prep. phrase 
(2.62) 
(2. 63) 
The phrase is fond of is equivalent to likes or a similar verb. Moreover, 
to classify of with flowers as a prepositional phrase and say no more 
about it is to say almost nothing of importance about its syntactic 
role in the sentence. 
This classification of "prepositions" with the nouns that follow 
them in sentences causes many problems unnecessarily when reciprocal 
Hentences are being considered. The following sentences illustrate 
this fact: 
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I am acquainted with Mary I I know Mary, 
I ran into Jane I I met Jane, 
I am interested in linguistics I Linguistics ~nterest me. 
(2.64) 
(2.65) 
(2. 66) 
' i 
The last pair, (2. 66), is interesting because it is susceptible to two 
varying traditional interpretations: (1) interested is a past parti-
ciple functioning as a predicate adjective followed by a prepositional 
phrase, and (2) am interested is a passive fortn of the verb. The latter 
analysis is suggested by the existence of the second example of the 
pair, which is a straightforward statement, but note that it fails to 
take into consideration that the passive transformation has not pro-
duced the characteristic E.Y in the prepositional phrase. The former 
analysis is suggested because E.Y does not occur, and, apparently, the 
feeling is that.!_ is the subject, not linguistics. If one just con-
siders this as a two-place relation, however, the analysis is quite 
simple: 
Linguistics interests me. (2.67) 
t1 2R t2 
If one· chooses to use the more complicated form of the sentence, it 
merely indicates the rhetorical stress that is desired--i. e., .!_, and 
not someone else, am interested in linguistics; the simpler form 
stresses that linguistics, and not something else, interest me; and 
it can be seen that the problem of "voice" disappears; the logical 
structure remains essentially the same in both active and passive 
voices. Lastly, it is difficult on logical grounds to see how 
interests (semantically) co4ld tak~ an object in such a sentence. 
One could better see interest acting on an object in a sentence such 
as He interested me in (the field of) linguistics, but this is a case 
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of embedding one sentence in another, for the meaning clearly is: He 
caused me to become interested in linguistics. 
The following sentence, which embodies nearly every problem 
encountered so far in this section, was presented by the writer to 
several of his teaching colleagues. All agreed beforehand that it was 
a proper English sentence. These colleagues, all college teachers of 
English of a traditional persuasion, were then asked to analyze it. 
All except one came up with different analyses; the one exception said 
that she could not analyze it with any degree of confidence that her 
analysis would be the correct one. The writer feels that the last 
answer is the most honest one, for it is contended here that this 
sentence is an excellent example of one which crosses over sentence 
patterns--to the point that one wonders if talk of "patterns" is not 
idle except in the most simple of cases. The sentence is: 
The ministers were agreed on a price of fifteen million 
dollars for the Louisiana Purchase. 
The intended basic meaning is in the context of the post-American 
(2.68) 
Revolutionary period: American ministers agreed to pay France the 
money. Omitting the last two prepositional phrases for reasons of 
simplification, the following paraphrases may serve to exhibit the 
possibilities suggested by the writer's colleagues: 
The ministers agreed on a price. 
The ministers were agreed on a price. 
The ministers agreed to a price. 
A price was agreed to by the ministers. 
The ministers were in agreement on a price. 
A price was agreed (up)on by the ministers. 
(2.69) 
(2. 70) 
(2. 71) 
(2. 72) 
(2. 73) 
(2.74) 
To snlve thlR dJlemma, the following considerations were suggested: 
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(2. 70) is not a .passive sentence because ~ (the ministers); does not 
occur. (2.69) and (2.71) are simple statements in which a variety of 
prepositions--..Q!!., upon, to, with--function as verb particles; further-
' 
more, they are reciprocal, for the meaning is clearly The ministerJ 
agreed with each other on a price. (2. 72) is a passive sentence. 
(2.74) is also a passive sentence with substitution of different verb 
particles. (2. 73) is "a kind of predicate adjective sentence" where 
the prepositional phrase in agreement is the adjectival. One possi-
bility missed by all the analysts was the paraphras~ 
The ministers agreed to pal a price . . . . (2. 75) 
ti 2 t2 
2R 
In (2.75), the infinitive complement (to pal), as it is called in 
traditional grammar, is indeed a completer of the verb, but it is first 
of all a part of the embedded sentence, The minisyers pal, with identical 
noun phrase (subject) deletion being performed transformationally later. 
What is left is a compound verb. Such a structure can be viewed as a 
verb with (literally) adverbial modification in the larger sentence, 
as is sometimes done in traditional analyses, but, as will be seen 
later, this kind of analysis is faulty because true adverbials (of 
manner) raise a verb to a "higher power," while infinitive complements 
merely add to the verbal (hence, the superscripted numeral on the left 
of the relation). (The same thing is true of compound nouns. In the 
phrase grammatical book, for instance, the adjective modifies the 
' noun; but in the phrase grammar book a certain class of book is being 
designated.) This compound verb solution seems to be a simple way of 
handling these matters, but a more precise interpretation is possible. 
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A still simpler analysis of this sentence is possible, if one 
ignores the existence of embedding: 
The ministers agreed to pay a price of 15 million dollars. (2.76) 
tl 4R t2 t3 t4 
Here, the infinitive complement is functioning as a noun (cf. the gerund 
on paying). This is a tetradic relation where the symbols are inter-
preted as: t 1 = the agreers, 4R = agreed, t 2 = the act of agreement, 
and t 4 = the object involved in the act. If for the Louisiana Purchase 
had been added to complete the sentence, that phrase· would be a fifth 
term in a five-place relation, for it is not a modifier; it is a kind 
of object (i.e., a kind of objective complement, in traditionai terms). 
The above analysis (2. 76), was suggested by an example in Hemphill 's 
work: 16 
The serpent tempted Eve to eat the apple, (2. 77) 
tl 4R t2 t3 t4 
where the symbols, respectively, represent tempter, tempted, the act, 
and the object of the act. 
Perhaps the best analysis is one suggested by transformational 
theory: 
The ministers agreed that they pay a price ...• (2. 78) 
That is, the sentence is treated as a peculiar sort of compound 
embedding. Analyses of this sort will be fully treated in Chapter III. 
Disguised Reciprocation 
Some verbs are not usually recognized as reciprocal. They include 
such verbs as dance, argue, marry, etc. In He danced delightfully, 
there is no reciprocation, for the sentence refers ~o a one-person 
dance, but in They dan'Ced (= together) or They danc~d (= with each 
other), there is. In He argued(= presented) his point well, the 
implication is of someone addressing others, not an interchange of 
discussion, necessarily, between them, but in Helen and Jane argued 
(=with each other), there is interchange. In He married off his 
daughter, again, there is no reciprocation, but in Bob married Grace, 
it is obvious that Grace married Bob also. Syntactically, the recip-
rocal forms may be represented in the following manner: 
63 
They danced with each other (2. 79) 
ti 2R t2 
Helen and Jane argued with each other. (2.80) 
ti 2R t2 
Bob and Grace married(= got married to each other). (2. 81) 
ti 2R t2 
These, then, are analyzed in the same way as They hit themselves was 
earlier, where it was noted that the "subjects" and the "objects" acted 
on each other, if considered in traditional terms. 
If one wants to indicate the reversibility ordering that is 
possible with the terms, one can affix an exclamation mark to the 
terms involved: 
Allen danced with Jean. (2.82) 
1 ti 2R JtZ 
This form can also be used to emphasize the existence of double 
subjects and double objects. That is, (2.82) is equal to the 
conjunctive form: 
Allen danced with Jean, and Jean danced with Allen, 
(t1 2R t2) -&- Tt2 2R ti ) 
(2.83) 
where the word simultaneously is understood from the context. The 
preposition with is here considered to be a verb particle because the 
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idea of dancing in junction seems intuitively to imply with in the 
relation. Armed with these thoughts, one can now see a possibly dif-
ferent analysis for an example cited earlier, namely, I am acquaint,ed with 
~ (= I know Mary). The speaker chooses to use the former because 
it stresses reciprocation, whereas the latter does not. In the latter 
case, I may know (of) Mary, but she may not know of me. But in the 
former case the implication clearly means that they know each other, 
which fact is expressed by using with. Thus, this ~entence could, 
and perhaps should, be analyzed in the same way that Allen danced with 
Jean was. Another thing the conjunctive analysis shows when applied to 
all the examples immediately above is that the ! ti 2R 
are actually reduced forms of the [(t1 zR tz) & (tz zR 
t 2 forms 
t 1)] form, 
brought on by various obvious transformations. This is also true of 
the earlier, similar example, They hit themselves, for what it means 
is They hit each other. Other peculiarities of conjunctive forms will 
be dealt with later. 
Such reciprocals also resemble sentence pattern one, for they can 
be further reduced through the application of elimination transforma-
tions to simply They danced, They argued, and They married; in each 
case, together or with each other is merely assumed. 
The resemblance of the so-called direct object pattern in 
reciprocal sentences to the predicate nominative pattern can also be 
established. In He made captain, captain cannot be a direct object, 
for it is in co-reference with He; the meaning is clearly He became 
captain. However, this sentence does not express an equality relation, 
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as is .usually thought; it is a case of a person becoming a member 
through promotion to the rank (class) of captain, and so it is a class 
membership sentence. 
Distinguishing Subjects and Objects 
The idea of subject and object is further complicated when one 
considers the following pair:17 
The waitress covered the table. (2. 84) 
ti zR t2 
A cloth covered the table. (2.85) 
(2.84) is a pattern four (direct object) type, but is (2.85) also? 
(2.85), apparently, means A cloth was on the table, where the copula is 
logically meaningless (tm.less ~=existed); this sentence is a loca-
tive type of sentence yet to be discussed, but it may be noted that 
covered need not be in the sentence, for one can say It is nice to see a 
cloth on the table, where no verb at all occurs with, or acts on, 
the table. Thus, (2.85) could be interpreted as simply an aF form, 
where covered merely indicates tense. 
Identifying Mandatory Locatives 
It has been demonstrated that the analysis of reflexive and 
reciprocal sentences must be somewhat different than the analysis of 
typical direct object types. A characteristic of sentence pattern 
four (in its simplest formulation) is that it is amenable to the pas-
sive transformation. The obvious reason why reflexives and reciprocals 
must be analyzed differently is that they contain co-references between 
their subject and object terms. (The only exception is a sentence 
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such as He was injured by himself, where the prepositional phrase 
carries the added meaning of only.) Also sometimes included in this 
group are verbs of "having," "containing," and "suiting. 1118 The passive 
transformation cannot be applied to these verbs either, though the 
active voice form of this seeming direct object pattern is symbolized 
in the same manner as regular S-V-0 forms: 
The hat suits you. (Z.86) 
ti ZR tz 
We have a pet. (2.87) 
ti zR t2 
That dress fits you. (2. 88) 
ti ZR tz 
The room can seat fifty (people). (Z. 89) 
ti zR tz 
Perhaps the reason that (Z.86) cannot be passivized is due to faulty 
reasoning. The hat is not suiting; what is meant is something like 
The hat looks good on you (to me)--i.e., I think the hat looks good 
on you. It might be objected that in (Z.89) a passive transformation 
is possible: Fifty (people) can be seated in the room. However, the 
characteristic £y_ is missing, and this fact is significant, for if it 
had occurred it would have been in a sentence of the form Fifty (people) 
can be seated in the room by the teacher; thus, the active form is 
The teacher can seat fifty (people) in the room. The room is, there-
fore, not a subject at all in the above symbolized sentence. Once 
again it has been demonstrated that talk of subjects and objects is 
pointless. What exists in all these cases (as well as in those where 
subjects and objects seem intuitively valid) is a two-place relation 
which predicates some property of the flanking terms. 
67 
Sometimes a sentence of the pattern four type requires an "adverbial" 
expression (usually a locative) to make it comprehensible.19 Neverthe-
less, this demonstrates once more the overlapping nature of the 
sentence patterns. Some examples are: 
John put his toys away. 
I placed my hand on his shoulder. 
We saw the stranger home. 
(2.90) 
(2. 91) 
(2.92) 
Home causes some analytical problems in (2.92) from the traditional 
point of view. Is home a locative adverb or a noun? In terms of 
morphological form, home is certainly a noun, but distributionally and 
perhaps semantically it may be a locative expression. The situation 
may be illustrated better by the following pair: 
The plane went around Chicago. (2.93) 
ti 2R t2 ? 
The plane went around Chicago. (2.94) 
tl 2R t2 
If in (2.93) Chicago means the city of that name, then this is simply 
a two-place relation of "aroundness" that could be paraphrased as The 
plane circled Chicago (= The plane circled it); hence, Chicago is a 
direct object. This is the interpretation that the present writer 
prefers. If, on the other hand, Chicago means there, then this is a 
sentence pattern that still remains to be discussed. The facts 
illustrate, in any event, a possible overlapping of sentence patterns. 
In (2. 94), around Chicago .is traditionally simply analyzed as a prepo-
sitional phrase performing the locative adverbial function. The 
68 
problem in this analysis is that it separates part of the p_roperty 
from the relation went and places it elsewhere. Logically, this is 
possible, but grannnarians find this untidy. It seems clear that 
what is being predicated of the plane is that it rounded th.e city 
of Chicago: 
The plane rounded Chicago. (2.95) 
t1 2R t2 
Chicago is thus interpreted as the direct object (and not an adverb) 
because the paraphrase 
*The plane rounded there (2. 96) 
is not grammatical, but the sentence 
The plane rounded it (2.97) 
is grannnatical. Thus, went around equals circled, and this is a 
typical sentence pattern four type (S-V-0). 
Objects Versus Verbs 
Similar to the last few examples in some respects are certain 
"transitive" sentences containing such verbs as take, give, do, J?..§!Y, 
have, etc. Zandvoort, in a very good modern, traditional, scholarly 
grammar cites the following examples: 20 to take a walk, to have 
breakfast, to give a jump, to give orders, to do good, to do harm, 
to do credit, to take place, to take part, to take care, to pay 
attention, to pay a visit, to have a shave, to have a smoke, etc. 
He notes that in such cases "the object is more important than the 
verb. . , . 1121 For example, in Alex gave· orders to them, the indirect 
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object pattern is actually a transformation of: 
Alex ordered them (2.98) 
~~ ~~
ti 2R t2 
Here, gave has little or no semantic content; it is a kind of quasi-
auxiliary. Of course, in a real conversational context, this simple 
direct object pattern would be expanded (at least by implication) to 
a more complicated pattern such as Alex gave orders that they evacuate 
the area at once. Anyway, the close relationship of pattern four 
types (direct object) to pattern five types (indirect object) has 
already been established. The fact that it only works with certain 
verbs indicates the essential need of a logical, propositional analysis 
rather than one based mainly on form and distribution. 
Sometimes the verb and direct object are more or less equivalent, 
thus equating pattern one type (S-V) with pattern four (S-V-0). Such 
cases are: 22 
I dreamed a dream. (2.99) 
He lived a life of sin. (2. 100) 
Such examples also seem to indicate, perhaps, that in universal 
grammar noun and verb categories are primary, not derived categories. 
On the other hand, it may be that nouns and verbs are just two aspects 
of the same thing, as is suggested by the following pair: 
He took a walk. (= He walked.) (2 .101) 
She had breakfast. (= She breakfasted.) (2 .102) 
Sometimes these kinds of sentences raise the issue of grammaticality. 
For example, the writer recently heard a British television 
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documentary narrator utter the following imperative sentence on an 
Oklahoma City television station: 
?*(You can) have a read at the newspaper. 
--Nova, KETA-TV, Jan. 12, 1975. 
(2.103) 
Whether the reader decides the above sentence is grammatical or not, 
this sentence and countless others like it illustrate the strong 
tendency to convert any sentence pattern to a pattern four type, if it 
is possible. Here, the change is from pattern two (S-V) to a pseudo-
pattern four (S-V-0?). That is, the meaning is You can read a newspaper, 
where no locative expression occurs. But in the narrator's sentence 
a read is the direct object (verb to noun metamorphosis without semantic 
change). In such a sentence it seems logically ridiculous to analyze 
at the newspaper as a locative expression or anything else (such as a 
complement). Grannnatically speaking, the only proper analysis one can 
apply, if one allows one's judgment to be influenced by logical con~ 
siderations, is to interpret the verbal as a complex entity which is 
in relation to two variables: 
(You) (can) have a read at the newspaper. (2.104) 
't1 zR t2 
(The circumflex accent mark is used to indicate an assumed term), 
Pattern Five--Indirect Object Senterices 
Identifying Indirect Objects 
This type of sentence is traditionally called an indirect object 
form of sentence. Logically, such sentences are labeled as triad.ic 
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because they display three-place predicate relations. A simple case 
is 
The bank sent a check to me. (2.105) 
tl 3R tz t3 . 
By movement and deletion transformations, this may be converted to 
The bank sent me a check. (2.106) 
---
tl 3R t3 tz 
Sentence (2.105) is considered primary, ordinarily, because it is 
actually a pattern four type with something else just added on to make 
the co1I1I11unication more complete; this point of view a~cords with the 
simplicity criterion of scientific thinking, for it suggests that 
complicated patterns derive from simple patterns through a set of 
(hopefully) well-defined operations. In (2 .106), the bank did not 
send me; it sent a check. Consequently, since to me is merely added-on 
information, the indirect object form of sentence is an extension 
of the direct object pattern. (However, the two patterns may appear 
identical in form when either one of the objects is deleted, of which 
·more will be said later.) At most, the only difference between the 
two sentences is one of emphasis. If word order only is considered, 
and stress, pitch, and intonation contour are ignored, the emphasized 
entity is 1he first entity; 
A peculiarity of this sentence pattern is exhibited in the 
following synonymous pair: 
Waiting will do him good. (2 .107) 
tl 3R t3 tz 
Waiting will be good for him. (2 .108) 
ti 2R t2 
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(For is included in the complex verb on the basis of cases such as 
What's it good for?) Traditionally speaking, the latter case resembles 
a direct object sentence in form, for by paraphrasing it is basically 
equal to Waiting will benefit him; but benefitting, semantically, 
does not. seem to "act on" the object him, as verbs are supposed to do 
to objects according to the definition. As in·the sentence I hear him, 
it is probably preferable just to speak of a two-place relation. The 
former case, Waiting will do him good, in form, seems to. be an indirect 
object pattern, but the direct object is not a nominal. Calling the 
adjective good a direct object in function goes against the traditional 
definition of what constitutes a direct object. The structuralist 
idea of "functional shift" does not seem to be a good analysis either, 
for then something like good person is implied. That is, it is not a 
case of an adjective substituting for a noun as in The rich get richer, 
and the poor get poorer, where people is implied as the modified element 
of rich and poor. Nor does it seem reasonable to· analyze good as an 
adjectival complement of him, for the meaning is ~learly verblike in 
~- ' 
nature; it seems to imply (roughly) that waiting will better him (make 
him better). More absurd would it be to analyze Waiting will be good 
for him, as some ~traditionalists would, as subject + copula + predicate 
adjective + prepositional phrase. Here, good is considered to modify 
waiting, and the idea that he will benefit is lost entirely. Moreover, 
no functional analysis is assigned to the prepositional phrase; it is 
merely classified as a prepositional phrase, as if by so doing some-
thing of importance has been said, when in reality nothing has been 
said. To call for him a kind of adverbial, as some might, is equally 
absurd. For these reasons, it seems inadvisable to accept the 
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traditional view that good is a direct object or any kind of complement 
in Waiting will do him good.24 Logically, the proper analysis is to 
assume the form Waiting will be good for him (or, Waiting will benefit 
him), a S-V-0 form. Hence, in (2.107), will.do good is the complex 
verb and him is the direct object: 
or 
Waiting will do •.. 
tl 2R 
him •.• good,. 
t2 
Waiting will do good for him. 
tl 2R t2 
(2.109) 
(2 .110) 
(The elipses in the first example above indicate not omission, but 
the places where the verb phrase leaves off and takes up again. It 
should also be noted at this point that the analysis of the gerund 
in such a sentence will receive a more sophisticated scrutiny in 
Chapter III.) 
Confusion of sentence pattern types is also possible in other 
cases involving the indirect object. The indirect object usually 
·occurs in sentences where direct objects also occur (and this is what 
will be meant when the term "indirect object sentence" is used 
hereafter), but it may occur as the only overt object in the sentence: 
He told me, 
tl 2R t2 
(2 .111) 
In such a sentence, it is the verb that furnishes the clue for analysis. 
A verb such as told implies both something to be told and someone to 
tell it to. A verb such as took, µowever, only implies a direct object, 
as for example, in He took her to the concert. Therefore, the analyzed 
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sentence above is merely a reduced form of He told me something, which 
is itself a transformation of He told something to me. That is, each 
sentence below implies the other: 
and 
something 
t2 
He told me. 
----
tl 2R t2 
(2.112) 
(2 .113) 
Since the same logical form applies to both cases,. how is one to dis-
tinguish them? Obviously, the only way to do this is to insert the 
"understood" elements so that a three-place relation results. 
Logically, however, the question is a sterile one, for the shorter 
forms indicate all that the speaker feels is necessary--!. e. , a two-
place relationship. If someone is only interested in who and somebody 
else is only interested in what, then as far as they are concerned He 
told me and He told something are both complete sentences of the 
S-V-0 type; talk of "direct" and "indirect" is meaningless. This is 
still another example that teaches one how the extralinguistic 
situation must be considered. What has or has not been retained is 
often inconsequential. It is only when knowledge of both who and what 
is required that one needs to show the expansion of pattern four to 
pattern five: 
He told something to me. (2.114) 
tl 3R t2 t3 
Occasionally, one incorrectly analyzes indirect object sentences 
because the characteristic to is replaced by a different preposition, 
usually for, but others are possible too. Stageberg offers the 
following examples:25 
75 
He built her a playpen. He built a playpen for (2 .115) 
her. 
He played~ a game of chess. He played a game of chess (2 .116) 
with me. 
He asked her a question. He asked a question of her. (2 .117) 
All of the above sentences are analyzed as three-place relations, just 
as in the more normal form containing tp. 
The Transitoriness of Patterns 
Early on in this manuscript it was maintained that there really 
is no such thing as a sentence pattern, at least in any absolute 
sense. "Patterns" are temporary things in a changing situation. Just 
as in man's external environment there is no constant except change 
(to speak paradoxically), so there is continuous change in the so-called 
forms of speech which man uses. The major discovery bf the twentieth 
century is. that made by Albert Einstein--that we live in a relative, 
constantly changing universe, where, for example, time and space are 
related as a continuum; and matter and anti-matter also co-exist in 
a continuum function. The situation is similar in grammar. It has 
been repeatedly shown that the patterns usually identified as such by 
grammarians actually overlap in ·a bewildering number of ways, often in 
a non-linear way, to such an extent that to speak dogmatically of 
patterns in an absolute sense is meaningless. What saves such an 
approach from being entirely meaningless is the fact that the sentence 
patterns are the forms which one seems to find in speech and writing; 
counterexamples, however, are easy to find if one does not close one's 
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eyes to the facts. The great Einsteinian lesson is that we live in a 
world that seems, and it is only by trying to establish relationships 
that any stability, however illusory, can be attained in any subject; 
the absolute universe of Isaac Newton exists no more. One reason that 
the sentence pattern approach is somewhat effective is that the granunars 
of all the vario_us linguistic schools contain mostly "made-to-order" 
sentences--i.e., those which occur in patterns reasonably frequently. 
Most of the sentences adduced so far in this work, too, have been 
easily recognizable in the interest of pedagogical rapport •. The fact 
is that, aside from merely listing such counterexamples and trying to 
expand the list of gramnatical transformations to account for their 
interrelationships, they are often of scant logical significance. More 
conunon patterns supply enough data to recognize the most important and 
interesting problems. How.ever, there will be some very unusual 
sentences introduced from time to time, not only to support inferences 
made above, but also because their analyses involve some important 
logical and syntactical concepts. 
Distinguishing Grammatical Function and Distribution 
The examples given thus far in this and the preceding sections 
prove that grannnatical analyses based only on such formal criteria as 
form, function, and distribution are fraught with errors and miscon-
ceptions. Meaning is also a slippery criterion, as will be shown 
presently. All of these approaches come into play in the indirect 
object type of sentence. That is the reason for this, perhaps, too 
long digression. A good example is the front page headline (pseudo-
sentence) which recently appeared concerning President Ford: 
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Nuclear plants pushed by Ford. (2 .118) 
--OklahottJ.a. Journal, Jan. 16, 1975. 
This seems to be ari obvious passive voice form of statement of the 
direct object sentence pattern type with auxiliary deletion: 
Ford pushes nuclear plants. (2.119) 
ti 2R t2 
Semantically, pushes here does not represent an action which can be 
said to "act on" something which "receives its action" in some sense; 
hence, how can nuclear plants be a direct object function in the tra-
ditional sense? Paraphrased (roughly), the meaning seems to be Ford 
urges (others) to accept nuclear plants; thus, others is the direct 
object, which is only implied. Ford is certainly not the "psychological 
subject," which is the criterion by which traditionalists, structural-
is ts, and transformationalists relate the essential ":identity" existing 
between the so-called active and passive forms of such a sentence; the 
main topic, if there is one, seems to be nuclear plants. One can 
alter the paraphrase a bit (ignoring the internal structure of the 
infinitive phrase): 
Ford wants (for) others to accept nuclear plants. (2 .120) 
t 1 2R tz (="it") 
The result is, ironically, one which would accord with views of most 
schools of grammar: i.e., it is a direct object type of sentence with 
the embedded for-clause functioning as the direct object of the whole 
sentence; but now others is the subject of the dependent clause (not 
the whole sentence) and the true subject, nuclear plants, is the direct 
object of the dependent clause (not the whole sentence). This analysis 
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is supported by the following passive (*R) paraphrase which occurs in 
the complex object of the total active sentence: 
Ford wants nuclear plants (to be) accepted by others. (2 .121) 
tl 2R ( U2 
· (= object) *S . u1 .... ~ 2 (= subjec;, 
With nominalization of the dependent clause, this becomes the indirect 
object form, and the whole sentence reverts to the active voice: 
Ford wants acceptance of nuclear plants by others. (2.122) 
tl 3R t2 t3 
Converting this to a sentence where the true subject is located in its 
usual first-place position, the result is a passive indirect object 
type of sentence: 
Acceptance of nuclear plants for others is pushed by Ford, (2.123) 
ti t 2 ~R t 3 
where pushed is re-inserted because it sounds normal in this locution. 
(An intermediate transformation has moved the others-phrase from the 
end of the sentence.) This analysis is based on the idea that the 
first term means Nuclear plants' acceptance (i.e., a possessive). 
Thus, this three-term analysis suggests that Nuclear Plants pushed by 
Ford (the headline) is actually an indirect object type of sentence, 
as indicated in the last two formulas. 
The headline writers, knowing that a pronoun such as others was 
obviously implied, reduced the last formula to the direct object form 
in the passive voice: 
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Acceptance of nuclear plants (for others) is pushed by Ford.(2.124) 
ti ~R t 2 
Thus, this form was further reduced to 
Acceptance of nuclear blants is pushed by Ford. (2 .125) 
ti ~R t2 
This formulation reveals that, contrary to what was said earlier about 
nuclear plants being the true subject, the real subject semantically is 
acceptance, but it would be incomplete without its modification, of 
nuclear plants--for it is the acceptance of nuclear plants in its 
entirety which forms the true subject of the sentence; nothing less 
will do. Headline writers must conserve space, ink, etc. Fortunately, 
in this case, it is possbile to retain the ideas contained in accep-
tance and nuclear plants, along with the rest of the sentence meaning, 
and still reduce the size of the sentence. This can be done because 
the meaning contained in acceptance and pushes is similar, for the 
reduction of the last formula, by subject headword deletion, becomes 
·*Nuclear plants is pushed by Ford; (2.126) 
tl ~R t2 
and, as noted earlier, this sentence is more or less semantically 
equivalent to Ford urges acceptance of nuclear plants. Thus, the 
distinction between subject and verb is even in jeopardy! For the 
idea of acceptance contained in the subject acceptance of nuclear 
plants has been separated out of the whole subject and this part of 
the subject's meaning has been transferred to the verb unit, for which 
pushes is supplied. One could, alternatively, say that the complex 
predicate meaning is actually pushes acceptance, where pushes takes 
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over the semantic job of indicating the object, acceptance, as well as 
the verb meaning in pushes · (= urges). The final reduction to the 
newspaper headline forin, as pointed out earlier, is only a matter of 
. copula deletion of the above ungranmatical passive sentence: 
Nuclear plants pushed by Ford. (2.127) 
t 1 ~R t2 
As stated above, the final formula is derive~ from an ungrammat-
ical passive, *Nuclear plants is pushed by Ford; the singular verb is 
does not agree in number with its plural subject nuclear plants. 
Therefore, the latter phrase cannot be the subject--i.e., the entire 
subject. The singular headword acceptance (or some such synonym) 
does agree in number with is. Consequently, the headline, Nuclear 
plants pushed by Ford, must derive somewhat according to the steps that 
have been outlined above. It could not have derived ·from the gram-
matically correct form, Nuclear plants are pushed by Ford because of 
the semantic reasons already discussed. 
This headline example has served to show, then, that there is no 
absolute boundary separating syntax from semantics, active from 
passive, direct object type of sentence from indirect type, and simple 
sentence from a sentence embedded with clauses. The variety of 
orderings combined with these factors all tend to confirm this writer's 
view that categories of distribution, form, and function are extremely 
tenuous things upon which to base a grammatical analysis, yet these 
things are the primary instruments usually employed for the determi-
nation of sentence patterns. In fact, it would not be much amiss to 
say that patterns ~ correlations of distribution, form and function. 
Patterns, however, form only a beginning for a more penetrating, 
logical analysis. There are many other peculiarities that have been 
ignored in the analysis of this headline sentence because they were 
thought to be of minor significance. One such is the behavior of the 
prepositions. The reader is left to puzzle over these. 
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Overlapping of functions and positions is what obscures truth in 
grammatical analysis quite often. Perhaps it would be better to say 
that linguists too often define one in terms of the other. This 
circular method produces few, if any, useful results, and it causes 
needless confusion. One common example of this is the practice of 
calling the first noun phrase in a passive voice sentence the subject. 
Since t~e subject is defined as that which performs the action of the 
verb, calling the ball in a sentence such as ·The ball was hit by John 
the subject causes the definition to fail. The psychological subject 
remains John regardless of noun phrase movement. Recognizing this, 
some (but not all) traditional grammarians have resorted to terms such 
as "psychological subject" (= actor, main topic) versus "grannnatical 
subject" (= first topical noun phrase). 
Another example of confusing distribution and function is the 
case of the indirect object. For instance, John Hughes, a structural 
linguist, defines the "dative case" (indirect object) "as structurally 
equivalent to an adverb or adverbial phrase. 11 26 In other words, in-
direct objects occur where adverbials may occur. As will be seen 
soon, this is only true of manner adverbials, but the important thing 
to note is that this statement already has destroyed any usefulness 
in the idea that certain functions occur in certain positions. Hence, 
the idea of sentence pattern is quite suspect. Hughes goes even 
further: "Insofar as a dative case exists in English, it is expressed 
only by structure. • • " and "this is based on commutation" of forms 
such as "I gave him the book" and "I gave the book to him. rr2 7 In the 
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present work, indirect objects are relational terms on a par with terms 
representing subjects and direct objects; on a par in the sense that, 
in the final analysis, subject, object and indirect object serve similar 
functions and are therefore really indistinguishable as separate 
functions. Part of the proof, in fact, lies in the fact that each may 
occur in positions where the others may occur. (Only the verb usually 
remains somewhat central distributionally, and it'is significant that 
the verb is the logical relation connnon to all the terms in a simple 
sentence.) Thus, distribution explains little, if anything, about 
functional categories in many instances, as a glance at the following 
list of sentences shows: 
Harold gave the book to Elaine. 
The book was given by Harold to Elaine. 
To Elaine Harold gave the book. 
Elaine was given the book by Harold. 
Harold gave Elaine the book. 
The book was given to Elaine by Harold. 
(2.128) 
(2 .129) 
(2 .130) 
(2 .131) 
(2 .132) 
(2. 133) 
If these sentences express basically the same proposition, as is usually 
accepted, then (aside from factors of stylistic emphasis and focus) 
Elaine must be performing the same function, however that function may 
be defined. 
On the other hand, if focus or emphasis is a fundamental factor 
in determining the propositional content, then many of the above 
sentences are different se.ntences because they are different propo-
sitions. An easy way to prove this is to take a modifying word, such 
as the so-called adverb only, and move it about with the indirect 
object to those positions that have already been identified: 
Harold gave the book to Elaine only. 
Harold gave the book only to Elaine. 
Harold gave only Elaine the book. 
Harold gave Elaine only the book. 
Only to Elaine Harold gave the book. 
To Elaine only Harold gave the book. 
?*To only Elaine Harold gave the book. 
The book was given to Elaine only by Harold. 
The book was given only to Elaine by Harold. 
?*The book was given to only Elaine by Harold. 
Onl~ Elaine was given the book by Harold. 
Elaine onll was given the book by Harold. 
Only to Elaine was the book given by Harold. 
To Elaine onll the book was given by Harold. 
The book was given by Harold to Elaine only. 
The book was given by Harold only to Elaine. 
?*The book was given by Harold to only Elaine. 
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{equivalent} (2 .134) (2.135) 
£ equivalentJ (2.136) (2.137) 
[equivalent} 
(2.138) 
(2.139) 
(2.140) 
f equivalent} (2.141) (2.142) 
(2.143) 
[equivalent} (2.144) (2.145) 
[Note possible} (2.146) 
additional (2.147) changes 
{equivalent ] (2.148) (2.149) (2 .150) 
By using the qualifying word only in each case, it seems evident that 
all these structures are propositionally equivalent; hence, the Elaine.-
phrase in each instance represents the same relational term which 
ought, therefore, to represent the same function,_if there is any such 
thing. However, most grammarians would not concede this view. The 
burden of proof, nevertheless, would seem to be upon them. The 
emphasis indicated in only seems to signify that the main topic of 
discussion is (or could be) Elaine--i.e., her (and nobody else) receiving 
the book. Thus, in traditional terms, e.g., (to) Elaine is performing 
the subject function in To Elaine Harold gave the book; but if the same 
idea is implied in Harold gave the book to Elaine (where to Elaine would 
receive rising voice inflection), the subject is, nevertheless, said 
to be Harold. Surely, there is something wrong with a theory that 
makes such claims. In any event, the distinction between subject and 
object is certainly in a state of confusion. 
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Another reason for using this mode of exposition is that only 
takes the place of voice intonation, pitch, and stress, and is thus 
more perspicuous on paper. For example, one could indicate the so-
called traditialial subject function by underlining: 
Harold gave the book to Elaine. (2 .151) 
Harold gave the.book to Elaine. (2 .152) 
Harold gave the book to Elaine. (2 .15 3) 
Harold gave the book to Elaine. (2.154) 
It is being maintained that, if stressed in an oral, spoken utterance, 
each of the above examples is a different sentence because of the 
implication embodied in the loudly spoken portion of the sentence~ 
That is, in (211.151), it is meant that only Harold (and nobody else) 
gave the book; in (2.152), only Elaine (and nobody else) received the 
book; in (2.153), only a book (not something else) was given; and in 
(2.154), giving (and not, e.g., lending) is being stressed. 
These concepts can be schematized rather simply as follows: 
--Harold--gave--the book--to Elaine--
The "blank" spaces indicated by dashes are where one could insert only. 
(The possibility of inserting only between to and Elaine is somewhat 
dubious as regards grammaticality, hence the asterisk usage above; it 
is also the reason why there is no blank space in this position in the 
schema above.) Now, due to the fact that this sentence can be restruc-
tured in fourteen different ways (omitting the asterisked cases), and 
only can occur with each sentence constituent, one can only assume, 
apparently, that a specific function (if such there be) can occur 
almost anywhere in the sentence without necessarily changing the 
meaning; for if little or no stress is attached in a spoken uttering 
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of these different formulations, the meaning can remain constant--i. e., 
that Harold had a book and he gave it to Elaine. Thus, in traditional 
terms, Harold is always the subject, and Elaine is always the indirect 
object. Consequently, if one accepts the idea of these functions, then 
functions must be indicated logically, not gralillllatically. It would 
not be impossible to indicate such functions in logical notation, but 
this will not be done in this work for two reasons: (1) One can 
always define the propositional content before beginning an analysis--
i.e., agree on the meaning of a particular sentence in a certain 
context--thus identifying the terms with certain of these traditional 
functions; and (2) the distinction between subject, object, etc. is 
very often not clear at all, as has been demonstrated. 
One final remark remains to be said on these issues. If argu-
ments (and terms) and logical functions (and relations) designate 
the basic units in a sentence, then a reasonable analysis can be 
carried through by indicating how they relate to one another, thus 
creating an abstract structure of which the sentence is a visible mani-
festation. That is, the labeling of terms and arguments in sentences 
is not a labeling of sentences, but of ideas which make up a proposi-
tion in sentences. But since logical structure and syntactic structure 
overlap somewhere, it is convenient to speak of sentences and sentential 
logic, where propositions and propositional logic are meant. If one 
defines his categories only in terms of form, function, and distribution, 
the ways in which they relate to each other to create sentences becomes 
confused quite often. For example, Hughes does ~classify the 
indirect object type of sentence as a distinct pattern at a11.28 
According to him, such a sentence is a combination of more than one 
sentence pattern; hence, it is not a simple sentence. This can be 
illustrated by considering The boy kissed the girl yesterday as being 
composed of The boy kissed the girl (pattern four) and The boy kissed 
yesterday (adverbial). In fact, his contention is not unlike some 
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that have been made in this paper. It seriously differs in that he 
classifies the simple sentence patterns as "exocentric"; hotvever, 
indirect object sentences are not sentence patterns, but sentence 
components, and are therefore labeled as "endocentric." The reason 
stated is that indirect objects and adverbials occupy the same dis-
tributional positions; and since adverbs are secondary modifications 
which indicate lower-level, internal structure, so are indirect objects 
secondary. The fact that indirect objects do not modify--at least in 
the same sense as adjectives and adverbs do--does not affect his 
judgment, in spite of the well-known different views of traditional 
grannnar. Hughes' view seems so patently absurd that it is hardly 
worth discussing, except that it is a good illustration of how dangerous 
it is to put too much reliance on distributional criteria for the 
analysis of sentences. Sentence patterns do merge, as he says, but 
the fact that one pattern contains an entity that distributes like a 
different secondary entity does not necessarily indicate that the 
former entity is also secondary. Anyway, adverbs do not distribute 
exactly the same as indirect objects, as the following pair demonstrates: 
John sent ~ a letter. 
*John sent swiftly a letter. 
(2 .155) 
(2.156) 
Swiftly in (2.156) can occur anywhere except after the verb. 
Recalling the mobility of only when in junction with an indirect object, 
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It might be argued by some that this .. argument is not conclusive. Only, 
however, is traditionally classified as both adjective and adverb, 
depending on what' it modifies. Since only can modify anything in the 
sentence John sent Mary a letter (as opposed to swiftly), 'it seems, on 
distributional criteria, inadvisable to classify it as an adverb. Yet, 
intuitively, one would hardly want to classify it in the same category 
as the indirect object, just because it distributes the same way. (One 
cannot speak of an only as one could of a person, which could be an 
indirect object in a sentence; however, one could speak of an only 
child, where only is obviously a quantifier.) Thus, the solution is 
to be found in the etymology of only: only is equivalent to "the 
unique one"; it is a peculiar sort of quantifier--and virtually any-
thing may be quantified. 
Pattern Six--Adverbial Sentences 
Definitional Chaos 
This type of sentence is classified traditionally as a predicate 
adverbial pattern. Hereafter, whenever the term "adverbial sentence 
pattern" or the like is used, the predicate adverbial is what will be 
meant. The problem of adverbs has already been met, in passing, in the 
process of discussing other sentence patterns. Certain adverbial 
problems relating to those discussions were ignored, and, in truth, 
not all adverbial problems will be taken up, much less solved, in this 
section either. The adverbial category traditionally has been very 
troublesome because in reality, it has always been a "catch-all" 
classification. Words such as only and ~. for example, have been 
called adverbs. As noted in the last section, only is a quantifier; 
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the fact that, in morphological form, it ends in .=!1_, usually associated 
with adverbs, is no sure criterion, for some adjectives do likewise 
(e.g., She is lovely). The word not is an obvious logical term, as 
study of any text on symbolic logic will prove; not merely negates 
(usually whole sentences) and to some extent quantifies, as in Not Bob 
(but someone else) is coming today. Further evidence of the confusion 
in this classification is its definition as a word which may modify a 
verb, adjective, or other adverb; such a definitiQn is so all-inclusive 
that it defines nothing very well. Some analysts, as will be shown, 
even say adverbs may modify entire sentences. 
Adverbs as Higher-Order Functions 
True adverbs (i.e., of manner) do "modify," bu.t not in the same 
way that adjectives do. Adjectives modify logical arguments (or terms), 
while adverbs modify logical functions (or relations). Logical 
functions and relations are logical predicates (attributes which 
specify or characterize arguments and terms). Distributional factors, 
along with logical insights, will help to make this clear. In the 
following pair, happy is said to be an adjective in (2.157), and an 
adverb in (2.158): 
Sall:y: is happy. (2.157) 
a F 
Sall:y: is Ela:y:ing haEEily. (2 .158) 
a F ? 
No matter where hapEily is placed in its sentence, it modifies the 
predicate. Thus, the EroEerty in the predicate which specifies a 
cond:ltlon of Sally is itself modified. An adverb, then, is a "higher" 
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function; it specifies a property of a property. This, however, can be 
symbolized rather like adjectives are, except that the "power function;' 
numeral is superscripted on the adverbial, instead of being subscripted, 
as it is on adjectives: 
Sally is playing happily. (2 .159) 
a Fl F2 
What this amounts to is the transformational idea that the sentence 
actually contains two predicates, hence two propositions, namely is 
playing and is happy. 
Example (2 .159), incidentally, shows the relationship of adjectives 
to adverbs: the latter derives from the former by a transformational 
process. Adjectives, on the other hand, may derive from verbs. If we 
agree, in a given context, that the following two sentences are seman-
tically equivalent (and they ~ be), then this is easily proved :29 
Silver shines. (2 .160) 
a F 
Silver is shiny (2.161) 
a F 
In any case, predicate nouns, predicate adjectives, and verbs are 
logical predicates (functions or relations); but an adverb is a higher 
order of predicate. 
Distinguishing Adverbs From Adjectives 
What of a sentence such as Harold is a rapid runner? After all, 
rapid seems to modify the noun (term) runner and should therefore be 
an adjective by definition. This analysis is illusory, however, for 
the logical meaning is that Harold (always) runs rapidly; i.e., it is 
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a categorical statement meaning that 
Harold is a runner 
T 
(2 .162) 
and 
a 6 
Harold runs rapidly. 
a -;r F2 (2.163) 
Consequently, whichever form rapid takes is immaterial to the logical 
interpretation. Grammatically, it simply means that when the two 
predicates are merged into one sentence, the adverb often loses its 
characteristic -ly suffix by a deletion transformation. This, perhaps, 
explains why, in the entire history of English, there have always been 
two sets of adverbs: some which evolved into the .::..!Y.. form, and some 
which evolved into the zero suffix form, e.g., Old English hear,dlice 
"hardly" and faste "fast." The process of deletion is still going o'p. 
as is seen in the imperative form on road signs: "go slow" rather than 
"go slowly." When the two sentences (2.162) and (2.163), are merged 
into Harold is a rapid runner, the two predicates occur in juxta-
position. Since the adverb rapid does modify the predicate (in the 
sense of higher-order predicate), speakers and grammarians who now see 
a grammatical unit in rapid runner naturally tend to think of rapid 
as an adjective because nouns take adjective modifiers by definition. 
They do not recognize the fact that two sentences (i.e., two patterns) 
are involved. Thus, the original meaning of "adverb" (something 
"connected to" the verb) is a fairly correct logical view; and the 
additional modificational functions attributed to it by tradition are 
also fairly correct in a rough-and-ready way, excep~ that·mixups in 
distinguishing adjectival and adverbial functions have caused much 
classificational chaos. 
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Such a mixup occurs when juxtaposition causes misunderstanding 
about the nature, and even existence, of the verb. These facts can be 
brought into sharp relief if one considers the following so-called 
predicate nominative sentence pattern: 
The boy is an excellent musician. (2.164) 
The proposition does not infer that the boy is excellent; it infers that 
he plays music excellently (i.e., The boy plays excellent music). 
Hence, the sentence.breaks down into the following propositions: 
The boI is a musician. (2 .165) 
a e M 
The boI J2lal:s excellentlI· (2.166) 
a Fl F2 
The direct object music is assumed because that is what a musician 
does--play music; the word~ is likewise assumed, since excellent 
specifies a property not of the boy himself, but of something he does. 
So, the complex proposition would be analyzed as 
The boy (who is a) musician 12lays excellently. (2.167) 
a Fl F2 
Therefore, excellent in The boy is an excellent musician is logically 
an adverbial function. Grammatically, its analysis is chaotic, for 
the word's classification seems to be based on its form (loss of =..!y 
suffix) and its distribution (juxtapositi·on to noun); no attention is 
paid to the fact that semantically the modifier does not specify a 
property of The boy musician. 
If the adverb modifies an adjective, the analysis is similar, but 
more difficult. As an instance, the sentence, She I?·ainted extremely 
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good pictures, is made up of the following propositions: 
She painted pictures. (2.168) 
t 1 2R u 
The pictures were good. (2.169) 
u sl 
*The pictures were extremely. (2.170) 
u s2 
The peculiar notation will become clear in the explanation which follows. 
To avoid notational difficulties, all the predicates have been inter-
preted as relations. (It will be recalled that F's may be considered 
as one-place relations, and relations many-place functions; the super-
script on s 2--that is, not sl--represents anticipation of further 
analysis of, comparison with, the other two sentences.) The predicates 
in the three propositions are all found in the predicate of the parent 
(first) sentence; this indicates that whatever extremely is, it is not, 
in some sense, a noun term (= pictures) modifier two levels removed 
from the noun. The adverb modifies only good, for the third propo-
sition implies The pictures were extremely good, not *extremely 
pictures. The analysis of the parent sentence, thus, is unlike the 
analysis of the earlier copula examples in this section, for it 
contains a complex grannnatical predicate which, positionally, is the 
direct object of the complete sentence, as shown below: 
She painted extremely good pictures. (2.171) 
t 1 2R ( 82 sl u ) 
tz (= "them") 
Some analysts feel uneasy about accepting anomalous propositions 
such as *The pictures were extremely. Many classify intensifiers such 
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as less, least, fairly, very, quite, rather, more, most, etc. as 
belonging to a variant subcategory of the adverb; others, such as 
structuralis'ts, assign a special classification to the intensifiers. 30 
(It should be noted that extremely is also an intensifier.) But these 
intensifiers are also amplifiers (quantifiers), and may be interpreted, 
without incurring severe logical difficulties, as (1) adjectives (noun 
modifiers, e.g., He owns more horses), as (2) adverbs (e.g., He ran 
more than he walked), and as (3) "quasi-adverbs" (e.g., He was mor~ 
angry than ••• I He was more angered ••. ). This last (3) case 
shows that true adjectives, which always originate as predicates (as 
do verbs), are usually (always?) "verbal" in function. Therefore, 
the quantifiers which modify such predicate adjectives as angry 
actually modify logical predications (i.e., verbs or verblike functions); 
hence, such quantifier-modifiers may be considered as "adverbs" two 
levels beyond the predicators •. These intensifiers, then, can indeed 
occur as adverbs, as is maintained in traditional grammars. This can 
be proven by the very same means that structural linguists use to 
disallow the claim--appeal to strictly formal considerations. An 
example is the synonymous pair 
He was a frequent visitor. 
He visited frequently. 
(2.172) 
(2.173) 
Visitor in (2.172) serves logically just like musician did in an 
earlier group of sentences in this section (2.164-7): it indicates 
the true verbal, visited, as in (2.173). Was in (2.172) only indicates 
tense, person, and number; it is not a logical sign expressing 
equality, membership, or the traditional idea of predicate nominative 
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(with the adjacent noun phrase). In (2.173), frequently is obviously 
an adverb of frequency, so the analysis is 
He visited frequently. (2.174) 
a Fl. F2 
Now, if the verb is converted to a noun, the frequency word may still 
modify it, and itself be. modified: 
fairly 
most 
quite 
very 
He was an extremely frequent visitor; 
and transforming visitor to visited causes no problems: 
fairly 
most 
quite 
very 
He visited extremely frequently. 
(2 .175) 
(2.176) 
The result is not exactly two adverb modifiers of the verb; it is an 
instance of quantitative increase in "power" function, for extremely 
modifies not visited, but frequently, which is symbolized as 
He visited extremely frequently. (2.177) 
a Fl F3 F2 
If one thinks of this kind of modification in a more.mathematical way, 
the function would look like F2(3), where (1) is "understood." 
Where does all this lead? Well, first of all, it shows that 
extremely (= ~t etc.) can occur directly after the verb (ad+verb) 
just like frequently. In He visited frequently, it also shows that 
the -ly form can occur last without getting an anomalous sentence like 
*The pictures were extremely; and the fact that both of these (fre-
quently and extremely) modify logical predicates ("visited" in He was 
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a frequent visitor and extremely in He visited extr'.emely frequently) 
shows intensifiers and adverbs often, if not always, function basically 
alike, and are therefore both adverbs in such instances. The only 
difference is one of "power." In He visited extremely frequently, 
for instance, it is a case of an adverb (extremely) modifying another 
adverb (frequently), which in turn modifies the verb visited, which 
in turn is a transformation of He was a frequent visitor. By their very 
nature, semantically speaking, intensifiers can be multiplied to 
infinity (theoretically) in a sentence. This is patently not the case 
with quantifier-adjective modifiers. One cannot say *He was a fre-
quent, frequent visitor; thus, here is further evidence that frequent 
in this sentence is not an adjective. But one can say He was very 
very, •• angry, where extremly could have been substituted for~· 
It is only stylistic considerations that dictate that very should be 
used in such a multiple construction, and not extremely. It would not 
be difficult to add a symbol to the stock offered so far that could be 
used to indicate that the same word (~) was being used for each 
"higher power"; but that will not be done, for this work is not a 
complete logical grammar, just a sketch of some of the things which 
should be in one, and simplicity is desirable wherever it is possible. 
It is necessary to note that resorting to distributional facts in 
an effort to define adverbs is a very dangerous thing. Distributional 
facts were cited above, but only as suggestive evidence that a corr-
lation between intensifiers and most .=.!.:Y. adverbs might be established, 
if other relevant factors also dovetailed. As was seen, the deciding 
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,, 
factors were, in fact, of a logical nature. This b~ing so, it seems 
of little use to employ the structural maneuver of class'ifying and 
subclassifying various types of "adverbs" accordihg to where they 
occur. The problem seems to be that structuralists (and many trans-
formationalists) have accepted the traditional view that adverbs 
express time, place, manner, conditions, etc. Then, they have tried 
to adapt the traditional view to their own views. Distribution, as 
such an adaptation, can be proven to be almost useless by a simple 
perusal of· a schematic sentence: 
--John--can--bat--the ball--. 
One should try placing traditional adverbs in each of these slots 
indicated by dashes--i.e., words such as always, never, seldom, rarely, 
yesterday, last week, early, late, at ten o'clock, hours, for a week, 
home, for a minute, until dawn, since midnight, thoughtfully, truthfully, 
habitually, often, nicely, etc. After a little time spent in this game 
of slot-filling, the investigator will find that while some patterning 
does seem recognizable at times, the variety of patterning is so great 
that either there is no distinctive adverbial pattern or not all of 
these words are adverbials. A glance at the above list of "adverbs" 
will also prove that classifying such adverbs according to morphological 
form is futile. Since logical analysis provides a more sure technique 
than either distributional or morphological analysis, one can stress 
the logical approach most of the time. 
For the purposes of completeness, the well-known case of preposi-
tional substitution should be mentioned. One example will suffice. In 
He performed the operation with care, the prepositional phrase, with care, 
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is semantically equivalent to carefully, and it modifies the verb 
performed. Hence, in this case, logical analysis agrees with tradi-
tional grannnatical theory. One may not make such an analysis solely 
on the basis of similar form, however. For example, in a sentence, the 
expression with minuteness might occur, which is equivalent to minutely; 
but in a sentence where in a minute occurs, one may not substitute 
*minutely to refer to time. 
Temporal and Locative Expressions 
Some log:i,cians would not agree with the tradition in grammar 
which classifies temporal and locative expressions as adverbial modi-
fiers. Hans Reichenbach is one such logician. He says: "Neither are 
the so-called adverbs of time and place adverbs; they are terms 
specifying the time and space argument to which the sentence as a 
whole refers. 1131 (He also classifies frequency, time, and space rela-
tions as higher-order logical functions.) Reichenbach cites no specific 
examples, nor does he give a detailed explanation. While there are 
cases where it would seem difficult to substantiate Reichenbach' s views, 
it is not hard to see how he arrives at these opinions. In comparing 
She sings excellently with She sings frequently, for example, it can 
certainly be seen semantically that excellently says something about 
sings (i.e., sings is qualified); but such a close connection between 
sings and frequently is. not so obvious. Frequently seems, rather to 
say something about She sings, not sings only. However, recalling 
earlier analyses, in the two pairs (1) She is an excellent singer I She 
sings excellently and (2) She is a frequent singer I She sings 
frequently, the adverbs seem equally and similarly manipulable; and 
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their structures are similar both syntactically and semantically. 
Therefore, frequency is held here to be one of several quantifier-
adverbs. In the case of time and space, is it not possible to 
consider such expressions relationally? That is, time and space 
expressions do not modify in the usual sense; they denote simply 
when and where the action expressed by the verb took place; thus, they 
relate to the whole sentence, whose core is the verb. This solution, 
which accords with the intuitions of many people, is a compromise, then, 
between certain logicians and other people (who are not necessarily 
illogical simply because they are not professional logicians). Time 
and space expressions are, thus, not examples of higher-order logic 
and are not modifiers as frequency is. They are just the simple 
relations that have been dealt with herein all along. Therefore, 
sentences containing such expressions are symbolized in the normal 
way, as in 
He arrives in church (on) Sundays at ten o'clock. (2 .178) 
tl 4R t2 t3 t4 
The notation indicates relationships, not "adverbialhood~" A logical 
.approach employing higher-order methods would require more complexities 
in the notational system. A traditional approach employing the present 
symbolism would require that the last three t's be converted to R's. 
Of course, the semantics of the "adverbial" expressions, as always, 
must be kept in mind--i.e., whether modification is intended or not--
as in He made a timely remark versus He arrived on time. 
Instrumental Expressions 
Instrumental expressions, too, are usually classified as 
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adverbials. This is a mistake which is caused by· the belief that any 
grammatical unit can be expanded by (or substituted with). modification. 
But He spoke with kindness (= He spoke kindly) is not comparallle to 
He killed her with an axe; in the latter, the prepositional phrase is 
a simple instrumental relation which is symbolized in the normal way: 
He killed her with an axe. 
- --
(2.179) 
tl 3R t2 t3 
Instrumental and locative expressions are often ambiguous: 
He saw the sentry with his binoculars. 
tl ·. 3R t2 t3 
(2.1~0) 
He saw her on the plane •. 
tl 3R °t2 t3 
(2 .181) 
Without a context to guide one, no grammatical or logical analysis is 
possible, except that one may consider believable contexts, and then 
proceed analytically on the basis of probabilities. Such sentences 
need to be re-written or re-spoken in a clearer style, though this 
fact does not affect the knowledge that the third term is in relation-
ship to, but not subsidiary to, the verb ~ any more than He or her is. 
Parenthetical Expressions 
So-called "parenthetical expressions" also defy clear analysis 
many times, but with some semantical tinkering some are found to be 
adverbial and some are not, as in 
To be sure, I can go. (= I certainly can go.) 
Of course, she will come. (=She will certainly come). 
Without a doubt, he's a teacher. (= He is doubtlessly 
a teacher.) 
(2.182) 
(2 .183) 
(2 .184) 
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The underlining in (2 .182) and (2 .183) indicates the verb and its 
adverbial modifier, but certainly could be a "sentence modifier, (see 
below): Certainly, I can ~; It is certain (= cel;'tainly) she will come. 
In (2.184), doubtlessly only appears to be an adverb (in form), but 
logically it modifies nothing in the sentence; it implies something 
rather like There is no doubt he is a teacher (= No doubt exists (in my 
mind) that he is a teacher) (= I do not doubt that he is a teacher) 
(=It is certainly true that he is a teacher). Thus, in (2.184) art 
embedded sentence is implied by the so-called adverbial. What is 
interesting here is that many would claim that the meanings of all 
three parenthetical expressions are synonymous! If this is true, 
the above analyses at least prove that whole sentence meanings 
(propositions) must be considered before any analysis of their parts 
is attempted. 
What of a sentence such as In any case, I know the answer (= Anyway, 
I know the answer)? Does In any case mean certainly (modifying know)? 
If it does not, then this phrase, like the -ly form, doubtlessly, 
above is an example of what some call. ''sentence modifiers." This term 
is fairly apt, but applications of the concept, in practice, tend to 
confuse levels. A logician would say that a sentence modifier, since 
it is not part of the sentence, strictly speaking, is an example of a 
higher-order logical function; thus, sentence modifiers would not be 
adverbials at all, by definition. 
Again, a simpler compromise can be effected, which derives from 
the insights of transformational grannnar (though members of this 
school of thought are not consistent in their handling of sentence 
modifiers). In He behaved in a natural manner, the adverbial 
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implication is a variant of that in He behaved naturally. But in He 
behaved naturally the ambiguity of the meaning and function of naturally 
can only be got over by recourse to the intonation and stress patterns 
of speech. It may be. synonymous to the previous sentence; on the other 
hand, transformations of word, intonation, and stress reveal a dif-
ferent meaning (though word re-ordering is sufficient): Naturally, 
he behaved. This last case is an example of a sentence modifier 
equal, perhaps, to It was natural (= normal) for him to behave (= that 
he behave). Such embedding, even though drastically reduced to one or 
a few words, is still embedding and obviously not a case of "adverbial-
hood" or simple sentence pat terning. Transformationally, then, one may 
consider such a case as an example of stringing propositions together 
in a kind of "compounding," for it is not a case of clear subordinating 
modification. Hence, this subject· is inappropriate here (though it 
needed identifying here) and will be pursued later in this work. 
Prefixed Adverbs 
A particularly peculiar form of adverb cited in the traditionally 
oriented handbooks is the so-called subclass of "prefixed adverbs." 
Most of them indicate location, and therefore could be analyzed like 
the other locative expressions described earlier--i.e., as simple 
relational terms: 
The passenger went aboard the ship. (2.185) 
t1 3R tz t3 
However, logically speaking, went is merely acting as an auxiliary 
indicating time; the idea of going is superfluous, for the meaning 
clearly is 
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The passenger boarded the ship. (2.186) 
tl 2R t2 
Likewise, in 
(2.187) 
the meaning appears to be (with word change but not semantic change): 
She left. (2 .188) 
a F 
(The original verb could have been retained in child-language: She 
goed.) As far as word change goes, went itself derives from a different 
Old English verb than does~.) It makes no difference that English 
has no verb, way (= left); many language have cases where words 
unaccountably can or cannot cross over pa.rt-of-speech boundaries. For 
example, one can say He lightened his study load by dropping a course 
(from adjective light), but the antonym of the verb does not occur, for 
one cannot say *He heaviered his load (from adjective heavy); one must 
say He made his load heavier. One can say He lowered his gun (from 
adjective low), but not *He highered his gun (from adjective high), 
even though the writ~r' s ten-year-old son used exactly this. expression 
recently. 
The analyses above work well in these sentences: 
They drifted apart (=They parted). (2 .189) 
a F 
They.went across the street (=They crossed the street). (2 .190) 
t1 zR t2 
The ship went aground (=?*The ship grounded). (2.191 
a F 
(cf. The ship was grounded by •.•. ) 
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The hero moved (= went) ahead. . • (= the hero headed. . _ • ) (2 .192) 
(Cf. The hero headed north) 
t1 2R tz 
This kind of analysis does not always seem to work: 
They walked four abreast. (2 .193) 
There are three ways of looking at this: (1) four abreast tells "how" 
'(manner) and is therefore an adverb; (2) there is simply no verb in 
English to express the concept, but there could be--e.g., They walked 
(went. beside) each other; or, (3) the expression is to be interpreted 
as They walked side by side, in which case side by side is a term 
relation indicating location. The writer prefers the second analysis, 
though admittedly the interpretation is intuitive. In any case, each 
of the three analyses is amenable to the notation that has been intro-
duced; the problem is one of categorization. Prefixed adverbs have 
been so-called because etymologically a- means "on," as in French ~ bard, 
"on board." However, etymological analyses are notoriously slippery, 
for meaning changes, sometimes drastically. In Old English and some 
other Inda-European languages the E::_ indicates direction: to (ward) ; 
in the ablative case of Latin, it indicates direction from; thus, in 
They were set adrift, one might on intuitive grounds object to the 
interpretation They drifted, but compare the sentence with to (=a-): 
They were set to drifting. No pretence is being made here of having 
solved the problem of prefixed "verbals"; but it does seem that classi-
fying all these words as adverbs is subject to question on logical 
grounds. In most cases, it seems that the E::_ is logically a verb 
marker or signal; its obvious verb usage in certain archaic expressions 
(still heard occasionally nowadays) helps to support the earlier 
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analyses above--'-e.g., He's gone a-sailing on the river. Yet, there ar,e 
cases such as She's ahorse (She's on horseback); is the traditionalist 
correct in assuming that ahorse is an adverbial expression of location, 
or is the logician right in assuming that ahorse predicates what the 
subject is doing (sitting or riding a horse)? Even this latter inter-
pretation might infer (as shown) that the copula is merely an example 
of incomplete predication (sitting or riding) , and ahorse is again a 
locative term. Since these prefixed forms are rather archaic, one 
really needs to know something about the extralinguistic cultures that 
gave rise to them. For example, when the sport was connnon, it was 
easy to hear such expressions as He's gone a-hawking I He's gone hawking. 
Logically speaking, since one does not always have recourse to earlier 
cultural information, perhaps each case must be solved on its own merits, 
rather than trying to force these similar-looking expressions into one 
class on the basis of form or etymology; the same forms occur with 
different parts of speech sometimes, and etymology is constantly 
shifting, as has been noted. 
Nonstandard Adverbials of Manner 
A case where etymology may give a clue to analysis is the sub-
standard (slang or dialectal) suffix -like used by some speakers, and 
often classified as an adverb of manner in those texts which discuss 
it at all. Some historical linguists speculate that the Old English 
adverbial suffix -lice had come to mean "like" (though its earlier 
meaning appears to be in doubt). The known history records the reduc-
tion of -lice to -li (phonetically [li]) in the middle of words 
(holiness) and to -ly when terminal (holy). The recent rise in the 
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use of~ has, as a result, produced forms such as manly and manlike. 
While the exact semantics of the two forms is somewhat different (the 
first stresses virility), the basic meaning remains "in the· manner of 
a man" or "characteristic of a man." THe manner interpretation can be 
seen in such words in sentences like Let's go easylike on this proposal, 
which is equivalent to Let's go easily. Avoiding the "imperative" 
mood, this may be symbolized as usual: 
We shall go easylike (=easily). (2.194) 
a Fl F2 
In terms of social status, the suffix -wise, which has been very 
productive in recent years, and which can be added to virtually any 
noun, is somewhat on a par with -like. The analysis here does not, 
however, agree with the traditionalist view that -wise forms are 
necessarily adverbials of manner. Some are; some are not. The tradi-
tionalist tends to be rather selective about his examples. For instance, 
one source cites snake-wise (in the manner of a snake).32 Certainly, 
this seems to be adverbial for it means 
*He crawled ''snakely." (2.195) 
a Fl F2 
On the other hand, another source cites publicity-wise and campaign-
wise as adverbial examples.33 Now, in a social context, such expressions 
are not adverbial at all, as seen in the following interpretations: 
Publicity-wise 
Campaign-wise 
Newspaper-wise 
Weather-wise 
t2 
he is knowledgeable. (2.196) 
tl 2R 
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The order of the terms is based on the idea that the meaning is 
He knows about publicity (etc.) (2 .19 7) 
tl 2R t2 
This analysis is perhaps supported by the fact that the -wise expres-
sions can occur either initially or finally in the sentence; in final 
position, the direct object function is fairly obvious. The particle 
about can even be deleted. 
Is it possible to.find some insight which will allow one to re~ 
analyze He crawled snakewise in the manner of the above case? One 
possibility is 
*He snake-crawled to the house. (2.198) 
t1 2R t2 
The result is thus not a direct object sentence, but a locative one; 
it is locative, however, only because of the added content; snake-
crawled is a verb. One might quarrel about such a verb form, but such 
forms occur frequently in popular novels and popular speech. Other 
examples are: 
He cat-footed it across the roof. 
He snaked his way between the rocks. 
The hunter dogged the trail of his adversary. 
He waddled bearlike (= bear-walked) across the field. 
(2.199) 
(2.200) 
(2. 201) 
(2.202) 
Such sentences do not find their way into grannnar books because gram-
marians simply refuse to try to analyze them; they are regarded either 
as substandard or as unanalyzable. The above cases illustrate that 
one could think of them as manner expressions (i.e., as semantic sub-
stitutes for .::1Y forms), but this is not necessary; certainly, the 
~isc format:lons illustrate this contention, for a sentence such as 
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Professor-wise, he knows a lot says nothing about professors (in the 
manner of professors)--it speaks of his knowing a lot about professors. 
Again, it may be necessary to treat each case separately according to 
its meaning. Form is of little use in these cases. For example, if 
cat-footed means walked like a cat (= *walked "catly"), how would the 
traditionalist handle a sentence such as He cat-footed it? 
The whole idea of classifying certain forms as manner adverbials 
just because they seem to substitute (semantic~lly) for .::.!Y_ forms is 
rife with problems For example, the writer heard the following 
sentence on a radio program recently: 
President Ford will whistle-stop around the country (2. 203) 
to gather support for his energy program. 
--Commentator Ed Caine, KLEC, Okla. City, Jan. 17, 1975 
The meaning (very roughly) seems to be that Ford will travel in the 
manner of trains that stop frequently to let him speak. Surely, the 
best way to analyze whistle,-stop is simply as a verb in meaning, 
position, and form (e.g., it may form a past tense, whistle-stopped). 
Quirk and Greenbaum note -style and -fashion forms are also manner 
adverbials.34 Using their examples, in sentences, note what can be 
done: 
He rode (on) his horse cowboy style (in the style of cowboys). (2.204) 
He dressed peasant fashion (in the fashion of peasants). (2.205) 
If these denote in the manner of (as the authors insi.st), then they 
may still be reduced forms of: 
He rode (on) his horse the way (= like) a cowboy rides his 
horse. 
He dressed (in) the way (= like) a peasant dresses. 
(2.206) 
(2. 207) 
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The use of like above, (2.206-2.207), does not accord with prescriptive 
grannnar rules, but is, neverthe.less, quite comm.on in popular American 
speech nowadays. In these cases, the way (or like) are equivalent to 
in the manner of. In view· of the embedding in the examples, this 
writer feels that such traditional ad hoc methods of definition as 
mere substitution (and no other considerations) are just misconceived. 
Many manner expressions, of course, are not adverbial in any sense. 
They indicate comparison, as the popular cigarette slogan-advertiskment 
reveals: 
Winston tastes good like a cigarette should. (2. 208) 
(= Winston tastes good as a cigarette should taste). 
This seems to be a sound analysis; reverting to Quirk and Greenbaum' s 
cowboy styie, a similar analysis is desirable: 
He rode his horse cowboy style. (2.209) 
(=He rode his horse like (as) a cowboy should ride). 
Interpreting the like-clause as an adverbial modifier is extremely far-
fetched. Such sentences are similar to John is taller than I am, only 
·more complex. 
Expletives 
The final so-called adverbial sentence form that is now to be 
considered is often called the expletive sentence. The term "expletive" 
is applied when the adverblike words do not seem to be functioning as 
adverbs, but as meaningless first-slot subject fillers. The confusion 
of adverb versus expletive is easy to recognize, for even when a proper 
social context is supplied, it is not always easy to guess the speaker's 
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semantic intent. ·Such an example is: 
There is a book on the table / (2.210) 
A book is there on the table. (2.211) 
ti 2R t2 t2 
Sentence (2.211) is interpreted as containing a verb of incomplete 
predication; that is, the copula is equivalent to something like 
is lying; the word there is in apposition to on the table, which 
simply specifies the meaning of there. While (2. 210) could be inter-
preted similarly--There lies a book on the table I A book lies there 
on the table--most analysts (who are native speakers) seem to feel that 
the semantic force of the sentence is 
A book is on the table, (2. 212) 
ti 2R t2 
where there has been deleted. In this interpretation, the assumption 
has been made that there in the original version merely functions as 
a subject slot filler; hence, the "subject" and predicate mean There 
exists, and the transformational (symbolized) form is, therefore, 
equivalent to A book exists on the table. In spite of the fact that 
this is the usual interpretation, the present writer (also a native 
speaker of English) feels that it is incorrect. Exists seems to be a 
very strange way to express what is otherwise more normally expressed 
as A book is lying (there) on the table. Hence, the word there, if it 
is overt, is a locative expression, often used when one points with 
one's finger, for example, or stares with one's eyes. 
Nevertheless, interpretations such as that above are not always 
so easy to come by. An instance is 
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There is a storm brewing, (2.213) 
which must be equivalent to 
A storm is brewing~ (2.214) 
a F 
for this sentence (as a whole) does seem to refer to a state of affairs 
(existence). It is certainly not equivalent to the following two 
versions of one and the same locative expression: 
A storm is brewing there. (2.215) 
ti 2R t2 
There, a storm is brewing. (2.216) 
t2 tl 2R 
The above locative interpretations are termed adverbial by tradi-
tional grammarians. Whether one calls there in these sentences a 
locative relation or an adverbial function, it is certainly evident 
that neither is equal to 
There is a storm brewing there, (2.217) 
which means something like 
The fact is that a storm is brewing there, (2.218) 
where the first noun phrase (etc.) means The fact exists: namely, that 
a storm is brewing there. Hence, such a sentence is not a simple 
pattern at all, but is a case of one sentence being embedded in another. 
Recalling the discussion concerning existence in section one of 
this chapter, it is now possible to state that the simplest sentence 
form of all, logically speaking, is the one-word proposition~ that is, 
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a sentence containing no argument, only a predication; more properly 
one should say that the predication contains within itself its own 
argument: 
It is raining (now) 
F 
(2. 219) 
or 
It rains (every year). (2.220) 
F 
Such sentences prove that the most important part of a sentence is its 
predication. It is possible to conceive a "subject," though none may 
exist. One could, for instance, insert The sky fbr the variable..!..!:_, 
thus claiming that the word is not meaningless at all, but merely a 
pronoun. On the other hand, one might say that rain itself is both the 
subject and the predicate, and that the subject has been deleted and 
has been replaced by a pronoun or verb deletion has taken place. That 
is, the sentences mean 
(Rain) is raining (= falling) (2.221) 
or 
(Rain) rains (=falls). (2.222) 
These cases are further supported by sentences noted earlier: I 
dreamed a dream, I lived a life of sin, where verb and object noun 
forms are simply somewhat different aspects of the same thing. 
One-word propositions such as (2.219-2.220) should not be confused 
with transferred discourse. In a "sentence" such as "Yes I" the 
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utterance implies previous knowledge, hence a previous identical propo-
sition which has been deleted because of its unnel:.!essary redundancy. 
Such a sentence is simply an answer, for example, to a sentence such 
as "Are you coming?" Other examples are: "How do you feel?" ("I feel) 
good"; "Where are you going?" ("I'm goirtg) there" (pointing to some 
place with one's finger). 
Finally, a sentence such as 
It is hot (here) in this house (2.223) 
is deceptive. If It is raining and It rains be interpreted, respectively, 
as Rain is raining (present progressive aspect) and Rain rains (simple 
present tense), then It is hot in this house is a kind of "passive voice" 
equivalent to This house is heated (by the sun). The implication, 
on the other hand, might be It is hot (for a person) in this house; 
in this case, is hot is still a "passive voice," for if the prepo-
sitional phrase is made explicit and replaces .!!_, the result is A person 
is (= feels) hot (= it) in this house. One could then also say in 
this instance, that It is a redundant pronoun variable for hot; such 
an interpretation would be similar to There is a book on the table, 
where the "expletive" (locative) is redundant. Thus, the reason the 
"expletive" exists in many of these kinds of sentences seems to be · 
because it functions quite often as a variable of something (explicit 
or implicit) and not only as a meaningless subject slot filler. 
Sunnnary 
Grammars: (',.enerative, Case, and Logical 
The knowledgable reader has, no doubt, by now noticed a number of 
>, 
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similarities of the approach taken in this work to that used in case 
grannnars and generative semantics (case grammar and generative semantics 
are essentially two aspects of the same thing), in spite of the fact 
that the writer has dissociated himself from these schools of thought. 
There are, nevertheless, important differences. First, no recourse to 
(or belief in) deep structure is posited. Propos~tional meaning 
simply refers to the speaker-hearer's thought--not where the thought 
exists. Second, transformations are indeed posited, but on surface 
structures only. Third, as a consequence, it is maintained that it 
is basically performance (not competence) that requires linguistic 
description. Fourth, the so-called "roles" employed in case (generative) 
semantics, though based on the logical conception of the primacy of the 
verb, are misconceived; they, in fact, look suspiciously like just 
different names for the traditional ideas of "subject, 11 "object, 11 etc. 
A logical approach using the concept of "relation," being more 
general, avoids the problem of classifying roles. Langendoen offers 
the following examples to illustrate the primacy of the verb in a case-
granunar approach:35 
John sent the news to the Congressman by telegram. (2. 224) 
x y z w 
The Congressman received the news from John by telegram. (2.225) 
z y x w 
The news reached the Congressman b_y telegram. (2.226) 
y z w 
A telegram conveyed the news to the Congressman. (2. 227) 
w y z 
Examples (2.224-2.227) show that, even though almost the same propo-
sition is indicated in all of them, the verb in each case indicates a 
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different relationship to the underlined roles. This analysis accords 
with the approach in the present work. They also illustrate the fact 
that the various orderings conflict with the traditional ideas of 
functions; the usubj ect," for example shifts to a different role in 
each sentence. To avoid the problem of traditional functions·~ 
Langendoen reclassifies these as "agent" (John), "patient" (the news), 
"goal" (Congressman), and "instrument" (telegram). It seems obvious 
that these are merely new terms (somewhat expanded semantically at 
times) for "subject" (John), "direct object" (the news), and "indirect 
object (to the Congressman). Langendoen glosses over the problem of 
how John and from John function in the first two sentences, by saying 
that the latter is the role of "source" which is related to the former 
case of "agent." How they are related, he never says--because this 
system of classification has the same built-in problems (almost) as the 
traditional scheme. "We conclude," he says, "that the deep structure 
of a sentence of the propositional core in English must identify the 
main predicate and the roles associated with it. 11 36 Identifying the 
main predicate is certainly essential, but why a deep structure must 
be posited is not clear. Manipulation of items need not imply a 
search of one's subconscious. All that is necessary is to determine 
how the speaker relates various items to one another as he performs 
these algebraic gyrations. 
Sentence (2.224) also raises another possible problem. It concerns 
the instrumental phrase. According to the logical sy~tem already 
outlined, this sentence would be analyzed thus: 
John sent the news to the Congressman by telegram. (2.228) 
tl 4R t2 t3 t4 
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But such an analysis may be lacking in insight, for the meaning is 
clearly 
John telegrammed the news to the Congressman. (2.229) 
ti 3R tz t3 
Whatever the reader's reaction to such a radical analysis may be, he 
must admit that all the semantic content has been retained; it illus-
trates, once again, a way in which one pattern may be absorbed by 
another pattern. This could not have been done with He killed her 
with an axe, for the result would have been · 
and the question of whether or not he killed her is left open. The 
point is, unlike Langendoen's, that there is not necessarily a clear 
separation of "case" (instrumentality role here) from the main verb. 
Hence, the main predicate (or "propositional core," as Langendoen calls 
it), which he thinks is so sacrosanct, is itself susceptible to inter-
ference because of its logical relationship to the terms in a 
communication. Thus, if one wishes, one can interpret John sent the 
news by telegram as a transformation of John telegrammed the news--a 
case of separating out a semantic "feature" (in Chomsky's sense) from 
the verb, namely~· Alternatively, one could say the latter form 
is a case of the application of the instrument absorption transfor-
mation, if one thinks the former case is, in some sense, primary 
(=deep structure in generative theory). 
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Verbal Primacy 
The considerations of this section have again pointed out the need 
for a more logical approach to syntactic analysis. Just analyzing 
word meanings and sentence meanings as being somehow mutually exclusive 
will not suffice. Frege's idea that a sentence is a kind of continuum 
between the two is an essential insight lacking in much grammatical 
work. Nevertheless, it is clear that within sentences containing verbs 
as predicates there is some priority associated with verbs (as Langendoen 
has demonstrated above). For this reason, the whole of Chapter III will 
deal with verbal formulations of various types. 
I 
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CHAPTER III 
VERBALS 
Infinitive Phrases and Clauses 
Beginning with this chapter, more complicated sentences will be 
discussed, although there will be some resemblance to examples already 
covered where it was seen that just as there is often no absolute 
division between the six simple sentence patterns, there is, likewise, 
often no absolute division between the simple and the not-so-simple 
sentences. Consequently, there will be also occasional refinements 
of analyses already performed. Sentences containing verbals (infinitives, 
present participles, and past participles) pose, perhaps, the most 
interesting and knotty problems. 
A More Sophisticated .Analysis 
Hemphill's sentence has been met earlier in Chapter II where it 
was claimed that a proper interpretation was a tetradic one. It is 
re-quoted below: 1 
The serpent 
ti 
(tempter) 
tempted Eve to eat the apple. 
4R tz t3 t4 
(tempted) (act) (object of act) 
(3.1) 
Now, in terms of the whole sentence, this is a reasonable interpretation. 
Note that it essentially follows a traditional analysis in that there 
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is no real subordination implied as there would be in a transformational 
analysis, which would be somewhat as follows: 
·~P 
Det ~ ~~p 
I I I I 
the serpent templed Eve 
r 
N 
Ele 
f 
s 
(Problems of tense have been omitted.) 
In the ab.ove analysis, Eve is doing double duty--direct object in the 
main sentence and subject in the "lower," dominated sentence. The 
notation indicates, once again, the futility of establishing such 
functions as subject and object--at least for every sentence in which 
such entities seem to appear. The transformationalist's sense of 
"lower" is not at all clear either. It seems to be based on the idea 
of "after thought"--i.e., the merging of two S-V-0 patterns, the 
"adding on" of more information. This is true, but it ignores the 
fact that in an oral context The serpent tempted Eve implies (because 
of the meaning of tempted) that Eve did something to something (or 
someone) else at such and such a place and in such and such a manner, 
and so on. 
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The traditional word-by-word analysis is more accurate here in that it 
considers this whole sentence as a complete, coherent pattern, in which 
no subordination occurs--just modification. However, while more 
revealing than the transformational view, the traditionalist view also 
is inadequate in some respects. For example, to eat would be called an 
"objective complement" of the direct object Eve; but it could just as 
reasonably be called a complement (completer) of tempted, for the act 
of temptation is, in fact, to eat. One wonders what the traditional 
analysis would be if into eating had been substituted for to eat. A 
more logical analysis is (paraphrased) as follows: 
The serpent tempted Eve (so that) 
( tl 2R t2) 
(3.2) 
(she would) eat the apple. 
zS u2 
This analysis indicates, unlike the transformational approach, that the 
first clause is being treated as a complex argument specified by the 
predicate ~at; the apple is, likewise, specified by the predicate eat; 
she is "understood" from the first clause, and, like the connective 
expression so that ••. would, is deleted by transformation. This 
analysis, thus, avoids the transformational view of subordination 
(in some sense); it avoids the traditional views of subject, object, 
and complement; and it avoids Hemphill's classification of the major 
predicate relation ("temptation" = to eat) as a term, which is prac-
tically the same as calling it an objective complement because of 
the ordering of the terms. To eat is the main relation, as is seen 
if the sentence is re-paraphrased to made Eve eat or caused Eve to eat, 
where made and caused simply denote the motivating force. 
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The above (3.2) analysis is, in other words, considered to be on a 
par with the following sentence, where a complex idea is the so-called 
subject: 
What you want can cause 
(~.) zR 
trouble. 
tz 
(3.3)' 
Certainly, no one would say that What you want is a complete sentence 
semantically, even though it is a sentence pattern; it is, by tradition, 
subordinate, but not in the same way that the what-clause is in What 
you want is for me to cause trouble, where both clauses are subordinate 
traditionally, and neither can stand alone; hence, the whole sentence 
(two patterns) must be analyzed as one! This is where the concept of 
distribution proves useful, for by labeling the what-clause in the 
symbolized sentence above as t 1 , one is saying that in this position t 1 
is not really a term, but that in relation to the main verb, zR, it is 
functioning rather like a term--a complex statement which has been 
reduced to a "single concept" equal to Your desires. . • . (If the 
reader still likes the subject-object distinction, u1 and uz should 
occur in each other's positions above, but this change necessitates 
recognition of the fact that word order is, as has been stated fre-
quently, of little use in determining such functions which are 
essentially semantic, not syntactic.) 
Verbals as Nominatives 
The validity of the above interpretation is easily illustrated by 
comparing verbal usage as substituting for subjects and direct objects. 
What I like is to sing. 
Singing is what I like. 
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(3.4) 
(3.5) 
In (3.4), the infinitive is, traditionally, a subjective complement 
(i.e., the infinitive is functioning as a predicate nominative). But 
what nominative form in the subject does it complekent? Surely it 
cannot be what, for the topical meaning refers not to a thing, but to 
an action, a continuing process, as is brought out in (3.5), the gerund 
(as subject) case. If the infinitive (or gerund) modifies .!_, then it 
is not modification, paradoxically, by traditional definition. There-
fore, it must be the whole clause, What I like, to which to sing (or 
singing) refers. Both of them simply denote 
I like to sing. (3.6) 
The complement here, to sing, based on substitutional principles, is 
said to function as a direct object (=it, what). If verbals are 
(nearly always) predicates, as is here being maintained, one must 
isolate the main predicate from any secondary ones in a complex ex-
pression. Now, since to si~g (or singing) seems to be the main 
predication, how is one to' get over the fact that it seems to be used 
here as a "noun"? In this case, fortunately, English has a more 
specific way of indicating the logical connections of the parts in 
question, as seen below: 
What I like to do is to sing. 
(\.. tl ! ,) F (3. 7) 
a 
Singing is what I like to do. 
F ( tl _R_ ) 
~
(3.8) 
a 
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What and to do are unlabeled (to avoid repetitive confusion) because 
they both have the sattle referent I Traditional and structural granunar 
have both confused function (subject, subjective complement, and object) 
and substitutional positioning with logical function in these cases 
because they have tended to ignore the fact that semantics to some 
degree also indicates (governs) syntax. In both cases, (3.7-3.8), 
above, a is an argument term whose properties are extensions of the 
specification given in to sing (or singing). The copula is not a 
logical word indicating class inclusion or membership, for the class 
of singers is not the intended meaning--just the process of singing. 
If one interpreted the whole what-clause as equivalent to to sing, 
then a true predicate nominative, traditionally, would seem to be the 
pattern into which the sentence was forced; but the clause refers to 
what. I like to do, not just to what I do. 
Entailment 
The infinitive or gerund is said in most textbooks to function as 
a noun when it is the subject of its sentence, as in 
To give is to receive. (3.9) 
Giving is receiving. 
" 
(3.10) 
By adding the complication of infinitives and gerunds in the predicates 
as well as the subjects, some interesting results ensue. If these 
predicates are predicate nominatives, as is usually claimed, in what 
sense is there equality? Giving is the opposite of receiving! Surely, 
something has been left out that is implied. If the granunarians of 
various schools can accept the idea of the "understood" you in 
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imperative sentences, then why can't they accept the obvious fact that 
the "understood" subject in the above "clauses" is the indeterminate 
pronoun one (= people= anyone)? That ist the sentences mean something 
like the following: 
If one gives, (then) one will receive. 
( a F ) --?> (a G ) (3.11) 
The same letter is used for both arguments, since they are identical. 
The arrow indicates logical entailment, just as if. • . then does in 
ordinary English, though then is often deleted. To give and giving 
are therefore true predicates. They result in the above sentences by 
transformations applied to the if. . • then sentence. If one wishes 
to claim that the entailment sentence has, by means of transformations, 
been forced into the so-called predicate nominative patterns cited 
(logically, the equality patterns), this would be satisfactory except 
that the verbals are not nominatives; they just occur in the same 
pattern where nominatives can also occur. Thus, the proper inter-
pretations are 
To give ~ to receive (3.12) 
F ~ G 
and 
Giving is receiving, (3.13) 
F __.:;, G 
where the subject ~has been deleted because of its obviousness. 
The transformational steps would have to indicate, of course, which 
form the verbals would take. 
Now that this simple example of entailment has been described, it 
is possible to return to an earlier, more complicated example: What 
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you want can cause trouble. This sentence can be simplified to 
If you~ that(= what), it can cause trouble. (3.14) 
< ti zs tz )..+Ctz zR t3 ) 
The result is a complex sentence according to the traditional definition, 
where the comma (oral pause juncture) performs, along with if, the 
logical idea of entailment. Again, neither clause makes much sense 
without the other; even the so-called independent clause is not really 
independent for it is meaningless unless one knows to what it refers .• 
Thus, the entailment sentence, (3.14), has been transformed into the 
grammatical form of the S-V-0 sentence pattern, What you want can 
cause trouble; the original logical notation, however, indicates its 
meaning structure more accurately. 
The passive infinitive can be treated similarly: 
To be flattered is not unenjoyable to me 0.15) 
means 
If I were (to be) flattered, 7 ( tl R ) 
(3.16) 
it would not be unenjoyable to me. 
-(u1 2s ti ) 
In (3.16), it refers to the whole if-clause concept, hence the repeti-
tional use of u1; likewise, I and to me have the same referent. The 
double negative form can be further simplified to the active form of 
If I were (to be) flattered, I would enjoy it. ( t"i" R ~(tl S u1 ) 
\...._ -- "< ___,, 
(3.17) 
u1 
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Because of the repetition of referents, the notation is troublesome, 
but it is at least perspicuous. A simpler (but too drastically para-
phrased, perhaps) interpretation might be 
If I were {to be) flattered, I would be happy. 
(i° F )~ (b G ) 
(3.18) 
where a=b would have to be shown in some way. This is mathematically 
neater, but it is possible to keep !!:_ in the last clause, if desired. 
Troublesome though the notation is, it illustrates the fact that the 
two clauses are inseparable both semantically and syntactically. In 
traditional terms, one would have to say that the indirect object to me 
has become the subject in the independent clause of the second complex 
sentence. The independent clause, however, is not so independent, for 
it makes no sense unless one allows that it is a substitution instance 
of the direct object, which is the whole dependent clause. That is, ..!! 
equals I were to be flattered in If I were (to be) flattered, it would 
not be rmenjoyable to me. 
Predicate adjective sentences with so-called verbal subjects can 
also be treated similarly: 
To look at the sick (people) makes me ill. 
Looking at the sick (people) makes me ill. 
The logical form of both sentences is: 
If I look at the sick, I become ill. 
<ti" 2R t 2 )-7-(t1 s ) 
(3.19) 
(3.20) 
(3. 21) 
This sentence could also be re-written, perhaps, as When I look at the 
sick, I become ill, for when carries little or no sense of time here; 
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many would use the if or when formulations equivalently in this 
sentence. 
Adverbs added to so-c411ed verbal subjects or complements cause 
no trouble, as seen below: 
It is fun to play happily. 
To play happily is fun. 
(3. 22) 
( 3. 23) 
Both (3. 22) and (3. 23) are examples of transformations of 
If ~ plays happily, ~ has :eun. 
(ti Rl R2 )-7(t1 S ) 
(3.24) 
Note that has does not indicate possession; it functions like to be, 
indicating tense, person, and number only. The true predicate is the 
adjective fun, which basically carries the idea of enjoys (oneself). 
When (3.22) and (3.23) are compared to (3.24), it becomes evident that 
the traditional distinction between simple modified statements and 
complex sentences is not at all clear. (This latter topic will be 
discussed more fully in the next chapter. 
Infinitives as Modifiers 
The traditional idea that infinitives may modify predicate 
adjectives is also misconceived. 2 
Larry was anxious to leave. (3.25) 
This sentence is actually a reduction of a two-clause sentence, for the 
meaning is obviously not anxiously left, nor is tt left anxiously. It 
means l,arry anxiously wanted to leave, which is itself a reduction of 
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Larry was anxious that he (himself) might leave. (3.26) 
(a F ) (a G ) 
This subjunctive form may sound a bit strange simply because it is not 
much used anymore, but it does show that the original intention was to 
treat to leave as a true verb. That is usually classified as a meaning-
less connective functioning rather like the logical word and, as in 
Larry was anxious and (as a result) he wanted to leave. The word that, 
however, could be interpreted as an anticipatory direct object. 
Structural grammarians and some transformationalists would categorize 
the that-clause as a substitution instance of the direct object; this 
analysis is based on the old, now non-standard form, Larry was anxious 
for to leave, which is equivalent semantically to. Larry desired to 
leave (=Larry desired it). Logically, this would require only a 
manipulation of the parentheses. It will be recalled that outer 
(sentence boundary) parentheses are always implied; in this inter-
pretation, the .outer parentheses are useful because the first phrase 
is not being considered as a clause, but part of the total sentence, 
and hence is not itself enclosed in parentheses: 
Larry was anxious that 
[ a F 
(subject)(predicate) 
(= Larry desired 
he might leave. 
( a G )] 
\,,, ).o ...../ 
(direct object) 
it ) 
(3. 2 7) 
Linking verbs sometimes require more elaborate paraphrasing. For 
example, in a sentence such as Henry appears to be improving, the pas-
ive infinitive is not a subject complement (i.e., a predicate adjective) 
as Conlin declares.3 The meaning is something like Henry appears to 
me to be improving. That is, the subject of appears is not Henry; 
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it is "understood" to be someone else. Therefore, the sentence may 
be analyzed somewhat as follows (supplying the lost subject): 
I think (=believe) (that) Henry is improving. 
(a . F ) ( b G ) 
(3. 28) 
Again, if one interprets the Henry-clause as. a direct object--i.e., .1 
think it--then the parentheses can be manipulated as above in (3.27). 
Likewise, the sentence Mother seems to know means something like 
I think Mother knows, contrary to the traditional (Conlin's) view. 4 It 
may be viewed as two "conjoined" propositions or, more logically, as 
one complex proposition. The latter would require the bracketed 
formulation as in (3.27); the "conjoined" formulation would require 
that the two clauses be enclosed in separate sets of parentheses. 
Infinitives as Predicate Nouns 
Conlin also calls the infinitive in John was to go, but he became 
ill a subjective complement (subclass: predicate noun).s This is 
certainly nonsense because there is no sense of equivalence existing 
between John and to go; the analysis is based on the structural idea 
that to go occurs in a position where a noun could occur; but any 
part of speech can occur in the third slot of a simple sentence pattern! 
The meaning of was to is an indication that something was planned for 
the future at some time in the past, for the paraphrase John planned 
to go ..•• leaves the identical meaning intact. The subjunctive 
form of the sentence reveals its true logical structure: 
The plan was that John go, but he became ill; (3. 29) 
or 
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John's plan 
ti 
was that he go , 
( t2 2R) 
~
but he became ill. 
-&-(tZ s ) (3.30) 
=t1 
Whiie but is semantically contrastive, it still represents a type of 
conjunction. Again, the word that could be an anticipatory object 
equalling everything that follows it in the clause The t 1 beneath 
the that-clause indicates that the complex meaning is simply another 
-·.--
way of stating the contents of plan; if one wishes to make more per-
spicuous the fact that the structure is different than that covered 
by the first instance of ti, another log~cal term symbol can, of course, 
be used, but it is unnecessary since (t2 2R) covers the desired 
structural facts. This analysis illustrates that the traditionalist 
is on the right track but is confused because of his word-by-word 
approach •. In the traditional sense, to go does complement the subject, 
but the subject is an idea corresponding to John's plan (with the 
emphasis on plan); and to go by itself is not the complement--it is the 
entire that-clause of the subjunctive form, which has been reduced to 
was to go by deletion transformation (of that he) and insertion trans-
formation of the meaningless to. Now, ~performs its usual tasks 
of indicating tense, number, and person; it carries no concept of 
futurity, for futurity is indicated in the noun plan. Of course, the 
logician would not call this a predicate nominative clause (he would 
not insert the second ti), for to him there is not, strictly speaking, 
an equality relationship between John's plan and the act of his going. 
This is a problem of conceptual interpretation which is hard to decide 
in any conclusive way. 
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Infinitives as Objects of Infinitives 
Sometimes one infinitive is said to be the object of another, 6 
as in 
She has the right to order her children to work, (3.31) 
which can be reduced to 
She can demand that her children work. 
·(a . F ) ( b G) (3. 32) 
This proposal illustrates that work tells what the children should do; 
it has no connection with order or demand unless one wishes to inter-
pret the whole that-clause as a complex notion functioning as a direct 
object of demand, which is, of course, possible. Even in the original 
sentence one could reasonably say, traidtionally, that her children 
is the direct object of to order and the subject of to work. Since 
this is so, the logical analysis seems more reasonable even though 
some might object to a change of verbs. The issue, in any case, is 
the relationship of the two infinitives. Keeping to the original 
sentence, (3.31), one could say that the whole complex idea contained 
in to order her children to work is a second direct object in apposition 
to the right, and, comparing (3.31) to (3.32), that would be equal to 
the right, producing a relational form. This traditional view could be 
re-written as 
She has the right: S 2R t2 to order her children to work. t2 (Internal structure is ignored.) 
Logically, however, there are many kinds of rights, and ordering 
(3.33) 
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children i~ only one of them. Yet, the definite article in the .right 
would seem to refer to the one and only right, if taken literally. 
Since this is not the intention, it must mean the ordering of children 
selected from those rights which exist. Hence, the last analysis 
lacks explanatory power, whereas the first analysis avoids these 
problems and states the proposition completely and correctly. 
Such an analysis as the above is comparable to sentences such as 
They elected him (to be the) President, (3. 34) 
tl 2R t2 tz 
which are usually analyzed as indicated (one direct object used in 
apposition to another). Even here, however, a more refined analysis 
seems in order' as indicated by the parenthesized words' for electing 
him is not exactly the same thing as becoming President. Thus, a more 
precise analysis would be something like 
They elected him (so) that he might become President. (3.35) 
tl 2R t2 tz e p 
This formulation points out the fact that there have been many Presi-
dents (P), of which he is only one member of that class of people. 
This distinction is better brought out if the sentence is re-paraphrased 
to They elected him to the (office of) Presidency. That is, a Presi-
dent is, in a sense, not a person at all, but an office (holder) whose 
duties are assigned to a man to carry out. A similar situation is the 
idea of a corporation being legally an entity which may be involved in 
court proceedings. If the corporation is ordered to pay damages to the 
c I aimnnt, this fact does not imply that the members who make up the 
corporatJon must dig into their own bank accounts. The corporation has 
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its own, separate bank account. Thus, him and President in the 
original, shorter sentence do not refer to the same thing, and assigning 
tz to both words is a misconceived maneuver. 
Subjects of Infinitives 
In a sentence such as I want you to go, it is usually said that 
the infinitive has a subject; the subject of the infinitive is said 
also to be the object of the preceding clause. Now; the subjunctive 
form, once again, illustrates that this is nonsens·e if one does not 
want to violate the definitions assigned to the terms "subject" and 
"object" (doer and receiver of action, respectively). You is not an 
object of want; the clause does not mean that I want you (I want to 
own you). You is the subject of to go, as a transformationalist would 
insist, but his analysis is also plagued with problems. Some trans-
formationalists would schematize the sentence thus: 
s 
The labeling obscures the fact, nevertheless, that the second S may be 
an NP in disguise, for the S is dominated by VP, which, in turn, is 
dominated by the first S. In fact, other transform~tionalists would 
label the predicate in this way: 
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p 
[ 
The latter analysis, then, actually agrees essentially with the tradi-
tional view. The structural grammarian, by substitution, would 
likewise say that the sentence means I want it, where it means you go 
but where it also means you in particular. That is, a noun or pronouq 
may be substituted in object position and it may perform the object 
function of receiving the action of the verb want; the sentence "makes 
sense." If one insists on talking in such terms, then the direct 
object is the whole complex notion of you go, for that is what is 
wanted, not just you, as explained above. The first transformational 
diagram (but not the second) has the virtue, at least, of treating the 
second S in its entirety as a direct object, while the traditional 
analysis more or less accords with the structuralist viewpoint and the 
viewpoint indicated in the second transformational diagram. Note 
should be taken, however, that there is no overwhelming reason, in the 
first diagram, to interpret the second S as an object at all! That 
is why it is labeled S, and not an NP converted to an S as in the 
second diagram. The fact that the first S dominates the whole predi-
cate does not disturb anything either, for domination simply means 
that a verb like want semantically requires something to follow--it 
cannot stand alone; in this case, a proposition follows. Hence, this 
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is a case of a logically complex sentence because the first clause 
depends upon the second clause for its sense (whereas in grammar it 
is said that the reverse is true): 
I desire that you ~· [ (a . F ) ( b G) l 
(3.36) 
The subjunctive formulation once again proves that the subject of the 
second clause is not an object of the first clause. (The word that, 
which is optional, could, as noted earlier be conceived as an antici-
patory object in the first clause: i.e., that= you go.) The notation 
indicates only that there are two propositions, the first specifying 
the need of a second. The outer brackets, while superfluous, make the 
necessary "conjoining" more perspicuous; the words that and to perform 
this service in the two versions cited. Of course, mere juxtaposition 
can be used to denote the "conjoining": 
I desire you go (=leave). (a F ) ( b G ) (3.37 
Leave is inserted parenthetically because it is stylistically preferable 
in everyday English to ~ in the subjunctive mode of expression. One 
can say I desire that you go, but for some unknown reason one cannot 
say I ~ant that you go; the latter sentence would be thought of as 
semantically deviant, even though it means the same thing as the first 
sentence and is just as grammatical (mechanically). Desire seems only 
to carry a "softer tone," while want sounds more demanding. These 
ideas concerning grammaticality and tone support the view of Chomsky 
and Frege mentioned in Chapter I. 
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The various subjunctive forms that have lately been cited delete 
the to from the infinitive forms (and retain the uninflected third 
person), which further supports the view of one sentence being trans-
formed from another. The to may also be deleted and the third person 
remain uninflected in some non-subjunctive instances, as in 
We watched Mary .£.!X· (3. 38) 
(a F ) ( b G) 
It is instructive to note that .£!Xis ambiguous; it may match watched 
in that simple, definite past time is intended, namely We watched while 
(or and) Mary cried. On the other hand, progressive aspect may be 
intended: We watched Mary crying, where was has been deleted. This 
usage contrasts with many cases cited earlier in this section where 
gerunds functioned exactly like infinitives--e.g., I like to swim I 
.I like swinnning--both were true predicates when logically explicated, 
and no alteration of tense or aspect occurred. The implication in the 
to-less sentences such as We watched Mary cry seems to be that deletion 
of the to signals the fact that the infinitive may be interpreted in 
the progressive aspect. 
Causation 
As usual, it is the meaning of the first verb which gives a clue 
as to vb.at is possible. In Helen made Paul leave, only definite past 
is possible; made governs the choice. The sentence is equivalent to 
Helen caused Paul to leave, where to reappears. There is no subjunctive 
form in this case that adheres more or less to the same wording. There-
fore, the only conclusion that one can logically reach is that made 
and caused are functioning as quasi-auxiliary verbs and that leave and 
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to leave are not infinitives.7 That is, the logical interpretations 
are identical: 
Helen caused •.. Paul ... to leave. (3. 39) 
tl t2 2R 
Helen made ..• Paul ..• leave. (3.40) 
-- --
t1 t2 2R 
The ellipses indicate that the auziliaries are discontinuously consti-
tuent with the main verbs; the Aux+ Verb constructions are caused+ 
to leave and made+ leave. In other words, to leave is either not an 
infinitive or it is still the main verb of the second "clause," not an 
objective complement. The point can, perhaps, be made clearer by citing 
cases where the so-called objective complement is an adjective., not a 
verb: 
He made •.. the house .•. white. (3. 41) 
He painted ... the house .•. white. (3.42) 
There is no hint of an infinitive in either of the above cases, yet the 
structures resemble those in (3. 39 and (3. 40). The underlined areas 
indicate the Aux+"Verb" structures. There is no meaning in made 
except causation; the true predicate is therefore white. Since (3.42) 
is equivalent to (3.41), the true predicate is still white. White, 
thus, cannot be an objective complement, as traditionalists would 
insist. 8 Painted does give the more specific added meaning of how the 
house was made white, so it must be part of the predicate white; hence, 
it is a quasi-auxiliary. Though strange in this usage, English does, 
fortunately, have a verb form for white. The sentence, then, is annlyzed 
as 
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He whitened the house. .(3. 43) 
tl 2R tz 
The above analysis is supported by a similar so-called adjective 
formation: 
The remark made ••• me .•• angry. (3. 44) 
tl tz 2R 
The remark angered me (3.45) 
ti 2R tz 
Therefore, made white and made angry are on par with made leave. The 
latter is no more an infinitive than the former two are. 
Anticipation 
Just as to be + infinitive implies anticipated future action from 
a past or present viewpoint, so does the for ••. to + verb construction, 
only the subject does not come necessarily from the first "clause." 
The following pair illustrate this point: 
You are to see the boss. (3.46) 
The man for you to see is the boss. (3.47) 
In (3.46), you is "understood" to be the subject of the infinitive. 
It is apparently a reduced form of (3.47), or (3.47) is an expanded 
version of (3.46)--for there is a redundancy in the introduction of a 
predicate nominative. However, (3.47) is misleading logically, for 
The man is not the true subject, as most traditionalists would declare; 
they would say that the for ••• to expression is equivalent to whom you 
should see. 9 Others would say that the subject of the infinitive is the 
object of the preposition for, which really is almost a meaningless 
statement. 10 Still others ignore the problem entirely by citing 
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sentences in which the optional for has been carefully deleted--e.g., 
He wanted (for) her to become a dancer; here, her is simply said to 
be the object of wanted and the subject of to become.11 (Sentences 
where for may not be deleted are usually ignored.) No one seems to see 
that you is the subject in sentences such as (3.47) cited above, in 
spite of its obvious similarity to (3.46): 
You are to (= should) see the boss. (3. 48) 
t1 2R t2 
American slang, interestingly enough, does recognize the resemblance: 
You are to (= should) see the boss-man. (3.49) 
tl 2R t2 
Such sentences are sometimes reduced to elliptical expressions where 
the subject must be supplied by the hearer (or writer), as, for example, 
in 
The man to see is the boss. (3.50) 
Such formulations, however, are said to be cases of deletion of for and 
the subject of the infinitive.12 This sentence is merely a transforma-
tional reduction of elements from You are to (= should) see the boss-man 
analyzed above. You is the one and only subject. More precisely, there 
is a relation of the necessity of seeing being established between you 
and the boss (=the man). 
Problems of Mood and Voice 
The above cases also illustrate that the distinction between indica-
tive and subjunctive moods is blurred: are to + verb = indicative and 
141 
should + verb = subjunctive. Are to is mandative; should implies 
advisability. The distinction between active and passive is even more 
unclear. All these problems are illustrated below: 
The litigation to be carried out (by you) is treacherous. 
The litigation (which) you should carry out is treacherous. 
The litigation (for you) to carry out is treacherous. 
The litigation (which) you will carry out is treacherous. 
(3. 51) 
(3.52) 
(3. 53) 
(3.54) 
Logic cannot solve these gra.nunatical dilemmas, but the relations are 
fairly easy to formalize, for they accord with (3.49): 
You are to (=should) carry out this treacherous litigation. (3. 55) 
t 1 2 R_ ( F a 
tz <="it") 
The direct object (tz) is itself a proposition--This litigation is 
treacherous~-which accounts for the complex notation. 
Apposition 
Infinitive apposition is easily handled in view of earlier insights 
discussed irt this section. The following passive sentence 
The plea to become President was pleasing (to Kennedy) (3.56) 
can be co.nverted to the active voice, becoming 
The plea to become President pleased Kennedy, (3. 5 7) 
which subjunctively, transforms to 
The plea that he become President pleased Kennedy. (3. 58) 
To avoid notational pitfalls, (3.58) can be further changed to read 
142 
The plea pleased Kennedy, that he become President. (3.59) 
t 1 2R t 2 ( t 2 s ) 
No equality (apposition) is shown between t 1 and t 3 because the that-
clause merely extends the meaning of plea (explains what this particular 
plea was about), but a plea (by definition) is not the act of becoming 
President; a plea is a request, but becoming President is an action (a 
predicate function which specifies the nature of the plea). All t 3 
indicates is that the whole unit can be shifted about as a single 
complex idea: That he become President was a plea that pleased Kennedy 
or The plea that he become President pleased Kennedy. The parentheses 
could serve alone to show that t 3 distributes as a unit, but the 
redundant notation, perhaps, increases clarification. 
Infinitive and Gerundive Usage Contrasted 
Conlin claims that "the infinitive is unique in its function as the 
verb part of an infinitive phrase which has a subject, nl3 of which 
several examples have already been noted, among which were some question-
able cases. The fact that Conlin is wrong in some instances would be 
trivial if it were not for the fact that it points up the inconsistency 
of traditional analyses based on paradoxical methods of interpretation. 
C.onlin's work, which has been often cited, is an excellent example of a 
very complete college handbook in which the best insights of both tradi-
tional and structural grannnar have been skillfully merged, if one 
discounts a few natural lapses. One such lapse is his remark that "the 
gerund may have a verb function in a word group by having a subject. 1114 
(Comparison of this quotation with the one immediately above should be 
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kept in mind in what follows.) Early in this section infinitives and 
gerund sentences were given in pairs to show their essential identity 
logically and grammatically; the only difference, of course, between 
the two is inflection (to+ simple verb vs. verb+ -ing). Two such 
cases that establish Conlin' s misjudgment are: 
Bill taught Jane to bowl. (3.60) 
Bill taught Jane bowling (3.61) 
Now, it was demonstrated that by converting such a proposition as 
that above to its subjunctive form one could see that both verbal forms 
are not objective complements; they are true verb (predicate) functions. 
If one still sees some validity in the traditional view, one could 
indeed repeat the feminine noun (or pronoun) to indicate its dual 
usage as subject and object, and this was, in fact, done several times 
in the following manner: 
Bill taught Jane (so) that she might bowl. (3.62) 
But Lt is just as logical (perhaps more so) to interpret the sentence 
thus: 
Bill taught (so) that Jane might bowl. (3. 63) 
(a F)~ ( b G) 
Jane (or feminine pronoun) is deleted in the first "clause" because 
Bill's teaching need not refer to whom he taught, but what he taught 
(i.e., the sport is implied because it occurs in the function _Q). One 
may have misgivings about using the logical symbol for entailment, and, 
indeed, one could devise another symbol to convey this type of 
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consequence •. The motivation for using the arrow (bekides the desire 
to keep the symbolism to a minimum) is the following paraphrase which 
may be a bit too "rough" for some: 
Since Bill was teaching (her) the sport, Jane could learn it. (3.64) 
This paraphrase seems close to an if ••• then type of sentence. The 
problem is that implication can be expressed in so many ways in a 
natural language such as English. In any case, some logical symbolism 
is needed to express (so) that, (in order) that, etc., for the two 
"clauses" as separate propositions mean different things than when they 
are combined. Here, again, is another excellent example which illus-
trates Frege's contention that propositional content cannot be 
determined by just examining word meanings, nor can it be determined by 
just examining "complete sentences," as grannnarians are wont to call 
such sentences as Bill taught and Jane might bowl (both S-V-types). 
Neither can the whole sentence be construed as a kind of conjunction 
of these two propositions, for the basic meaning of the whole is dif-
ferent than that of its two major parts. Hence, some kind of 
implication is meant. The complete sentence does not represent a mere 
concatenation of two other, separate, "complete" thoughts; it represents 
a still different thought unto itself. In composing such a sentence, 
one is operating on two separate levels, though the two levels obviously 
connect or overlap somewhere. One level is the level of complex thought 
sketched above; the other level is that of forcing the complex thought 
into one or more ready-made (so to speak) syntactic patterns known to 
the speaker or writer. It is like having a finite quantity of clay; 
the artist may mold and remold the clay over and over again into an 
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infinite quantity and type of object, but he is restricted to the infi-
nite possibilities of the clay itself, for he has no access to additional 
materials which may be combined with the clay. There are levels of 
infinities, in other words! The clay represents the sentence pattern--
pattern one from which all the other sentence patterns are extensions. 
The infinite variety of forms which the clay may take represents human 
thought. But human thought, paradoxically, may be contained in (or 
stem from) a higher-order of infinity--e.g., Divine Thought, as some 
say. If a higher-order of infinity is not posited, then how is one to 
account for the limited sentence patterns (the clay)? Mathematicians 
who know of Cantor's laws on the infinite can perhaps appreciate this 
exposition better than most people. 
What the above discussion is getting at is the need in grammar for 
a unified approach--if not the one being attempted in this work, then 
some other. But the ad hoc interpretations that have been noted in 
grammatical analysis must be recognized and stopped, if any progress 
is to be made in syntactic analysis. Conlin's lapses, to which reference 
has been made, were made in the space of five pages! (And his views 
are the conventional ones.) Some twenty-five pages earlier in his book, 
Conlin lapses again where he is dealing with a different topic (agree-
ment). It, like the first two lapses, can be found in almost any 
standard schoolroom grammar. No wonder many of the brighter children 
avoid the study of grammar as they would the plague! Specifically, 
this lapse deals with possessive pronoun usage with gerunds. Now, 
gerunds will be taken up in the next section; the purpose here is again 
to contrast infinitives and gerunds. In a test exercise for students, 
Conlin offers the following pronouns in the sentence 
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1 k ( ) d 15 I do not i e you, you~ running arou .•.. (3.65) 
The proper pronoun choice is said to be your. This selection is based 
on the idea that running is a direct object, and your is its possessive 
modifier. A very widely used college handbook by James McCrimmon, 
agreeing with Conlin, says that "pronouns take the possessive case when 
they precede and modify a gerund. ul6 Mccrimmon' s definition is cited 
because Conlin, as do many textbook writers, never really explains the 
rationale for his choice; he presents it as a tacit rule. In fact, 
neither of these two writers gives a reason for the rule. Some analysts 
classify possessive use as formal style and objective case use as 
connnon or informal style, however.17 
A rule should have a logical basis which accords with the grannnar. 
If this assumption is true, what sense does it make to analyze the 
following two sentences differently? 
I don't like him to smoke cigars. (3.66) 
I don't like his smoking cigars. (3.67) 
The fact that nearly every school handbook has exercises like Conlin's 
which require that one choose his, not him, in the gerundive example 
(but not in the infinitive example) does not make the choice correct. 
It does show, however, that a great many people see things differently 
than the school grannnariansl Are the laymen necessarily less logical 
than the specialists? They are, after all, native speakers too. Both 
(3.66) and (3.67) are almost identical word-for-word, grammatically and 
semantically. Why is (3.66) said to contain a pronoun subject of an 
infinitive and (3.64) a verbal noun object modified by the same third 
person pronoun in its possessive form? Since the present writer is a 
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a native speaker and a specialist and one who sees absolutely no dif-
ference in meaning betw-een these two sentences, he would interpret both 
to be logically identical, as follows: 
don't like him (=his) to smoke (= smoking) cigars. (3.68) 
zR (u1 2S u2 )] 
tz 
This notation agrees with the traditional idea that the him-clause is 
distributionally functioning as a unit, i.e., as a kind of direct 
object. Him (objective case) is selected as the proper grannnatical 
pronoun because, apparently, 'most people including grammarians, think 
that him is an object of like. The notation does not indicate this 
because the writer thinks it is logically incorrect. A more logically 
correct form, it is believed, would be 
I don't like the fact 
-~~ zR tz 
that he smokes cigars. 
(~)] 
"t II 2 
(3. 69) 
No true apposition (equality) is shown between t 2 and "tz" for the same 
reasons given in an earlier example; however, distributionally "tz" is 
usually treated as simply a more complete explanation of t 2 . This 
example illustrates the fact that native speakers, including grannnarians, 
treat the masculine pronoun as a true subject of the verb smokes, but 
they do not think of it as an object of like; if one equates the whole 
clause ("t2") with the direct object, the fact (t2), that is not the 
same thing as equating a part of the clause (him) wi~h t 2 . 
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Infinitives as Adverbs 
It has been demonstrated, so far, that infinitives perform the 
verb function in sentences where traditionalists would define the · 
infinitive function variously as subjective complement (both predicate 
"noun" and predicate "adjective"), subject, direct object, objective 
complement, object of preposition, predicate adjective modifier (ad-
verbial), and certain undefined sorts of complements. As if this were 
not bewildering enough, traditionalists also claim that an infinitive 
can function adverbially as a verb modifier. They cite examples such as 
as 
He has gone to hunt, (3. 70) 
where to hunt is said to be an adverbial modifier (not a predicate 
complement) of the verb gone. This classification is, apparently, 
based on definition and substitution: (1) a word which modifies a verb 
is an adverb; and (2) adverbials such as quickly or north (locative) 
could replace to hunt. 18 Structuralists are a bit cagey. They do not 
say such an expression as to hunt is an adverb; they say, rather, that 
it is in the adverbial position. But this thinly-veiled hint of 
adverbial usage is not enough, for an object may also follow the verb 
in third position. So the structuralist sets up a rule: If in an 
expression of the form V + to + V a pronoun such as it or that can be 
meaningfully substituted for the infinitive, then the infinitive is 
located where nominals occur and is probably functioning as a nominal; 
if, on the other hand, in order to can replace the to, the infinitive 
is occupying the adverbial position and is probably functioning 
adverbially •19 If defining, even partially, by position is a valid 
procedure, the aforesaid definition certainly is not a good example of 
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its efficacy! Third position is third position, no matter what fills 
it. Substitution seems, in fact, to be the key to the answer, and 
is basically the traditional approach--so nothing has been gained at 
all. The fact is that a priori reasoning has been used in both the 
traditional and structural analyses. Mere juxtapositiioning of verb + 
infinitive has suggested one possibility, "adverbialhood." This 
being accepted, the next step is to substitute an adverbial expression 
for the infinitive; if the sentence makes sense, then the infinitive 
is functioning adverbially. But one may substitute (paraphrase) other 
things, based on the propositional meaning of the whole sentence. If 
this is done, the result is similar to many that have been noted 
previously: 
He has gone (so that he might) hunt. [<a F ) (~ G · )] (3. 71) 
The circumflexed~ in the second clause above is actually "understood," 
not overt. The brackets have been inserted to stress the fact of the 
unity of the two clauses in combination, for to say that He has gone 
implies (in this context) some reason for going; i.e., the first 
clause is not truly independent. He is the subject of the second 
clause just as it is in the sentence I want him to go. The tradition-
alist rejects the former analysis, but accepts the latter (with the 
proviso that he must be converted to him to signal its additional 
function of direct object of want). This capricious analytical be-
havior is caused by the traditionalist's word-by-word approach and his 
a priori thinking. A similar fallacious method beclouds the struc-
turalist's vision. Even the transformational school, in spite of some 
advances made in this area, still comes up with garbled interpretations, 
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as was shown early in this section. The stumbling block for all three 
schools of thought is their reluctance to give up subject-predicate 
thinking in favor of a more flexible method, such as the logic of 
relations. 
Gerund Phrases and Clauses 
Definition and Function 
Gerunds are defined as -ing verbals that function as nouns. As 
with the case of infinitive expressions, this traditional definition 
leaves a lot to be desired. Nouns (and therefore gerunds) are said to 
function in the following capacities: subject, direct object, 
subjective complement, appositive, and prepositional complement. Each 
of these functions will be covered in this section. 
Gerunds as Nominatives 
Many homely sayings use the gerund as a subject and as a subjective 
complement (predicate noun) in the same expression. So, these two 
functions may be conveniently combined into one exposition. A common 
example is 
Seeing is believing. (3. 72) 
The analysis of this sentence is the same as that given in the previous 
section for To give is to receive: 
If one sees, (then) one believes. 
c-a--n ~ ca.- G ) 
(3. 73) 
Traditional grammarians interpret such a sentence as a kind of predicate 
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noun sentence on the basis of supposed permissible reversibility: 
Seeing is.believing= Believing is seeing. There is no identity of 
meaning, however, and perhaps this is the reason that some analysts 
avoid the term "predicate noun" and use instead just "subjective 
complement." When so used, the term "subjective complement" becomes 
meaningless, for it just labels some vague, undefined intuitive notion. 
The resemblance of such a sentence to a predicate noun formulation is 
misleading, as can be proven by comparing the two implicational forms: 
If one sees, then one believes I If one believes, then one sees. The 
meanings of the two sentences are different, for the int~nded meaning 
of the saying is clearly that one must first see so that belief can 
occur. Not only are the attributes attaching to seeing and believing 
dtfferent, but also the propositional meanings of the two clauses are 
different. There is no identity or even similarity of any kind. The 
ordering must place seeing before believing because the latter is a 
consequent of the former. Reversibility can only occur if one re-words 
the sentence more extensively, perhaps to One believes after one has 
~; but the proposition, if not the grannnatical structure, remains 
as symbolized above, and no one, of course, would equate this sentence 
grammatically with a subjective complement form, nor would anyone say 
it is a transformation of the original saying or the symbolized impli-
cational form. Seeing is believing is, however, a transformation of 
If one sees, (then) one believes. 
Also classified as predicate complement gerunds (predicate nomi-
nals) are such sentences as 
Mr. Miller's profession is teaching (3.74) 
a F 
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and 
Al's hobby appears to be loafing. (3.75) 
a F 
These two cases are unlike the gerund complement in Seeing is believing. 
Since a profession is defined as a unit of people banded together in 
co11mlon cause, it cannot be said to be equivalent to what the people 
in the profession do. Likewise, a hobby defines an activity, but it 
is not the performing of that activity itself. Sentence (3.74) is a 
reduction by deletion of redundant elements shown below: 
Mr. Miller's profession is (that) he is teaching. (3. 76) 
a (b F ) 
Sentence (3.75) implies a deleted subject in a passive voice form, Al's 
hobby appears (to me) to be that he is loafing, which implies in active 
voice 
l. think Al's hobby is loafing. (3. 77) 
t 1 2R ( a F . ) 
\.....: ./ 
------v 
t2 
In (3.76), ~labels profession; Mr. Miller's is only a possessive modi-
fier which redundantly occurs as he (~_) in the paraphrase; he may be 
deleted since Mr. Miller's makes the subject obvious. The result is 
the simplest of all logical patterns. But the paraphrase, (3. 77) of 
(3.78) shows more complexity because there are two propositions: I 
think (something) and Al's hobby is loafing; one is a relation and the 
other is a function. Thus, the Al-clause is functioning as a kind of 
direct object (in traditional terms); the clause is not labeled as a 
direct object because it is a proposition which completes the sense of 
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the first clause (proposition); i.e., the second proposition is embedded 
in the first proposition. 
Just as standard usage requires a possessive (not objective) 
pronoun with a gerund in I don't like his smoking cigars (discussed 
and compared with infinitive use earlier), so standard usage also 
requires a possessive pronoun with a subject gerund. In this case, 
however, the.subjective usage makes more sense, for a sentence such as 
His lying annoyed me is merely a reduced form of something like 
or 
or 
He lied which (fact) annoyed me. 
The fact (that) he lied annoyed me. 
He lied (a_F_) 
~ 
ti 
and 
& 
it annoyed me. 
(tl 2R tz) 
(3.78) 
(3.79) 
(3.80) 
Sentence (3.80) is chosen as the simplest form from which (3.78) and 
(3.79) are transformational derivations. Since the whole first clause, 
He lied(= it), is a term with regard to the second proposition, the 
requirement of a possessive in the gerundive use makes some sense, 
for lying was something he did and thus in some sense belonged to him. 
In any event, the pronoun does not originate as a possessive idea, 
whatever the reasons adduced for its later form. It is probably not 
the conjunctive form, past tense from which the original gerundive 
sentence is derived. Nearly any definite past tense form can be 
expanded (grannnatically) to the progressive aspect form: 
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He was lying, and it annoyed ~· (3.81) 
(a F ) -&-(t1 2R tz) 
'---v---/ 
ti 
It is the above progressive form, no doubt, frotn which the gerundive 
form derives. The tense of the second verb causes ambiguity, for it 
refers to definite past time, while was lying may· be meant progressively; 
on the other hand, it may not be meant progressively, for the gerundive 
in His lying annoyed me can mean habitual behavior or an act just 
performed. Since the time ambiguity exists in both -ing forms, and 
since the logical form agrees in all these cases, it seems beyond 
doubt that the analysis is essentially correct. The gerundive form 
is a reduction of the progressive form, where He was becomes His and 
the redundant it is deleted. 
It is possible to interpret the remaining gerundive usages more 
or less analogously to the above analysis. In direct object usage, 
for example, the sentence The I.R.S. doesn't like people misrepresenting 
their assets can be treated as 
or 
The 
-[_ 
The I.R.S. doesn't like people who misrepresent 
their assets 
I. R. S. doesn't like EeoEle misreEresenting their assets. 
tl zR ( ul zS 
uz J ~ y _.,,,,,, 
tz 
(3.82) 
(3.83) 
The above analysis agrees with the earlier similar treatment of infini-
tive clauses (misreEresenfing =to misreEresent). Few people would 
insist on the possessive form EeoEle's in this construction, yet if 
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one substituted, say ~ and his for people and ~; school gram-
marians would insist on the possessive John's (or his). There is 
obviously something contradictory in such an analysis; to say "It 
juS!t so.unds better" is ridiculous. Nor does it make sense (in the 
infinitive construction) to require the objective case (for pronouns); 
the "object" which the I.R.S. doesn't like is not people (or John 
= hiin)--it is the activities represented by the whole second clause 
which the I.R.S. doesn't like. The same analysis of the "object" 
applies to the -ing construction. Therefore, misrepresenting is not 
a gerund at all; it is a true verb derived from something like 
• . . are (always) misrepresenting their assets. Since the -ing form 
is a verb, not a nominal, it cannot be a direct object; the direct 
object in the clause is their assets. Furthermore, it cannot be a 
direct object because the whole people-clause is the direct object. 
This latter fact is proven by recourse to the alternate form 
The I.R.S. doesn't like the fact that 
- [ tl 2R t2 
people misrepresent their assets. (3.84) 
( u1 2s u2 ) ] 
II t2 II 
The object term "t2" is merely a more detailed explanation of the 
object the fact. Thus, people is not possessive nor objective; the 
-ing (or infinitive) form is not objective, but a true verb; and the 
last clause, whether in the -ing or infinitive construction, should 
logically begin with a subjective nominal. 
The -only reason some analysts say that gerunds may function as 
prepositional complements is because of their refusal to recognize 
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that the so-called prepositions are often actually postpositions with 
respect to verbs--i.e., they are verb particles. For example, in 
Robin Hood delighted in robbing the rich, 
the first verb is delighted in and the second is robbing, which 
analysis is supported by the idiomatic alternative formulation 
Robin Hood took delight in robbing the rich. 
That in goes with delighted is further supported by the following 
sentences: 
What Robin Hood delighted in was robbing the rich. 
Robbing the rich was what Robin Hood delighted in. 
(3. 85) 
(3.86) 
(3.87) 
(3.88) 
If in were placed before robbing in these cases, ungranunatical sen-
tences would result. The same thing is true for countless other verbs 
such as tired of, insisted on, interested in, searched for, fought 
with, talked about, etc., when nouns or gerunds follow. The so-called 
gerunds, however, are true verbs describing habitual behavior or 
continuing process performed by someone, as the following paraphrases 
show: 
Robin Hood was delighted in the fact that 
he was robbing the rich. 
Robin Hood took delight in the fact that 
tl 2R tz 
he was robbing the rich. 
(tl zS t3 ) 
II t 11 
2 
(3. 89) 
(3.90) 
The notation has retained .!_' s, somewhat confusingly, throughout the 
formula to show that the two "clauses" are actually inseparable; the 
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parentheses, as always, indicate the proper grouping. Thus, robbing 
is not a direct object nor an object of a preposition; the only sehse 
in which robbing can be called a nominal is in the sense that it is 
a part of the whole he-clause which is itself ftmctioning as a kind 
of direct object in that it is an extension (logicaliy) of the fact, 
in the same way that 2 + 2 is an extension of 4. Just as it is 
somewhat inaccurate to say that a pie cut into two pieces is exactly 
the same thing as a pie cut into four pieces (even though the totals 
in both cases equal a whole pie), so it is inaccurate to say that a 
part of an expression is equal to the whole expression even though 
it is somewhat implied--i.e., robbing implies he. Thus, He (=Robin 
Hood) is the subject of robbing even though it has been deleted in the 
original sentence. Robbing by itself is not the object of anything. 
A similar analysis applies to appositive gerunds. A case in 
point is the sentence 
His job, counting fish hooks, is boring. (3. 91) 
This sentence is a reduction of the sentence 
. His job, which is counting fish hooks, is boring. (3.92) 
The analysis here is the same as the traditional one--the whole which-
clause modifies (extends the meaning of) the noun job--except that a 
deleted he is the subject of is counting. Which by itself does not 
refer to his job, but to the whole habitual, continual process inferred 
by His job (that he counts fish hooks), as shown in the paraphrase 
His job is counting fish hooks, which is boring. (3. 9 3) 
( t1 2R t 2 ) "a" F 
a 
158 
Which, (Ii a"), thus, is a reduced form of the whole first clause (a). 
This formulation.is a reduction of the truly appositive sentence 
His job, he is (always) counting fish hooks., is boring. (3. 94) 
a (t1 . 2R t 2 . ) 
'.:_....._---¥ - / 
F 
II a" 
By transformational deletion of he (already inferred by his) and the 
meaningless is, the original sentence, His job 7 counting fish hooks, 
is boring, is obtained. 
Participial Phrases and Clauses 
Predication Versus Modification 
Present Participles (hereafter, simply participles) are defiried 
as -ing verbals that function as adjective modifiers. Most so-called 
modifiers, however, are really predicates, as has been demonstrated 
many times. 
The participle as an adjective complement is easily treated as 
long as one recalls that with each additional modification (i.e., not 
quantified "modification" and the like) there is an: additional propo-
sition. As an instance, the sentence 
The players were busy planning strategies (3.95) 
is divisible into 
The players were busy. (3. 96) 
a F 
and 
The players were planning stratekies. 
ti 2R tz 
Hence, the complete sentence becomes 
The players were busy 
( a F ) 
~1 
planning strategies. 
2R t2 
The above formulation is motivated by the transformational form 
The busy players were planning strategies. 
( F a ) 
\... v _,I 2R tz 
ti 
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(3. 97) 
(3. 98) 
(3.99) 
Incidentally, the above analysis proves that in The players were busily 
planning strategies the word busily is not an adverb modifying a verbal 
(planning), for it was their planning which kept them busy; in other 
words, their being busy was a consequence of their planning, not a 
modification or description of it. 
Juxtaposition of subject and participle is what causes the notion 
of subjective modification to arise. A sentence such as 
The crying boy was hurt. (3.100) 
( F a) G 
'---b-" 
is simply a reduction to a complex propositional form; its component 
propositions are: 
The boy was crying. and The boy was hurt. (3.101) 
a F a G 
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The so-called modification may occur before the subject as well as 
after it: Crying, the boy sat down; The boy, crying, sat down. In 
fact, crying may also tenninate the sentence: The boy sat down, crying. 
All of these variations express the same two propositions and are 
symbolized just as the above cases: 
The crying boy sat down (=reclined). (3.102) 
( F a ) G 
\....._ "T- ,,I 
b 
it can easily be seen that the traditional notion of "modification," 
as it is usually defined, is inaccurately applied. Personally, the 
present writer likes the loose application though, for it illustrates, 
in fact, logical relationships operating throughout the sentence, not 
just phrases within the sentence. The complex propositions above are, 
obviously, cases where one predicate in one sentence is moved to 
subject position in the other sentence, one redundant copula is deleted, 
and the resultant subject is, indeed, a kind of modification (just as 
it was when it was a predicate). The confusion which arises in the 
traditionalist's application of the concept of modification is due 
to the fact that the traditionalist fails to distinguish between 
simple sentences and non-simple (modified) sentences when the modifiers 
are single adjectives. 
In the following sentence the "participle" comes after the subject 
noun phrase and before another noun phrase. Which does it modify? 
Some would say that it modifies the second noun phrase because there 
is another verb phrase which accomplishes the predication of the first 
noun phrase. The sentence is 
The bill ending the state inheritance tax between 
spouses was passed 96-1 Wednesday by the House of 
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Represerttatives and sent to Gov. David Boren. (3.103) 
--John Greiner, The Daily Oklahoman, Jan. 30, 1975 
The meaning (abridged) of (3.103) is clearly 
The bill (which is) ending the state inheritance 
tax was passed by them. . . , 
which, converted to active voice, becomes 
They passed the bill 
. ( tl 2R tz ) 
(which is) ending the state inheritance tax. 
( A. zS u2 ) u1 
<= tz) 
(3.104) 
(3.105) 
The redundant. copula and pronoun which have been deleted; the latter's 
function of connecting the two clauses is performed by the bill. The 
"subject" of ending is They passed the bill, for it was by this action 
that termination occurred; it was not just the bill that ended the 
practive. Hence, the overall pattern would be 
They passed the bill ending the state inheritance tax, (3.106) 
tl zR tz 
if the internal structure of the first clause were ignored. Thus, the 
first clause is a proposition functioning on a higher level as a term 
for a different proposition in which ending is a true verb, not a 
participle. 
Further modification is, of course, possible, but this does not 
alter the form of analysis. For example, The boy, crying noisily, woke 
me is a merging of three propositions: 
The boy was crying. 
a F 
The boy was noisy. 
a G 
The· boy woke ~· 
t 1 (= a) 2R tz 
The transformed sentence is thus analyzed as 
The boy, crying 
c~) 
noisily, woke ~· G] 2R t 2 
162 
(3.107) 
(3.108) 
(3.109) 
(3.110) 
Other transformations, such as The boy who was crying noisily, are also 
possible, but the logical relationships remain identical. The close 
relationship of verbs, adjectives, and adverbs is shown above where 
the adjective noisy, by rule, must add .::_!y, giving the appearance of a 
.different part of speech (adverb) when it is juxtaposed to the verbal 
(participle). It is interesting to note that some would require, for 
the sake of good usage, that the possessive case be used in.the subject: 
The boy's crying noisily woke me; and in deleting the commas, some 
would say the main subject (topic) has been altered from boy to crying! 
Thus, this sentence shows the essential closeness of good logical 
analysis and its relationship to correct syntactic judgments. Whether 
boy or crying is being stressed is merely a rhetorical matter of focus. 
If one ignores the concept of "subject," one may focus on whatever he 
wishes without doing violence to the logico-syntactic analysis. The 
possessive and non-possessive forms are, in all essentials, the same 
proposition, and the same syntactic analysis applies to both inter-
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Modification and Voice 
Participles may be active or passive. The sentence below illus-
trates both types: 
Knowing he was being sought, he fled. (3.111) 
He is obviously the subject of knowing, and by someone is the implied 
subject of being sought. Consequently, the logico-syntactic form 
of the sentence is as follows: 
(Since) he knew (someone) was seeking him, he fled. (3.112) 
u1 2s ( 't'1 2R t2 )-7 (u1 G ) 
u2 (="it") 
In the above formula, t2 = u1 ; the t's have been retained in the internal 
clause to attain "synnnetry"--i. e., to differentiate the clauses perspic-
uously. Actually, the existence of three places in the sentence all 
referring to the subject helps to establish the overlapping of the 
three clauses; none is mutually exclusive of the others. Knowing in 
the original sentence carries the force of continuation and implication 
(= because he had known for some time ..• ) and is more suitable than 
the definite past knew in the formalized version; but the formalized 
version allows one to perceive the structure now of the original 
sentence: 
knowing he was 
2S (t2 
"'-..... ---
-): 
u2 
he fled. 
(u1 -G-) 
(3.113) 
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The second (passive) "tenn" is substituting for a whole proposition 
above. The circumflexed elements, as in earlier cases, stand for 
deleted portions. 
The participle is often used in a kind of "hidden passive." The 
sentence, Obtaining knowledge is advantageous, is such a case, for it 
implies something like for people at the end of the sentence. Con-
verting this to active voice form, the result is For people, obtaining 
knowledge is advantageous. Again, some would allow or advocate the 
possessive conversion to People's obtaining knowledge is advantageous. 
But, as shown earlier, these conversions or preferences do not affect 
the analysis at all; one reason is that the same meaning is conveyed 
by the infinitive form of the sentence without changing to possessive 
fonn of the pronoun: For people to obtain knowledge is advantageous. 
The meaning is clearly that the process or activity of obtaining 
knowledge is advantageous, as implied in the verbal obtaining. A 
rough paraphrase would be 
People shquld obtain knowledge, (3.114) 
ti zR tz 
but, while displaying the true verb aspect of obtain, it departs too 
much from the original wording, for it omits the process-meaning. It 
does, however, have the advantage of showing from where the "nominal-
ized" possessive fonn has come, which pennits For-deletion. If one 
merges the forms below by deletion transformations, the original 
sentence can be obtained: 
Knowledge is advantageous (for people). (3.115) 
a F 
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People should obtain knowledge. (3.116) 
t 1 2R t 2 (=a) 
People's obtaining (of) 
( tl 2R 
"-~--------< b 
knowledge is advantageous. 
tz ) F 
......, / 
(3.117) 
Example (3.117) is a nominalization of (3.116) (= People (who) are 
_o_b_t_a_i_n_i_n~g-·~~~~·)· Perhaps a more complete formulation of (3.117) 
would be: For people who are obtaining knowledge, it is advantageous. 
The verbal obtaining, thus, comes from a who-clause and is in the 
progressive aspect and is a true verb. Therefore, the final form is 
.~-- obtaining knowledge is advantageous. 
( ~ 2R tz ) F 
(3.118) 
b 
The first, circumflexed t refers to the deleted referent People (or 
People's). 
The participle may come after the direct object, but, as above, 
it should not be construed as an object modifier as it is in most 
schoolroom handbooks. It is still just a disguised ~erb--disguised 
because of transformations that have taken place. In He saw the cat 
clawing at the cage, e.g., clawing does not modify the cat, as can be 
seen by expanding the sentence to its longer, redundant form: 
He saw the cat that was clawing at the cage. 
t 1 2R t 2 Tt2 2s t 3 ) 
(3.119) 
As the duplicated second term shows, the pronoun that is unnecessary 
and can, in fact, be deleted; was is unnecessary too, for past tense 
is shown by ~, and progressive aspect is shown by -ing. Therefore, 
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the analysisis is just the same as in the previous example: 
He ~ the cat (pronoun) (copula) clawing at the cage. (3.120) 
t1 2R t2 < "n 2s t1 ) 
It is advantageous above to use t's throughout; the parentheses show 
which two terms go with~; the term numerals are merely labels, but 
after deletion of certain elements the order may also be shown by the 
numerals. 
The participle is said to be capable of functioning also as a 
predicate adjective after linking verbs. But, as noted in Chapter II, 
such usage is really predicative in the same way as verbs are predi-
cative. An added factor here is that sentences containing predicate 
adjective participles seem to be "disguised passive" sentences. For 
example, Something is lacking in your behavior is more or less 
equivalent to Something is lacking in your behavior, it seems to me. 
Converting seems to "active voice," the latter sentence becomes 
.!.. think you are lacking something in your behavior. (3.121) 
ul 2S (tl 3R t2 t3 ) \.. ___________ y-__________ _../ 
U2 (= 11 i t") 
In (3.121), seems and think are regarded as semantically equivalent. 
Any dictionary one consults defines seem as appear to be (etc.), which 
is obviously passive. For example, a sentence such as It seems frus-
trating to me may also be stated as It seems to be frustrating to me 
without change of meaning or mood. The trouble with such a passive is 
that converting it to active voice is not a straightforward procedure 
as it is with more normal verbs. The active form of seem, some say, 
is see in its widely used sense of think. (Actually, verbs such as 
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~ and appear are more like the subjunctive mood in that both 
·express doubt.) So, converting the above sentence to active voice 
requires that some liberties be taken in the paraphrase. 
I see it as frustrating. 
!. think it is frustrating. 
(3.122) 
(3.123) 
t 1 2R ( a F ) ~
· t2 (= "it" or "this") 
The result, then, is a kind of direct object sentence, not predicate 
adjective. The object is not the verbal, but the whole it-clause. 
In (3.121) as seems to be ·substituting for to be as a kind of com~ 
parative (to something not stated). The interesting thing is that the 
11passi ve" can persist; similarly, the "passive" persists in 
!. find it (to be) frustrating. (3.124) 
t 1 2R Cz._ ~F .../) 
t2 
However, as the schema shows, to be is optional. Further, the active 
can be reasserted without changing the word order: 
I find it is frustrating. 
t1 ~(a F ) ...._.._ __ ""V _/ 
(3.125) 
t2 
To me may still be inserted terminally, but this is a direct object in 
a present progressive clause equal to It frustrates me. Structurally 
speaking (logically and syntactically), these analyses do prove that 
It seems (to be) frustrating µie is a passive formation, which when 
converted to quasi-active form displays the fact that the -ing word 
is a true verb. But semantically speaking, these conversions do not 
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seem clearly or necessarily to convey the idea of uncertainty inherent 
in seems. This fact is probably why many grammarians treat seems in 
It seems frustrating as active. The verb appears catlses the same 
trouble, for it can be substituted in all the above formulations; 
the same is true of looks. 
Another passive verb which is hard to analyze according to the 
standard passive transformational procedure is become. For instance, 
one may compare the following sentences, keeping in mind that become 
is equivalent to the passive come to be plus complement: 
Her hat is becoming (to her). 
Her hat becomes (=suits) her. 
I find her hat becoming 
(to her). 
I find her hat is becoming 
(to her). 
I find her hat become (=suits) 
her. 
(Passive, progressive, or 
predicate complement?) 
(Active or passive?) 
. (Reduction of next 
sentence?) 
(Passive, progressive, or 
predicate complement?) 
(Active or passive?) 
(3.126) 
(3.12 7) 
(3.128) 
(3.129) 
(3.130) 
The passive nature of become (= come to be) indicates that to say Her 
hat becomes her is to say that *Her hat comes to be just for her--i.e., 
it is befitting; thus, it is a passive form. And to say Her hat is 
becoming to her is to say *Her hat is coming to be just for her; thus, 
this sentence is also a passive in form. In spite of the form, the 
sense of all of these examples above, to the present writer, is 
active (either straight indicative or present progressive aspect). 
What these examples show is the difficulty of applying analytical 
techniques on the basis of form alone or meaning alone. Even when 
form and meaning are both considered, a decision such as has been 
made here may seem a bit artibrary. In any event, the -ing forms are 
here all considered to be in progressive aspect, hence is becoming is 
a true verb, not a verbal. 
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Traditionalists and structuralists would classify all the recently 
discussed -ing forms as predicate complements because an adjective 
modifier, such as ~, can be inserted before the verbal. This 
argument is quite persuasive, but it is not without counterexamples. 
As an instance, one may note the sentence, Paul was entertaining (very) 
much last night. Since very is synonymous (and redundant) to much 
(many), the latter may be deleted, but only if very is moved by trans-
formation to the left of entertaining--thus producing Paul was very 
entertaining last night. Finally, this latter sentence's meaning, 
in fact, implies that ~modifies something besides entertaining. 
Very and much here imply people, place, time, and the like. That is, 
sentences such as the following result: 
many friends. 
much of the time. 
Paul was entertaining much at home. (3.131) 
By the very meaning of the activity of entertaining, how could an 
intensifier-quantifier modify entertaining? A little reflection will 
reveal the point. Perhaps a few other examples will help to clarify 
the issue: 
being (helpful) 
playing 
singing 
acting 
*Paul was very helping last night. (3.132) 
All of these verbals might well define the kinds of entertaining that 
Paul was doing, yet none of them can be modified by very. However, 
all of them could use very to modify later ideas: 
being very helpful. . • . 
playing very well. • • . 
singing very poorly .••• 
acting very strange(ly) •• 
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Paul was helping very much with. • . . (3.133) 
Thus, in Paul was very entertaining last night, ~ cannot modify 
the -ing word, for it makes no sense; such a formation must result by 
transformation from a set of sentences such as those immediately above, 
where ~has been moved between the auxiliary and the -ing word, and 
the implied portion of the sentence has been deleted. 
A participle as an objective complement is usually said to differ 
from the participle as a modifier of the object. 21 The question, then, 
is what function exactly does such a complement perform? The term, 
apparently, is just a label for something beyond explanation. To say 
that a complement is a completer (but not a modifier) is to say nothing 
if one does not say just how the completion is accomplished and what 
purpose it serves. Conlin contrasts, as he says, "this function and 
the modifying function of the participle •• 1122 If the objective 
complement is not a modifier, what is it? Conlin cites, as illustra-
tions, the following two sentences:23 
Mary found the book interesting. 
Mary found the interesting book. 
(3.134) 
(3.135) 
The interpretations of these two sentences can, indeed, differ; but 
they do not necessarily differ; and if they do not, then however 
interesting functions, it functions alike in both cases. Example 
(3.134) means 
~ found the book (3.136) 
t1 2R t2 
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and 
The book was interesting (to her). (3.137) 
ul 2S ~ 
Hence, the two combined propositions are 
~found the book (was) interesting (to her). (3.138) 
t1 2R ( ul 2S ~1 )(= tl) 
Sentence (3.137) is a transformation of 
~.found that the book interested her. (3. 139) 
tl 2R . ( ul 2S u2 )(= t1) 
\....... --< / 
t2 (= "it") 
Thus, both of the last two formulations show that interesting and 
interested are true verbs which are parts of clauses; and each clause 
as a whole is functioning as a kind of direct object. Now, it is 
possible to present a "cleaner" notational solution: 
~found the book interesting. (3.140) 
t1 2R ( a F ) 
'- .../ 
Conlin's second sentence, (3.135), is ambiguous. It can mean 
that the book Mary found was interesting to her, or it can mean she 
found a book which was interesting to others (i.e., intrinsically)--
but the latter interpretation would make little sense in most contexts. 
But since the first interpretation would be exactly like the solution 
above, (3.140), for (3.134), consideration must be given to the second 
possibility. Sentence (3.135), then, breaks down as follows into 
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the propositions 
~·found the book (3.141) 
tl 2R tz 
and 
The book (was) interesting (to others). (3.142) 
u1 (= tz) 2s ~ 
Hence, 
~found the book (was) interesting (to others). (3.143) 
t1 2R ( ul 2s ~ ) 
Thus, in analyzing Conlin' s pair of sentences, extreme attention must 
be paid to the notational symbolism only if there are two interpre-
tations. The above solution would be exactly like the former solution 
where the internal object her was retained even though on an "under-
stood" basis. Using that solution with the one above would require 
different letters in object clauses to differentiate them, for the 
mechanical structures are the same! If the assumed elements were 
removed from the above solution, as they were with the final solution 
of the first sentence, attention to the notation would again be very 
important. In most extralinguistic contexts, however, the two sen-
tences mean essentially the same thing, and either the expanded or 
simplified solutions would be an adequate logico-syntactic explanation 
of the structures of the sentences. After all, it would be extremely 
unusual to find a book interesting if it were not interesting to the 
person who found it. That is, if I found an interesting book, it 
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ordinarily means that I found the book interesting. So, it may be 
concluded that Conlirt' s traditional distinction is 'trivial to the point 
of ridiculousness. Should such a situation arise, the symbolism can 
be precisely defined to handle it. The rarity of such a distinction 
probably accounts for the lack of a proper traditional definition; it 
cannot be defined for most cases because such cases seldom exist. 
Participles, since they are thought to be adjectives, should be 
able to modify (or amplify) other adjectives. This is what most 
grannnarians would say is being done in the following sentence: 
The boiling hot water burned the howling angry man. 
Logically, as noted so often, adjectives are predicates; so; ti.he 
embedded propositions are: 
The water burned the man. 
The water was hot. 
The water was boiling. 
The man was angry. 
The man was howling. 
(3.144) 
(3.145) 
(3.146) 
(3.147) 
(3.148) 
(3.149) 
A particularly difficult example was chosen this time to illustrate 
several things: (1) the complicated nature of human thought and 
language, (2) the difference between true verbs (so-called participles) 
and adjectives, and (3) "participles" in both subject and predicate 
positions. The analysis is as follows: 
The hot water (which) (was) boiling burned f ( F a ) ( ~ ~----G-__,; )] 2R 
ti 
angry~ (who) (_w_a_s~)_h_ow_l_in_g. 
H b )('b I '],::) 
tz '__f 
(3.150) 
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Deleting the "understood" elements, the formula like this: 
2R (3.151) 
Following the transformational procedure of many generative grammar 
books, the redundant personal pronouns are deleted, the copulas are 
deleted because the continuous idea is retained in the -ing forms, 
and these latter forms are moved to the front of the subjects in their 
respective clauses. 24 It should also be noted that each -ing form 
could be placed on either side of the other adjective in each clause. 
The capital letters under the -ing portions of the sentences indicate 
that they symbolize true verbs in the progressive aspect, not adjective 
modifiers. Later deletion and movement transformations tend to obscure 
this fact because of the resulting juxtapositions of the -ing forms 
with the adjectives and the nouns. 
Definitional Chaos Again: Participial Adverbs 
The last two cases of participial usage, which will be considered 
next, illustrate the contradictory character of traditional gram-
matical theory. Participles, it is claimed, function as adjective 
modifiers. What does one do, then, when the participial expression 
seems to be modifying the verb in a given sentence? Why, just say 
that this is "one of the rare adverbial uses of the -ing form of the 
verb," of course!25 Thus, the definition fails. For if adjectives 
(including participles) modify nominals by definition; and adverbs 
modify verbs, adjectives, and other adverbs by definition; and 
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participles can also be adverbial; then participles .can modify notms, 
verbs, adjectives, and adverbs--i.e., all the major parts of speech! 
And, to further compound the problem, if participles (and infinitives 
and gertmds) are verbs from the standpoints of form and meaning, but 
may function as subjects, complements, or modifiers, then participles 
seem to form a separate, all-inclusive category all by themselvest26 
In other words, no definition whatever has actually been developed. 
What has been proven, however, is the "centrality" of the verb in its 
clause or sentence; it is the central core of the sentence in which 
it exists. 
The idea of "adverbialhood" for the participle probably rests on 
a comparison with the infinitive form cited earlier, which is here 
repeated with its participial counterpart:. 
He has gone to htmt. 
He has gone hunting. 
(3.152) 
(3.153) 
"Adverbialhood" is established as follows: (1) the "verbals" are 
obviously verb forms because they may be used as verbs: What I like 
to do is (to) hunt, where to do signifies the action of htmting, also 
shown in He is hunting; (2) the so-called adverbial signaler, in order_ 
to, may be inserted in the infinitive sentence (but it should be noted 
that it may not be inserted in the participial sentence, even though 
the sentences look formally very much alike and mean the same thing); 
(3) it or that may not be so inserted, thus showing, presumably, that 
the verbal expressions are not functioning as objects (nominals); and 
(4) the juxtaposition of the verbals to the main verb .8£ seems to hint 
at verbal modification (by definition of adverbial), which hint is 
176 
validated if (1) through (3) work out satisfactorily. However, as 
shown in the infinitive section, the proper way to view either the 
infinitive or the participial form of the sentence. it3 as a trans-
formational case of 
He has gone (so that he might) hunt. (3.154) [Ca F ) (~ G )] 
Sentence (3.154) means that the man has gone in order to carry on the 
(continuing) activity of hunting. Thus, the conjunctive elements 
so that and the redundant elements he might are deleted; and -ing is 
added to hunt to retain the continuous aspect idea; the result is, 
therefore, He has gone hunting. where the -ing form already exists 
with its auxiliary be, thus evincing the progressive aspect nature of 
hunting, and controverting the idea that hunting is adverbial. In 
terms of the reduced sentence form, He has gone hunting, gone may be 
said to function as a quasi-auxiliary retaining its meaning; but the 
main verb is hunt. 
The fact that the participle can be modified by an adverb, of 
course, does not prove that the participle is an adverb too, for adverbs 
also modify verbs. An example is The girls came laughing loudly into 
the house. This sentence breaks down into three propositions: 
The girls came into the house. 
The girls (who) were laughing. 
The girls were loud. 
These, combined, are analyzed thus: 
The girls ~ laughing loudly into the house. 
( a F ) 1 
~zR R2 tz 
ti 
(3.155) 
(3.156) 
(3. 15 7) 
(3.158) 
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As in (3.153), one could say, in terms of the above combinatory 
sentence, that~ is functioning as a quasi-auxiliary, but it is 
here analyzed as the verb in the first proposition above; in terms of 
a merging of the first two propositions, the verb is compound: came 
laughing; the main verb of the whole sentence is, however, laughing 
(from the progressive aspect were laughing). Loud is not a.predicate 
adjective, for it does not predicate a quality or attribute of the 
girls, but of what they did, namely laugh; so, when combined with the 
verb laughing, a grammatical transformation to -ly irtdicates this fact. 
Participles are also, unaccountably, said to function adverbially 
in "sentence modifiers." Stageberg, in his structural grannnar, says: 
"A sentence modifier is an adverbia;L which modifies, as its head, all 
the rest of the sentence, 
participial case:28 
. . . . 
1127 Among his examples, he cites one 
Considering the circumstances, he was lucky to escape alive. (3.159) 
The underlined portion of (3.159) cannot be adverbial by definition. 
Adverbs are supposed to modify verbs, adjectives, and other adverbs. 
If they modify sentences too, as Stageberg claims, they also modify 
nouns; for sentences not only contain nouns, but they also function 
as nominals at times, according to the structuralist--e.g., in (What 
I want) is advice, the parenthesized portion of the sentence is 
itself a nominal sentence. Again, the definition of "adverb" fails. 
As the term indicates, an adverb must be a specification of a logical 
function (or relation). Distributional definitions or form definitions 
(-ly) are hopelessly inadequate. Sentence (3.159) contains an implied 
subject: 
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If (= when)(one) considers the circumstances, . 
< t'1 zR tz ~ (----x--..,.-) 
. (3.160) 
The only difference in this formation from the so-called adjectival 
modification is the presence of a subject in the main claus~--e. g., 
Knowing the danger, I ran, where .!_ is also the subject of the dependent 
clause. The sentence is, then, an implicational sentence. The conuna 
(pause) equals then, the verbal construction and meaning implies if 
(or when) and a covert subject, and X stands for an unanalyzed clause. 
The -ing form in the original sentence is simply an expansion of the 
above example to If one were considering; i.e., a subjunctive progres-
sive is the source of considering; i.e., where subject, copula, and if 
deletions have occurred. 
Example (3.160), like many discussed earlier, points up the fact 
again that transformational granunarians would not have to posit 
strange, deviant, underlying structures to account for the problems 
that have been noted in the course of this exposition, if they would 
only examine the history of the language. It is true that the sub-
junctive form is no longer very productive, but it once was used 
rather frequently. It should be unnecessary to say that, as English 
has evolved, various archaic forms, once productive, have gradually 
changed into the forms we know today. Though transformational gram-
marians especially emphasize the idea of one form coming from another, 
subjunctive examples, for the most part, are conspicuous by their 
absence in transformational works. Yet, in the development of the 
present work the subjunctive has often been found to supply an 
answer to grannnatical problems. The moral seems to be: Before one 
searches for linguistic answers in "depth psychology," philosophy, etc., 
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one should first exhlaust the materials in his own discipline. Many 
grammarians, thus, seem functionalyy illiterate with respect to the 
earlier stages of the history of the English language. 
"Pasticipial" Phrases and Clauses 
Pasticipial Problems in Tense, Voice, and Aspect 
Traditionally, a past participle (hereafter, "pasticiple") is 
said to perform just like a present participle--i.e., as an adjective 
modifier--except that it refers to past time; and it may also occur in 
both active and passive voices. In form, the pasticiple is inflected 
ordinarily in the same way that the past tense of the verb in question 
is (either regular or irregular); the regular form ends in a dental 
suffix, usually spelled -d or -ed, but sometimes -t; in other (irregular) 
cases, the inflection is often spelled~· Because of its close 
association with the past progressive aspect, the perfect t~nses, and 
the passive voice, it is often confused with them. 
Since the pasticiple performs the adjective function (presumably), 
it may occur as a subject modifier, as in the sentence, The fallen 
rain flowed everywhere. Logically speaking, however, this sentence 
is composed of the following propositions: 
The rain had fallen. (3.161) 
a F 
The rain flowed everywhere. (3.162) 
tl 2R t2 
Sentence (3.160), a true verb in the past perfect tense formulation, 
provides the source of fallen in the merged version. Both (3.161) and 
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and (3.l62) can first be made into a compound sentence; then a 
relative clause pattern may be derived from it: 
The rain which had fallen flowed everywhere. (3.163) 
( a a . F ) 2R t2 
tl 
The redtmdant auxiliary is then deleted; also the auxiliary had is 
redundant, for the tense is shown in the inflection~' and is there-
fore deleted; finally, the verb fallen is moved to the front of rain, 
but mere movement does not change its logico-syntactic function of 
predication: 
The fallen rain flowed everywhere. 
( F -a-) 2R t 2 
~
(3.164) 
t1 
Fallen is, therefore, a true verb, not a pasticiple in the traditional 
sense. The analysis is semantically sotmd too, for fallen does not 
describe something about rain, but specifies what rain does. 
The pasticiple may occur after the subject: Bacon, fried crisp, 
is (=tastes) good. The propositional breakdown is: 
Bacon is fried (by someone). 
Bacon is crisp. 
Bacon is good. 
(3.165) 
(3.166) 
(3.167) 
The original sentence is thus obtained from the passive (not predicate 
adjective) form indicated by the first example above. This can easily 
be seen if each proposition is strung one after the other in a kind of 
"compound" (relativization): 
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Bacon which is fried (by someone) which is cr.fsp is good. (3.168) 
G )] HJ ( b *F ) ( b 
a 
By· someone is not labeled so as to avoid notational problems; it is 
deleted anyway, since it really means by anyone at all; it was inserted 
above to show the true verb nature of fried. The ..§!. indicates a complex 
argument operated upon by the predicate !!.· To reduce to the original 
sentence requires deletion of the redundant pronouns and copulas in 
the relative clauses. The result is 
Bacon, fried crisp, is good. (3.169) Lb (*F) (G) J 
~
H 
a 
The argument!! is, of course, not really an argument in the usual 
sense, ·for it is composed of an argument operated upon by two logical 
functions; yet the whole acts as a kind of argument operated upon by H 
(is good). The!! could have been left out; the bracketed expression 
operated upon by H accurately represents the situation. 
The pasticiple may occur in a clause which precedes a main 
clause whose head noun is said to be modified by the pasticiple, as in 
Hampered by the ropes on his feet, the prisoner stumbled. (3.170) 
As stated in the discussion of present participles, this is nonsense; 
hampered is a true verb whose subject is the prisoner, and thus not a 
case of modification according to the traditional definition of 
modification. The correct rendition is 
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The 2risoner was hampered 
t1 *R 3 
b:Y the ro2es on his feet) (and). . . (3.111) 
tz t3 
The psychological subject is the ro2es, as in the active voice sentence, 
The ropes on his feet ham2ered the prisoner. Thus, (3.171) is in the 
passive voice; the so-called verbal is not a predicate adjective 
modifying the 2risoner. Therefore, in 
~~-· ham2ered by the ro2es on his feet, .•. , (3.172) 
~ ~R tz t 3 
there has merely been transformational deletion of the meaningless 
copula and the redundant subject which initiates the next clause. 
In a sentence such as Having been convicted by the jury, the 
defendant was sentenced by the judge, the pasticiple is said to be in 
the passive voice and is said to modify the defendant. The problem 
and its solution are similar to the last case. Supplying the missing 
elements and converting the first clause to past perfect tense produces 
The defendant had been (=was) convicted by the jury, 
( tl ~R tz ) 
and the judge sentenced him. (3.173) 
& ( ul 28 uz) 
The last clause (where u2 = t 1) has been transformed to the active 
voice; this clause can be dispensed with hereafter, for the trans-
formation proves that the original verb was passive, not a predicate 
adjective. In the first clause, the passive voice has been retained 
(the psychological subject is the jury) because it is the form from 
which the original sentence has been obtained by transformation. There 
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is only one hitch: Having been is present perfect, but the force of 
the verb is the past perfect tense because the time of the action 
expressed by the verb occurred before the action expressed by the 
past definite tense of sentenced. Thus, changing had to have results in 
*Have been convicted by the jury, (3.174) 
The transformation of have to having is necessitated by the implication 
of a deliberating process, suggested by the paraphrase: After the 
jury was through convicting him, the prisoner was sentenced by the 
judge. The problem of tense here is brought on, thus, by the fact that 
there is both a past progressive aspect and past perfect (passive) 
tense operating simultaneously. Hence, deleting the redundant the 
defendant (implied by the same phrase in the secdnd clause), the 
final form is 
--:-~-Having been convicted by the jury, 
1"1 ~R tz 
the defendant was . . . ' (3.175) 
where having refers to the convicting being done by the jury. This 
analysis is supported by the variant active formulation: The jury 
having convicted him, the prisoner was sentenced by the judge. In this 
formulation, the present perfect is apparent, hence have rather than 
had occurs. It should be noted that there is no such form as *hadding, 
which causes the past perfect sense of the original sentence to be 
carried by having; the jury's convicting (progressive), therefore, 
must be signaled in the present perfect form so that the passive (-ed) 
can be displayed by inflection on convict. Some would require the 
possessive in The jury's having convicted him, 
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The curious relationship of the perfect tenses, the progressive 
aspect, and the passive voice with each other can be illustrated by 
reference to ttvo simpler and similar archaic expressions: 
(You) have done with that (now) I + im-(present perfect 
perative) 
(present perfect + 
progressive) 
(3.176) 
(You) having done (= finished) 
with that, you left. 
(Since) (you) had done 
with that, you left. 
(= finished) (past perfeet) 
(You) be done with that (now)! 
(You) being done (= finished) 
("passive" + imperative) 
("passive" + present 
progressive) with that, you left. 
(Since)(you) were done 
with that, you left.· 
(= finished) (past "passive") 
The first sentence in each triple is in the imperative mood, but 
(3.177) 
(3.178) 
(3.179) 
(3.180) 
(3.181) 
according to most schools of granunar, all that needs to be done to 
convert to normal declarative form is to supply the missing initial 
subject. Yet, in doing so, the be-sentence becomes "passive" without 
moving the subject to the end of the sentence. In be done, done 
surely cannot be a predicate adjective, for it does not describe ypu, 
but predicates an action to be performed by you. If interpreted as 
You are done, the same objections hold. (This topic will be discussed 
further later on.) In the first triple, the second and third verb 
expressions refer to exactly the same time period, yet one is present 
perfect and the other is past perfect; hence, the only difference 
(other than form) must be that having implies contipuation in the 
past (progressive), and had implies completed action in the past--but 
both imply essentially the same time before the verb in the final 
clauses. In the second triple, as in the first, the second sentence 
implies "passive" past continuation. Yet, the third example, which 
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differs from the second only in that completed action (past ·"passive") 
is implied, refers to the same time period. Thus, the first sentences 
in the triples are equivalent in time, mood, and voice! The second 
sentences in the triples are also equivalent in present progressive 
aspect, but having (in form) is present perfect, while being is 
"passive," yet both refer to the same time meaning! LiketHse, the 
third sentences in the triples mean exactly the same things, yet one 
is past perfect, while .the other is past "passive." The only conclusion 
that can be reached is that the first, second, and third sentences in 
the first triple are equivalent to the first, second~ and third sen-
tences, respectively, in the second triple! Continuation (-ing) cannot 
be added to past tense forms of have and be; thus, it is impossible 
(in form) to express either a past perfect continuation or a past 
"passive" continuation (third examples): if such continuation is 
desired with these time periods, it must be expressed with the present 
progressive aspect plus past perfect (with have) and past "passive" 
(with be). Since the meaning of the second and third sentences in each 
triple are equivalent, the distinction between continuing and completed 
action is, paradoxically, abolished. Hence, the so-called pasticiple 
forms, having done and being done are not only true verbs (not modifiers), 
but also are logically, semantically, and (almost) syntactically 
equivalent! 
The relationship of the passive voice and the pasticiple functioning 
as a so-called predicate adjective is easily demonstrated in most cases. 
For example, in You were tired, tired is said to be a pasticiple modi-
fying you. This kind of analysis ignores the implication of a subject 
(something or someone) as in 
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(Something) tired you. (3.182) 
'f'1 2R t2 
Thus, by application of the well-known passive transformation, the two 
noun phrases switch positions, the proper tense (implied by tired) . 
. 
of be is inserted before the verb, and .!?.!. precedes the exchanged last 
noun phrase: 
You were tired (by something). 
-t~ *R /\ 
2 2 ti 
(3.183) 
Similarly related forms are You were tired (by yourself) and You tired 
yourself; the passive is ambiguous, but the active could be a para-
phrase of the passive in one of its meanings. 
A similar, but more complicated, analysis can b~ seen when 
other linking (copula-like) verbs occur. In You bec~me tired, there 
is again a passive, for, as noted earlier, become is regularly passive 
in meaning. The meaning of You came to be tired (because of overwork) 
is obviously passive because of the presence of the passive infinitive 
to be tired. Came is not carrying its usual action connotation; it 
seems roughly to be equivalent to 
You gradually (became) tired. (3.184) 
a F2 Fl 
Thus,~ seems to be functioning adverbially, since became can be 
substituted for gradually above. But substitution is unreliable. 
Became is a quasi-auxiliary, as will be shown presently. Converting 
You came to be tired (because of overwork) to active voice is not a 
straightforward procedure, for the following form is possible, where 
one phrase only has been moved, providing a form that is still 
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' grannnatical: (Because of overwork) you came to be tired. If you 
had been moved to th~ end of the sentence (regular passive transfer-
mation procedure in. reverse), an ungrammatical sentence would have 
resulted. The paraphrased because provides a solution. The sentence 
is a causation sentence, as in Overwork caused you to become tired, 
which is still passive; but this can now be converted to active voice, 
and the auxiliary become disappears in the process: Overwork caused 
you to tire. Caused may be removed from the latter sentence to 
produce the semantically equivalent sentence 
Overwork tired yoµ. (3.185) 
t1 zR tz 
Thus, )'.'ou were tired and You became tired are of the same logical form. 
Therefore, a possible final formulation for You came to be tired 
(because of overwork) is 
You became tired (because of overwork). (3.186) 
t;- ~R 1)_ 
However, there is something unsatisfying about the above solution. 
If someone tired, it was due to some reason such as overwork. But work 
is a verb, as is seen in Working (too much) tired him, as proved 
earlier in this paper. This sentence, again, suggests causation. For 
this reason, perhaps You became tired should be interpreted thus: 
(Since= because)(someone) (overworked) (you), you tired. (3.187) 
( ~ °'tR fz ).-+ (tz S ) 
Deletion of the "understood" circumflexed elements leaves what seems 
to be equivalent to an aF logical form (i.e., t 2 S = aF); but for the 
above reasons in the last two discussions, it would be wrong 
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to interpret the two cited sentences, without considering the "under-
stood" elements, as 
You were tired (3.188) 
a F 
and 
You became tired, (3.189) 
a F 
for these logical interpretations accord too closely (but not exactly) 
with the traditional idea of predicate adjective modification, which 
has already been proven false in these sentences. 
Similar problems occur with other linking verb constructions. 
Look, seem, and appear are all passive ordinarily, i.e., when they 
occur with other verbs or so-called predicate adjectives. In a 
sentence such as 
appears 
Janet seems worn out (=tired), 
looks 
(3.190) 
the verb worn out is not functioning as a predicate adjective as is 
traditionally maintained; it is a true verb in the passive voice. 
Again, there is an implied subject. Since there are no active forms 
of these verbs (without semantic shift), the passive forms are often, 
confusingly, called active. But this notion can be dispelled by 
noting an obvious passive expression is "understood" and this fact 
may be proven by inserting a subject: 
appears 
Janet seems to be worn out (to me). 
looks 
(3.191) 
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Although with looks, to be seems somewhat inappropriate stylistically, 
it can and does occur. It is necessary to come up with another 
(active) verb which is more or less synonymous to these verbs, such as 
appears 
I think Janet seems (to be) worn out. 
looks 
(3.192) 
However, the second clause is still passive, as the possible insertion 
of to be indicates. One may not use the regular passive transformation 
(in reverse) here to convert to active voice. All that appears to 
be needed is (1) simple deletion of the passive verb (plus to be, if 
it occurs), (2) insertion of the proper tense form of be, and (3) con-
version to active voice of the true verb. Doing these things produces 
*I think Janet is wore out. (3.193) 
The result is ungrammatical because it is still passive, though one 
often hears such an utterance lacking the pasticiple inflection (~ 
for worn). One more step is needed: supplying still another "under-
stood" element, an implied subject of the second clause. When this is 
done, the two noun phrases switch positions (as in the more normal, 
reversed, passive transformation). The result is a complex proposition 
wherein the second proposition is functioning as a kind of direct 
object: 
(!. think) (that) (someone) wore out Janet. 
~ A < 11 zR tz ) 2S 
u (= "it") 
2 
(3.194) 
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Here, I think carries one of its common meanings, that of uncertainty, 
and thus replaces the uncertainty verbs appear, ~' and look. When 
one says Janet seems worn out, it obviously means that she seems that 
way to someone; and if she is worn out, then something or someone 
(perhaps she herself} must have caused her condition. Stylistically, 
the passive form is more desirable if one wishes to focus on Janet 
and her condition, rather than on who has observed it or conjectured 
about it. 
Conlin cites the traditional idea that past participles (pasti-
ciples) ''may take adverbial modifiers but not complements" and cites 
the following examples as proof:29 
Father appears very excited. 
Father appears excited tonight. 
Father appears excited at the good ne~s. 
(3.195) 
( 3.196) 
(3.197) 
He further says that "these italicized word groups are participial 
(= pasticipial) phrases used in the predicate complement function." 30 
Now, the third example, even on traditional theory, can hardly be 
adverbial! In addition, "predicate complement function" is meaningless, 
since the intention is to indicate noun modification. Then, what is a 
predicate complement? Examples (3.194) and (3.105) can easily be 
disposed of. Following the .line of reasoning used earlier, they are 
symbolized in the active voice in the following manner: 
(I think) (that) 
~ f 
(something)(has ••• ) quite .•• excited 
( 't° R2 2Rl 
,1 
~---------------~ ----u 2 (= "it") 
(3.198) 
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Again, it is obvious that something or someone has caused F~ther to be 
excited; and appears implies an unnamed observer who is unnamed in the 
passive precisely for the reason that the speaker (writer) wishes to 
focus on Father. As indicated in the paraphrased part, the true verb 
excited may be past definite tense or present perfect. tense, but it 
is not an adjective modifier. Quite has been substituted for ~ 
for stylistic reasons; very may occur, however: I think that something 
has father very excited. The second sentence, symbolically, is 
(I think) (that) 
~ ~ 
(something)(has ••• ) excited father tonight. 
( " R t t3 ) 
ti 3 . ~---2 ___ ·_.J. . J 
"-=---· --- ....- J -y-
(3.199) 
U 2 
(= "it") 
Unlike quite, tonight is not an adverbial intensifier; tonight is a time 
expression that refers to the time when father became excited (by 
something); the whole clause is affected, not just the verb; strangely 
enough, tonight can occur almost anywhere in the sentence except after 
excited which traditionalists would claim it modifies. The verb is in 
the present perfect tense; it is not a modifier. 
Conlin' s third sentence example is a bit more complicated because 
of the added proposition implied by the predicate good. On the other 
hand, the analysis is also made simpler because the psychological 
subject is overtly shown; it is at (= by) the news. The active voice 
formulaticm, therefore, is really quite straightforward: 
(I think) (that) the good news (has) excited father. 
,,..- A ( F a ) 2R t2 
ul 28 ~
(3.200) 
u2 (= "it") 
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The true verb excited may be either in the· past definite tense or in 
the present perfect tense; it is not an adjective modifier. There is 
no adverbial expression at all. 
All of these examples of Conlin 's are transformations from the 
active to the passive voice, for to be can be inserted after appears 
and before excited in each instance. 
The pasticiple functioning as an objective complement is equally 
misconceived. The underlined expression in the sentence below is 
said to be an objective complement headed by a pasticiple: 
The Democrats wanted Nixon (to be) fired. (3.201) 
The possible insertion of to be, without meaning change, strongly 
suggests that this is a passive sentence where the copula may be overt 
or may be deleted. Though the method used here is not employed by 
them, the fact that such a sentence is a disguised passive is well 
known to some structural and transformational grammarians. 31 Con-
verting the above sentence to active voice (but not by the reverse of 
the usual passive transformation) produces 
The Democrats wanted to fire Nixon. (3.202) 
In the original formulation, the sense of just who should fire Nixon 
is ambiguous, but a possible, "loose" interpretation is suggested by 
the second formulation. Most grammarians would agree that identical 
noun phrase deletion has taken place in the second example. This is 
also supported by the subjunctive form of the sentence: 
The Democrats desired(=wanted) that they(==Democrats) fire Nixon. 
ul 28 ( tl (=u1) 2R t2 ) 
(3. 203) 
"it") 
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A stricter, more likely interpretation (in view of Watergate) suggests 
that they refers to someone other than (or in additidn to) the Demo-
crats (e.g., Congress). In any case, it is easy to see that they fire 
is simply the active form of to be fired by them. Hence, (to be) 
fired is merely a passive voice verb, not an objective complement; 
and it is the main verb in its clause. 
The same analysis, essentially, applies when the "direct object" 
of the first clause is an infintive which is said to be complemented 
by a pasticiple. For example, the sentence 
They wanted to have. Nixon fired 
(by themselves and/or someone else), (3.204) 
is exactly logically equivalent to (3.203). Once again, the essential 
passive equivalence has been shown to exist betwe~n the passive infin-
itive (to be fired) and the "present perfect passive infinitive" 
(for want of a better term)--i.e., to have fired. 
Mandative and Causative Usages 
Unlike the above example, the subject of the second clause may 
not always be inferred from the first clause. Such a sentence is the 
following where the psychological subject has been parenthetically 
inserted: 
Dad had a house (to be) built (3.205) (u1 28=< tz ~R 
U2 ( = II it II ? ) 
Thus, the sentence Dad had a house built is simply a transformation of 
the above formula wherein the passive copula marker of the true verb 
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and the unnecessary subject have been deleted. The rtumeral subscripts 
on the !_'s have been kept in the order of the active form to ·provide 
the added support shown in the active sentence below: 
Dad had 
[ul 2S: 
them (to) build a house. 
("-tl 2R t2 ~~ 
_/' "--""-------~--...,r----~--
u 2 (= "it"?) 
(3.206) 
A new logical sign, the colon (:), has been introduced because, as has 
been suggested earlier on several occasions (e.g., pp. 166-171), it is 
not at air• apparent that the second clause should be interpreted as 
a "kind of direct object," but this view was difficult .to substantiate 
earlier. A comparison to the subjunctive form of this sentence 
illustrates this fact: 
Dad asked that [u1 2s they build a house. (~] 
u2 (= "it"?) 
(3. 207) 
The word that overtly performs the connective function of the colon. 
It will be noticed that had has been changed to asked because, other-
wise, an ungrammatical sentence would have resulted. Depending on 
context, had seems capable of expressing both mild and strong conno-
tations. Had, for example, can connote the semantic forces of verbs 
such as asked, requested, demanded, ordered, as will be seen below. 
The necessary verb change above further supports the idea that 
the second clause is not an object in the usual sense, even on the 
view that the object is simply an amplified explanation or extension of 
"it.". The problem may be solved when one considers the fact that have 
is used in several ways: (1) as a verb to indicate possession, 
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(2) as an auxiliary, and (3) as a Substitution instance for another 
"understood" verb (as above). It may be used in still a fourth way: 
(a) as a combination of (1) and (2)--cf. Have you any money? with 
Do you have any money?--or (b) as a combination of (2) and (3). It 
is this latter case which occurs in Dad had a house built, for the 
real, complete verb expression is had built (as in They had built a 
house), the passive of had build, which is a shortened version of the 
earlier past perfect form had builded (conunon as late as Samuel 
Johnson's time). Thus, had is doing double duty, as seen in the 
alternative statement, Dad had ordered them to build a house, in 
which had ordered is obviously a past perfect tense of the verb. Thus, 
a form such as 
Dad had 
c~ 
ordered that 
2S 
they build a house 
( tl 2R t2 )] '-----~~--~y~--~--~ ( "it"?.) u2 = 
(3. 208) 
proves that in Dad had a house built the word had is both an auxiliary 
and a substitution instance of another verb such as the pasticiple 
ordered; and built is also a pasticiple completing the "understood" 
past perfect expression had build(ed), where had is inferred from the 
first clause. It is the meaning of the verb which determines whether 
what follows can be interpreted as a direct object for which "it" 
substitution may be adduced, and in the above formulations, it still 
seems possible to make such a substitution. However, such a substi-
tution could not be inferred in a sentence such as He ran (in order) 
to (so that he might) escape, for one cannot say He ran it in this 
instance. It may still be a bit arbitrary, but the present writer 
prefers to view such a sentence and the ones above (and many others 
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discussed earlier) as containing a second clause which is simply 
tacked on in a kind of compounding operation; thus, these clauses 
need not be divided into so-called "objectival" and "adverbial" 
modifications of the first clause; they may be considered as a single 
form, a sentence pure and simple, as analyzed by some transformational 
grammarians. 
That second clauses in had ordered (etc.)-sentences are not 
necessarily objects seems conclusively proved when one considers that 
even on traditional theory, as Conlin says, "the contrast between a 
participial modifier and a participle used as an objective complement 
may be seen in the following •.• sentences. 1132 
He had my coat mended. 
He had my mended coat. 
Sentence (3.209) may be paraphrased as 
(3.209) 
(3. 210) 
He had (requested) my coat (to be) mended (by her), (3.211) 
from which, by deletion, the original sentence may be obtained. The 
verb had is functioning both as an auxiliary and as a substitution 
instance of a verb such as requested, as can be proven by perusal of 
the same sentence in subjunctive form: 
He requested that she mend my coat, (3.212) 
where had may not substitute for requested, for an ungrammatical 
sentence would result; but had may be inserted as an auxiliary to 
requested, proving that had requested, a past perfect tense form, is 
what is inferred in the first clause. However, unlike the sentence 
Dad had a house built, had is not an implied auxiliary to mended, 
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and the resultant second clause is not amenable to "it" substitution. 
The difference is entirely due to verb choice substitution for had 
in the first clause, as the following pairs illustrate: 
Dad (had) ordered (that) a house (had to be) built. (3.213) 
*He (had) requested (that) my coat (had to be) mended. (3. 214) 
Dad (had) ordered (that) a house (must be) built. q~ 215) 
*He (had) requested (that) my coat (must be) mended. (3. 216) 
The first sentence in each pair, (3.213) and (3.215); is grammatical 
because both sentences could be used in a social context where the 
hous.e, in fact, had actually been built; but the second sentence in 
each pair is ungrammatical for had requested is opposite in meaning 
to had to be + (any infinitive) because the latter is a type of order 
or command. That is, He had requested does not imply, and could not 
imply, that the coat was, in fact, mended when the whole sentence 
meaning, or rather non-meaning, is considered. Therefore, .the second 
sentence in each pair, (3.214) and (3.216), makes no sense because 
there is no semantic (and, hence, no grammatical) unity between the 
first clause and the second clause; thus, the second clause may not 
function as a direct object of the first clause because there is no 
logical connection existing between them. So, the original conclu-
sion must be correct, that the source of mended (formally speaking) 
is not a past perfect form, but a passive infinitive form, which can 
be analyzed in the following fashion: 
He had (requested) my coat (to be) mended (by her). (3. 217) rl 28 : ( t2 ~,,...R _____ 1.,..l J 
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Therefore, u2 simply labels a "tacked-on" proposition which completes 
the first clause, but is not interpreted as "a k:tnd of direct object." 
The above result is a further proof of the contention made many 
times in this paper that it would he better not to talk of objects 
at all, for the idea is greatly misused as a conceptual device and is 
unnecessary anyway. The term has been used in this work because of 
its familiarity to students and teachers of granunar. If the verb 
choices above had been had ordered and had to be mended, it might 
still be true that the order was not complied with, but at least the 
possibility of its having been complied with exists. These semantic 
problems are avoided in the subjunctive form of the sentence, He 
requested that she mend my coat, where the uncertainty implied in 
requested is not obviated by the neutral, unamplified mend; the more 
usual infinitive form used nowadays, He requested her to mend my coat, 
maintains the same uncertainty and neutrality. 
While the above discussion illustrates that the idea of a pasti-
ciple functioning as an objective conplement is misconceived, it 
cannot be said, exactly, that a pasticiple cannot function as an 
adjective modifier of a direct object in Conlin's second sentence, 
for He had my mended coat is equivalent to the following sentence 
(supplying the missing subject): 
He had my coat (which she (had)) mended. (3. 218) 
The traditional idea that the relative clause is a kind of adjective 
modifier of coat is intuitively attractive; thus, if one deletes 
everything in the relative clause except the verb, and moves the verb 
directly ln front of coat, it seems even more. obvious that the verb is 
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functioning as an adjective. There is nothing wrong in calling such 
overt words and functions adjectives and adjectival as long as one 
recalls that they are not, logically, separate parts of speech or 
functions (verb vs. adjective); verbs and adjectives are both predi-
cates and may be derived from each other by transformations. As 
the above relative formulation indicates, mended may be derived from 
either the simple past definite tense or the past perfect tense. 
If one merely moves the past tense verb (or pasticiple) to the front 
of coat after deletion of the parenthetical portion, this action in 
no way changes the basic predicative function of mended; it is there-
fore not modifying coat in the traditional definitional sense of 
"modification" (i.e., it does not describe someth.ing about the coat, 
but something that was done to the coat). "Logic.al predication" 
avoids the problems of these admittedly overlapping nuances (i.e., 
verbal "action" vs. verbal "description"). The proper logical 
analysis is: 
He had ~· .• mended •.. coat. (3. 219) 
( F a ) 
t 2 (::: "it") 
Here, ~indicates simple possession, which was not at all meant in 
the earlier "objective complement" sentence where had occurred after 
coat; it has no connection whatever with the verb (or pasticiple) 
in the (relative) second clause. Moreover, "it" substitution is more 
obviously possible (He had it), thus fulfilling the traditional 
intuition about the validity of "objectivalhood." 
The transformation involved, incidentally, in moving mended 
from the relative clause to the left of coat is nearly identical to 
the well-known "nominalization transformation" described in many 
generative grammars, e.g., 
The enemy had destroyed the fortress. 
The enemy's destruction of the fortress was complete. 
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(3.220) 
(3. 221) 
It was suggested in Chapter II that so-called adjective complement 
modifiers of a direct object were not such at all. In some instances, 
at least, the underlined portions in the construction verb (+object) + 
adjective is equivalent to a verb expression. This can be illustrated 
by the following pair: 
He had them~ the horse gentle. (active) 
He had the horse made gentle by them. (passive) 
(3.222) 
(3. 223) 
The word made in (3.223) would usually be called by traditional analysts 
a pasticiple functioning as an adjective modifier, of the object horse. 
This is ridiculous, for the same traditional analysts would claim that 
make in (3.222) is functioning as a verb whose subject is them; and 
them is also functioning as an object in the first "clause." This 
latter analysis is· based on the following construction which is like-
wise interpreted: 
He had them to make the horse gentle. (3. 224) 
However, the subjunctive form, once again, shows that the plural 
pronoun is, logically, only a subject of the last part of the sentence: 
He ordered (= had) that they make the horse gentle. (3.225) 
They replaces them when the infinitive form above is not used. Unlike 
some had-sentences which have been discussed previously, inthis 
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sentence had is not grammatically connected with the verb expression, 
niake gentle; it does, however, carry the semantic notion of a completed 
act. (made gentle) over into the second "clause," for the above passive 
may be transformed to 
He had the horse gentled by them, (3. 226) 
where made is deleted and a past tense inflection is suffixed to 
gentle. This conclusion is further supported by.the following para-
phrase to which the original passive and the tran.sformed adjective-
to-verb sentences may be compared: 
He saw to it that the horse was gentled by them. 
He saw to it that the horse was made gentle by theni. 
He had the horse made gentle by them. 
[
u1 ;s: ( t 2 ~R t 1 )J 
\ --y----~-----~ 
U2 
(3.227) 
(3. 228) 
(3.229) 
The active fonn of (3.229) is, of course, He had them (to make) gentle 
the horse. The logical structure is, thus, the same in all three last 
"clauses" in the examples above. With respect only to the last clauses: 
(1) the second passive is an expression of the first passive in that 
the second is a compound verb where the -ed meaning in gentled has 
been transferred to the added word made; (2) the third clause is a 
deletion instance of the unnecessary copula in the second clause, for 
the past tense meaning and the passive meaning are both implied in made. 
Therefore, the true verb is gentle, and made is a quasi-auxiliary, 
for it does carry the semantic notion of "compel." Thus, made is not 
a pasticiple modifying horse, for made tells what the horse was 
compelled to do; it does not tell something about (i.e., describe) the 
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horse. Grannnatically speaking, in addition to being a quasi-au:kiliary, 
made is the passive form of the verb make functioning with the auxiliary 
~ (overt in th.e second sentence, covert in the third sentence). Even 
made can be deleted by further transformations to the active yoice (as 
noted above) or to the passive voice: He had them g~ntle the horse I 
He had the horse gentled by them. 
Although gentle, without an auxiliary, is seldom used as a verb, 
it does occur occasionally. What if there is no verb form counterpart 
for an adjective? Can it be used as a verb? Yes, it can; but it 
must have a quasi-auxiliary functioning with it. Sometimes a nearly 
synonymous one-word substitution instance can be cited for added 
support; other times, unfortunately, such a word has. simply not been 
developed (or it has been lost) in the evolution of the language. 
Because no verb forin exis.ts in some cases, traditional (and other) 
grannnarians, ignoring logic, complicate the situation unnecessarily 
by multiple classifications. Conlin cites the following.two convenient 
examples: 33 
The news made me happy. 
I was made happy by the news. 
(3.230) 
(3. 231) 
Of (3.230), he says, "the adjective happy is a complement, not of the 
subject, ••• , but of the object me. 11 34 Of (3.231), he says, "the 
adjective is used as a complement after a verb in the passive voice."35 
In other words, happy modifies me (= .!)· Logically, however, happy 
is not modifying (describing) a condition of me(!); the sentences 
clearly refer to the action of making happy--i.e., my happiness 
deriving from hearing the news, which is quite another thing. Therefore, 
the logico-syntactic structure of the active voice forms, dictated by 
203 
the meaning, is: 
*The news happied ~· (3. 232) 
tl ZR t2 
The news made .•• me .•. happy. (3. 233) 
t1 . t2 2R 
Sentence (3.232) is ungrammatical only because happy has no verb form. 
The same logical structures apply to the passive voice forms: 
*I was haEEied b;y the news. (3.234) 
t2 *R tl 
I was made haEE:l b;y the news. (3. 235) 
t2 *R tl 
These sentences are, thus, simple S-V-0 sentences! This analysis is 
supported by substituting a synonymous one-word verb form for the 
µngrammatical *haEEied and the grannnatical made haPEY: 
The news gladdened ~· (3. 236) 
t1 2R t2 
I was gladdened by the news. (3. 237) 
t 2 ~R t+ 
The news made •• ·~· •. glad. (3. 238) 
tl t2 2R 
I was made glad by the news. ( 3. 239) 
.t2 *R t 2 1 
A Related Digression 
Sometimes there is no verb form for the adjective nor a synonymous 
one-word substitute verb. This does not alter what has been shown 
above, however. It is logic, not form, in these cases which should 
dictate the analysis. For example, the word stupid is functioning as 
a logical predicate in both sentences in the following pair cited by 
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Conlin, but the propositions are different: 36 
They called the stupid man. (3. 240) 
They called the man stupid. (3.241) 
Sentence (3.240) is like many analyzed previously. It breaks down into 
two propositions, simplified, which may be combined linearly into one 
relativized sentence: 
called the man (who was) (3. 242) 
2R ( a 
------..... 
t 2 (= him) 
All that is obviously necessary is to delete the unnecessary copula and 
the r·edundant pronoun. 
Sentence (3.241) is different in three ways from the first: 
(1) sentence meaning, (2) order, and (3) meaning of called. The last 
point destroys Conlin' s comparative argument concerning the two 
functions of stupid, for (3.240) states that there was a stupid man 
whom they called, i.e., yelled at, telephoned, etc. (The man was 
assumed intrinsically to be stupid.) Sentence (3.241), however, 
implies that the man was called (i.e., labeled, classified, etc.) 
stupid for some reason, but was not necessarily stupid in fact. 
(Perhaps they were merely maligning him, for example.) Thus, the main 
predication is called stupid in (3.241), for called by itself makes 
no sense otherwise in the context. That is, if one were to ask them 
what they called him (what they labeled him), they might answer with 
one word--stupid. Nevertheless, the sentence is ambiguous, for it may 
mean that the word itself they used for him when they talked to him, 
called him, and so on, was "stupid"--as in We call him by that name--
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"stupid." This is an exainple of metalinguistic usage--using language 
to refer to or talk about language. If the metalinguistic meaning is 
ignored (i.e., only the meaning of, not the word itself, is meant), 
then the proper logical analysis of this sentence (and stupid) is, 
in the active and passive voices, respectively, as follows: 
They called ••• the man •.. stupid. (3. 243) 
tl tz ZR 
The man was called stupid by them. (3.244) 
tz ~R t 1 
This analysis is supported by the following paraphrase, 
They considered the man to be stupid, (3.245) 
where the infinitive in the underlined phrase is meaningless; only 
stupid predicates anything. If one argues that to be stupid indicates 
the state of being of the man, the sentence would be false in this 
context; for the meaning is that they considered him stupid, not that 
he was, in fact, stupid. Considered makes no sense unless one knows 
just what was being considered (thought over); hence, considered and 
stupid are inextricably intertwined as a single unit idea. There are 
not the two propositions: They called the man and The man was stupid 
(false). If one insists that there are two (combined) predications, 
then in order for the sentence to make sense, they would have to be 
They called the man and *They called stupid, which further supports 
the above analysis. 
The last few discussions have been, admittedly, a bit digressive. 
They were included because some of them did employ usages and forms 
that have been confounded with pasticiple usage. They further show 
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the essential sameness of sentences which have always been regarded as 
separate types demanding different analyses. 
Absolute Participles and "Pasticiples" 
Definitional Chaos Once More 
Participles and pasticiples are said to function as "sentence 
modifiers." It was shown in the section on gerunds and participles 
that such a (structural grammarian's) definition completely destroys 
any effectiveness the definition of a participle as an adjective 
modifier may have had. Thus, the definition of a pasticiple (past 
participle) as a past time adjective modifier is also destroyed. 
Traditionalists classify "sentence modifiers" as "absolute construc-
tions." It is to their credit that traditionalists, at least, do not 
classify the participle (or pasticiple} in such a construction as 
adverbial, as do the structuralists. Traditionalists do not clarify 
things much, however, for they claim that while absolute constructions 
cannot be classified as regular parts of speech, such expressions, 
nevertheless, are often not fully independent of the main clauses to 
which they are attached, as the name "absolute" implies. Some analysts 
call such absolute expressions "parenthetical," meaning deletable, but 
deletable seems sometimes to mean appositional, etc. There are several 
types of absolute expressions, but what can be said of participles 
and pasticiples in such expressions also applies to most of the others. 
Since the participle as absolute was discussed earlier, the emphasis 
in this section will be mostly on the pasticiple as an absolute, for it 
provides the most interesting examples. 
Sentence Modification Versus Tense, Mood, and Aspect 
Conlin cites the following sentence as containing a pasticiple 
expression (underlined):37 
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His work finished, the President left for Gettysburg, (3; 246) 
Now, there are two possible ways in which to view the meaning of this 
sentence. The first way is merely to consider the first clause as 
essentially independent of the second clause (the traditional view). 
If this is the case, then how does it differ in any important sense 
from another of Conlin's examples,38 
Driven by the wind, the dust spread over the city, (3.247) 
where it is said that "the participial phrase may, however, precede 
the norm it modifies"?39 (Author's emphasis.) Both (3. 246) and (3. 24 7) 
could be interpreted as simple, transformationally reduced sentences: 
The President's work (was) finished, and he left for 
Gettysburg. 
The dust (was) driven by the wind, and it spread over 
the city. 
(3.248) 
(3.249) 
If, traditionally, driven is said to modify wind, then why is finished 
not said to modify work? Position alone, apparently, is the criterion; 
but this won't work either, for Conlin cites as a pasticipial the 
following (underlined) expression: 40 
The snow, melted by the rains, helped to flood the river, (3.250) 
where melted is said to modify snow. This sentence, too, could be 
interpreted as a transformationally reduced sentence: 
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The snow, (which) (was) melted by the rains, helped to 
flood the river, 
(3. 251) 
which is merely another form of the compound (active) sentence as is 
true in the previous two re-worded (passive) sentences: 
The rains melted the snow, and they helped to flood the 
river. 
The wind drove the dust, and it spread over the city. 
The President finished his work, and he left for 
Gettysburg. 
(3.252) 
(3.253) 
(3.254) 
The pronouns in the second clauses, of course, can be replaced by the 
proper referent from the first clause if there is any question of 
ambiguity. These examples thus prove: (1) that the distinction 
between pasticipial modifier expressions and pasticipial absolute 
expressions is not only ill-defined, but non-existent in such .cases; 
(2) that the so-called pasticiples are really trahsformational deletions 
of the copula from passive verb formulations, and are therefore not 
modifiers in the dust- or ~-sentences any more than in the Presi-
dent-sentence; and (3) that they could all be interpreted as embedded 
cases (compound and relativized sentences). 
Since the writer (or speaker) of (3.252-3.254) does, apparently, 
see a close connection between the first and second clause in each 
instance, and since in each instance the action of the second clause 
depends on the action of the first, then it might be better to view 
all three as implicational in form: 
Since the President had finished his work, 
< tl 2R t2 )~ 
he left for Gettysburg. q. 255) ( x ) 
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Since the wind had driven the dust,~ 
( ti 2R t2 ) 
it spread over the city. 
( x ) (3.256) 
Since the rains had melted the snow,~ 
( tl 2R t2 ) 
it helped to flood the river. (3.257) ( x ) 
This last analysis, (3.255-3.257) seems preferable, if one believes 
that, in some sense, the first clause does, indeed, "modify" the 
second clause--as is clearly the motiviation implied in the term 
"sentence modifiers." Whether one chooses the embedded or implica-
tional interpretations makes no difference as far as determining the 
sources of the pasticiples is concerned. They are not pasticiples at 
all; in the first analysis, (3.252-3.254), they are passive verbs; in 
the second, (3.255-3.257), they are past perfect tense verbs with the 
same inflectional suffixes. 
That the past perfect choices in the above sentences are the 
probable sources, logically, of the verb forms, can be proven (some-
what paradoxically) by noting one of Stageberg' s "senence modifier" 
examples: 41 
The guests having departed, 
we resumed the normal household routine. (3.258) 
In appearance, the verb portion of (3.258) seems to be present perfect 
for the form is have + -ed. However, like the sentences cited in the 
previous paragraph, this sentence may be viewed as an implicational 
one: 
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Since the guests had departed, we resumed. . . . (3.259) 
The past perfect tense occurs just as it did in the three previous 
cases, and it makes sense in this context. Why, then, use having? 
When one considers the fact that none of the three previous cases had 
-ing (in any of their versions) in the first clause, one must assume 
that progressive continuation was not meant; consequently, since 
'f 
having does occur here (in the first version), continuation must be 
meant, yet it is missing in the implicational form above. There are 
two possible answers: (1) that having is replacing the nonexistent, 
therefore, ungrammatical, *hadding; or (2) that the meaning is 
Since the guests have (just) departed, we resumed (3.260) 
( a. F )_,. ( X ) 
Thus, in Stageberg's version the -ing is added to the present perfect 
tense to impart the idea of continuation having just recently occurred 
(as is occurring in this explanation at this very moment!). Now, in 
spite of the fact that progressives require copulas (as is usually 
thought), this sentence contains a present perfect+ progressive verb 
construction. The unnecessary copula is deleted, for have + -ed 
(plus optional just) indicates the time, and -ing indicates the con-
• 
tinuation. 
Another paraphrase supports the last, preferred interpretation: 
Since the guests who were departing were now departed, (3.261) 
we resumed . • . . 
The fo.nnulation were departed is here used in its somewhat archaic 
form where verbs of motion often used to take to be rather than to have 
as an auxiliary. This is reasonable because the past perfect tense is 
t • 
gradually falling into disuse, and, in fact, both it and the present 
perfect are often replaced nowadays by the simple past without a 
meaning change occurring •. The point here is the one made earlier 
several times: transformations should be based on actual language 
usage--past and present. Many older, almost obsolete, granunatical 
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forms still occur but their existence is obscured by the fact that 
certain deletions or replacements have taken place. Before specu-
lational deep structures are cited in order to explain overt structures, 
the historical forms that have actually existed in the language should 
be considered. Interestingly enough, in this regard, it may be noticed 
that in Middle English the word have did occur with both v and the 
dental suffix d indicative of the past and perfect tenses--havde--yet 
the perfect tenses did not come into connnon use in English until much 
later. Thus, the development of the English past perfect tense (based 
on Latin models) of have comes from the simple past tense originally--
hav + ~(~_). The present perfect tense developed from Middle English 
habbe, where the bilabial £. pairs with the labio~dental v. 
Predominance of Implicational Constructions 
Almost all absolute constructions containing participles or pasticiples, 
so far as the present writer has been able to ascertain, occur in im-
plicational sentences. In order to determine whether the passive voice 
or the perfect tense is the source of the later ("absolute") transfor-
mational derivation, it is necessary to consider the logical time 
sequence of the two clauses in such a sentence construction, for the 
modern form is often deceptive on this point, as illustrated below: 
. 
The time came, and John left. 
The time having come, John left. 
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c (simple past tense) (3.262) 
(past perfect + progres-
sive--*hadding to havJng)(3.263) 
Sentence (3.263) implies that John was in the process of waiting for a 
certain time to arrive; when it had come, he left. Thus, a perfect 
tense plus continuation is indicated. In Early Modern English, the 
verb could have been was come, which (because of the copula) has the 
form of a passive verb, but the meaning is clearly had come, a perfect 
form. What most analysts seem to ignore is the semantic similarity 
that many native speakers feel exists between passives and perfects. 
This semantic similarity accounts for their similar derivational 
history in the development of the predominant forms used in Late Modern 
English (particularly the twentieth century). Sentence (3.262) has 
simple past tense forms in both clauses, the nuances described above 
have been lost, and the sentence could be considered a regular com-
pound sentence. However, the described nuances are often implied in 
such a sentence, and that is probably why two such clauses could be 
joined into one sentence--to preserve the implication. The fact that 
pasticiples and past tense verbs usually take the same inflectional 
suffix, in addition to indicating past tim7 also supports this point 
of view. That is, if arrived had been substituted for came or come, 
both tense and form requirements would have been met, and the meaning 
would not necessarily have changed one bit in either of the two sen-
tences. It is no accident, that is, that past tense forms and passive 
and perfects are usually the same; even in the case of irregular verbs, 
the overwhelming tendency is to reduce the past tense and pasticiple 
forms to one inseparable form--as in I went I *I had went, ..!_saw I 
*I seen, I sang I *I sung and so on in laymen's speech. If this were 
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not the case, the section on "troublesome verbs" would not exist in 
virtually every prescriptive textbook used in the conunon schools. The 
writer has tested class after class of students on these past /pasti-
ciple forms, and has found that nearly all students, for instance,· do 
not know the "proper" forms for slink; all the following forms occur: 
slank, slunk, had slank, had slunk, and slinked. 
In an absolute construction such as 
His researches (being) finished (bl him), . 
( t2 *R t ) ......> 2 1 
he wrote UE his findings, (3.264) 
( x ) 
the optional being and by him show that the first clause is a 
passive form; the active form is 
Since he had finished his researches, 
( tl 2R t2 ) ~ 
he wrote UE his findings. (3.265) ( x ) 
Again, if being is overt in the passive instance, (3.264), the idea is 
one of continuation--i.e., He had just (recently) finished his researches, 
stated actively. Many analysts, because they refuse to recognize the 
essential similarity between be and have (in passive and perfect 
sentences) interpret His researches in the first version above, (3.264), 
as the subject of finished (i.e., just as they would interpret the Early 
Modern English form The time was come differently than The time having 
come = The time had come), Logic, rather than form, dictates such 
various traditional interpretations. These considerations prove once 
more that logical analysis should precede, so that it may help establish 
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syntactic structure. The traditional approach produces unnecessary 
multiple. relationships where an essential simplicity exists, logically 
speaking. 
So far, the sequence of tenses have all concerned past time fortns. 
Iinplicational absolute constructions may also occur in the present 
tense. However, active versus passive is not always clear. For 
example, in the above paragraph His researches being finished was 
seen to be passive, for the psychological subject by him is implied; 
but the same structure in the sentence below does. not function in the 
same way: 
He being my brother, I trust him. 
Since he is my brother, I trust him. 
( tl ---;;- t1 )7 ( x ) 
(3.266) 
(3. 26 7) 
The paraphrased version, (3.267), proves that He is the· subject of 
being, and the clause is active, not passive. Being, thus, is once 
again a present progressive form indicating continuous "action." It 
is interesting to note that, semantically, the implication might also 
be He has (always) been my brother; but this is self-evident from the 
context and does not seem to be the real force of the clause. Sentence 
(3.267) indicates an exact paralleling of tenses, present-present, 
comparable to past-past in Since he was my brother, I trusted him; 
but it could have been Being my brother, I trust~d him, where Being 
is obviously past progressive (although there is a possible ambiguity 
of referents in this case). 
Just as perfect may precede simple past, so may present precede 
future: 
(He) being my brother, I shall trust him. 
Since he ~my brother, I shall trust him. 
( tl = tl ) ~ ( x ) 
215 
(3. 268) 
(3. 269) 
The only essential difference between I trust him and I shall trust him 
is that the latter implies the possibility of not having always trusted; 
the former indicates habitual behavior, which therefore also implies 
futurity. He need not be overt; if it is not, being cannot modify 
my brother, as is often claimed; there seems to be an equality inferred 
by being my brother, so He must be understood as the subject, for it 
seems odd to say *Since my brother is he, I shall trust him; and one can 
certainly not say *My brother being he, I shall trust him. These facts 
suggest that the relationship is actually not one of exact equality; 
therefore, the first clause would be better interpreted, perhaps, as 
(He) being my brother, (3.270) 
( ~ F )-7( x 
Since he is my brother, 
( a F )-1( x ) (3.271) 
Absolute constructions may occur internally, surrounded by the 
main clause: 
Lee's decision (to surrender), viewed now 
(by posterity), was wise. 
If viewed by posterity now, (then) Lee's 
decision (to surrender) was wise. 
When posterity views it now, .... 
( t 1 3R t;° -;;-)7( X ) 
The first two versions, (3.272-3.273), are passive verb forms: 
(3. 272) 
(3.273) 
(3.274) 
If the 
decision is viewed by posterity. . . . A present participle or an 
infinitive could have replaced viewed, though the latter would require 
some re-wording: If one is to view (=were to view or should view) Lee's 
decision now, • • 
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The following absolute construction may be interpreted as a com-
pound or implicational sentence: 
Granted (that) you are knowledgeable, you are still not 
wise• 
It is granted (by me) that you are knowledgeable, 
but • • • • 
I grant (that) you are knowledgeable, but •••. 
Even though (!. grant that) you are knowledgeable, ~ 
[· 11 ~ (a F j~ 
you_._. __ 
( x ) 
(3.275) 
(3.276) 
(3.277) 
(3.277) 
Clearly, granted is a present passive verb, as proven by (3; 276). The 
active version, (3.277), is a compound sentence form, and (3.278) is 
implicational. In the latter case, the logical expression even though 
(= although) substitutes for I grant that; the latter expression may 
be inserted too, however, as a kind of logical redundant apposition. 
Sometimes absolute expressions cannot be sensibly interpreted 
as implications when pasticiples or participles are present. When 
this is true, they may be interpreted as compound sentences, as seen 
in these final examples: 
He attacked, his hands clenched in fury. (3.279) 
He attacked, and his hands were clenched in fury. (3.280) 
<a F ) & ( b *Gl c2 ) 
He attacked, his hands clenching and unclenching 
in fury. (3. 281) {He attacked, and his hands were clenching in fu!}'.: 
( a F ) & [ b ( *Gl G2 ) 
· ~ unclenching in f~P;] 1 ( & *Hl (3. 282) 
The so-called pasticiple in the first pair, (3.279-3.280) is clearly a 
past passive voice form of the verb, for it may be transformed to the 
active voice: he clenched his hands. . . . In the second pair, 
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(3.281-3.282), the so-called participle is passive and past progressive 
simultaneously: his hands were clenching and unclenching. . . . 
The logical structure of both types may be shown completely and more 
easily when they are transformed to the active voice: 
. . . , [< x ) and he clenched his hands in furya. -&-(t1 1 t 2 R2 ) 2R 
(3. 283) 
his hands in fury 
t2 R2 ) 
and he was unclenching his hands in f~p); 1. J 
-&-<t1 sl t2 '..J 
2 
(3. 284) 
The prepositional phrase has been interpreted as an adverb of manner, 
furiously. This causes some notational difficulties, for it assigns 
R2 ·and s 2 for the "same" adverb; but since there are two propositions 
in the last clause, this usage is not technically incorrect. Likewise, 
the repeated t's in the second clause are not technically incorrect; 
though other symbols could have been used, the repeated !_'s add per-
spicuity to the overall formula. 
Miscellaneous Considerations 
Indeterminacy of Parts of Speech 
Digressing a bit, it is interesting to consider that a universal 
theory of grammar must come to grips with the possibility of the idea 
that even the main categories of noun and verb are really two aspects 
of the same thing, but not in the traditional senses already refuted 
in this chapter. This chapter has vigorously demonstrated that so-
called verbals (i.e. , verbs said to be performing other part-of-speech 
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functions: infinitives, gerunds, etc.) are, in fact, usually true verbs. 
But in Chapter II some interesting examples were cited, such as I 
dreamed a dream, He lived a life of sin, He took a walk(= He walked), 
Do you (have a) desire to go? etc. The same verb-noun correlation can 
be seen in the case of verbals; in the examples below, only occurrences 
of a swim seem obviously nominal, yet all.the underlined forms could 
translate as it when the context is known: 
Ted enjoys a swim early in the morning. 
Ted enjoys to swim early in the morning. 
Ted enjoys swilllllling early in the morning. 
Ted enjoys taking a swim early in the morning. 
Ted enjoys having a swim early in the morning. 
Ted enjoys being (in) swinnning early in the morning. 
(j.285) 
(3.286) 
(3.287) 
(3.288) 
(3. 289) 
(3.290) 
Unlike the earlier cited cases in this chapter, these examples may 
support the traditional notion (intuition?) that there are cases where 
a word usually considered to be a verb is actually functioning as ~ 
kind of nominal. It seems that these cases illustrate the boundary 
which separates logical semantics and true grannnar. In other words, 
substitution and distribution may be the most important factors here 
with respect to the underlined phrases, for only patterning seems 
significant for determining their functions. Logically; there is no 
problem. There are two propositions, one embedded in the other: 
Ted swims early in the morning (every day, presumably) and Ted enjoys 
it (where it equals the first proposition). Swim in ail its forms 
above is a predication, but determining the grannnatical functions is 
something else again. 
Scientifically speaking, the above dilemma is untenable, for it 
leaves the analyst of grammar no tools with which he can carry on his 
work. The situation is comparable to that of a chemist who unexpectedly 
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discovers that molecules ~ atoms, not "compounds" constructed from 
atoms. There is a way .out of the dilemma posed by the swim-sentences, 
however, if one will cot.mtenance a little tinkering. The word enjoy 
has two meanings which are not necessarily mutually exclusive: (1) "to 
get pleasure from" and (2) "to have the use or benefit of," according to 
Webster's New World Dictionary of the .American Language (Cleveland and 
New York, 1960, p. 482). Now, the swim-sentences imply that Ted does, 
in fact, swim, and that he derives benefit (= pleasure) therefrom. 
Thus, these sentences may all be cases of a transfdrmation from a kind 
of "compound" proposition, as noted above. Alternatively, one could 
interpret each somewhat as follows: 
Ted swims enjoyably early in the morning. (3. 291) 
tl Rl R2 t2 t3 
3 
The above adverbial (R2) interpretation, though lacking in aesthetic 
virtue, seems to convey accurately all the propositional content. It 
will be recalled that while symbolized in a manner similar to that of 
adjectives, adverbs are really higher-order functions (or relations). 
Adverbs, thus, signify properties of properties--i.e., enjoyably 
specifies the attribute attaching to swims. Now, the whole sentence 
with its entire meaning seems to "hang together" rather well, and the 
noun-verb distinction has been maintained. 
The problem with such a solution is that one has the unsettling 
suspicion that one will not always be able to handle every word that 
poses a similar dilemma. Hence, purely structural factors will 
probably have to be the final measuring stick for sentence analysis 
after logic has been exhausted. A case in point .is the following 
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sentence taken from a popular comic strip, wherein a woman has agreed 
to a man's suggestion that they "go steady" for awhile. She says: 
"Okay! We' 11 one boy-one girl it for a while . . . , " 
in "Mary Worth," Daily Oklahoman, Jan. 30, 1975. 
(3. 292) 
The verb phrase is will one boy-one girl it, which simply means will 
go steady. While the logic of the paraphrase seems obvious; one cannot 
help but wonder, on grannnatical grounds, whether the words and word 
structure have not been so altered that one cannot really say that he 
is dealing with the same sentence (disregarding concepts) or any gram-
matical derivation therefrom. If one. boy-one girl it really is a verb, 
in what sense is it a verb? 
Such strange examples as the above are really not strange at all. 
They occur all the time in everyday utterances; they are just not the 
sort of thing of which English teachers and other purists approve. 
In an interview with the movie actor Charles Bronson, for instance, 
the interviewer said of Bronson that 
He finger jabbed, "Now you're going to say I don't like Burton." 
--Jerry LeBlanc, "World's Favorite Tough Guy," 
Sunday Oklahoman, Feb. 9, 1975. (3.293) 
The verb is clearly finger jab bed. It may be a "paraphrase" of He 
jabbed with his finger, but if that is the case, how does the "object" 
(in quotes above) relate functionally to the verb, whether it be 
finger jabbed of simply jabbed? If the comma is actually a conjunction, 
then the first clause means, apparently, He jabbed his finger at me. 
It is quite possible that finger jabbed is being used physically and 
metaphorically ("pointing" out the meaning expressed in the quotation). 
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In a popular novel, a man is trying to overwhelm a woman with his 
attentions, but she thinks to herself 
No, she could not. be cave-manned. 
--Grant Stockbridge, Death Reign of the 
Vampire King (Spider, number no. 1) 
(New York, 1975, p. 80) 
(3.294) 
As written, cave-manned is necessarily a passive infinitive, as the 
active form proves: He could not cave-man her. So, cave and man are 
not nouns; they are parts of one verb •. 
The examples discussed in this section and countless others like 
them which could easily be adduced illustrate the need in grammatical 
theory for a more logical approach in defining basic grammatical 
categories. In the last case (cave manned), the '-ed form helped to 
determine the correct answer, but it has often been shown in this 
chapter that form can be misleading. Thus, a close relationship 
between logic and syntax must be established for each language, based 
on each language's socio-cultural context, before a universal thedry 
of grannnar may be attempted. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EMBEDDED CONSTRUCTIONS 
Parenthetic;al Expressions 
In this work, the term "embedded" has been used to mean that a 
sentence contains two or more clauses, not all of which are always 
clearly overt. Some types of embedding have already been encountered. 
This chapter, therefore, may be considered to some extent to be an 
amplification of previous material 
Dependency 
Parenthetical expressions are sometimes called sentence modifiers 
or absolute (independent) constructions, as noted in the participle 
and pasticiple sections of Chapter III. The expressions to the left 
of the brace below are said to be parenthetical because it is usually 
believed that they are deletable. However, they are not independent, 
for if deleted, the remaining clause becomes a statement of categorical 
fact, which is not necessarily the case when the parenthetical portion 
is retained, as is apparent upon inspection: 
Truly 
Naturally 
Certainly 
To be sure 
Surely 
Fortunately 
Luckily 
, he could swim. 
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(4 .1) 
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All of the above parenthetical expressions could have been placed 
after the verb swim; but it should be noted that when palced in final 
position the expressions become adverbs of manner describing a 
characteristic or property of swim. If the parentheticals are placed 
before swim, the meanings change; they are the same as when they occur 
in initial position--i.e., they imply a clausal function such as 
It was true (etc.) (that) he could swim. Since this latter form 
causes some notational problems, it is more convenient to represent the 
logical structure in a transformation of the above, thus: 
That 
( 
true 
natural 
certain 
sure 
fortunate 
he could swim was lucky. 
\.. 
a F J) G 
-----.... y -
b 
(4.2) 
Even this symbolization is simplified, for that means The fact (that) 
or It was a fact (that), i.e., an appositional expression. These 
latter formulations support the colon notation used earlier, for they 
are equivalent to It was a fact: he could swim, where the whole first 
clause, in a sense, is "equal" to the whole second clause. Ignoring 
the appositional aspect, sentence (4.2) treats the whole first (sub-
ject) clause as an argument specified by the function _Q.. Thus, in a 
way, the paren the ti cal expressions are sentence modifiers, for they 
modify (in the traditional sense) the subject clause; they certainly 
do not modify the verb swim, as in He could swim naturally. 
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Independency 
The following sentence, though similar to the one in the last 
paragraph, differs in one important respect: since the parentheticals 
are semantically equivalent to the predicate adjective, they can indeed 
be deleted without sacrificing any of the (whole) sentence's meaning; 
of cours·e, if a different adjective or noun were inserted, the situation 
would change. The parentheticals, in this case, merely serve as 
emphasizers (e.g., Truly, he is truthful). The sentence, therefore, 
is symbolized in the following manner: 
That he is truthful is 
(~
b 
true (= a truth) 
a reality 
a fact 
my opinion. 
G 
(4. 3) 
Thus, even though predicate adjectives occur in the formula of the last 
paragraph, and predicate nouns (except true) occur in this instance, 
the logical structure is identical; both forms may be reduced, that is, 
to one logical structure, for in both cases the subject clauses are 
"modified" by the functioD: G. Hence, the distinction between adjec-
tives and nourts (as in He's a fool I foolish) is blurred, to say the 
least. 
Meaning and Paraphrase 
Some parentheticals, in the course of time, have lost most of their 
semantic content, and more extensive paraphrasing, though not desirable, 
is necessary. This fact is shown in the first two parentheticals below: 
In the final analysis } 
In the long run 
When all is said and done 
Everything considered. . 
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; the truth will out (= emerge) (4.4) 
The simplest (and perhaps the most correct) analysis is to interpret the 
initial expressions as temporal (=then, eventually). However, the 
first parenthetical may be read as When one finally analyzes everything, 
and the second, similarly, means When one has run through the length 
(and breadth) (= the long and the short) .of the problem, . . • . Hence, 
all four could be equivalent to the implicational forms discussed in 
the section on pasticiples. This may be proven by converting the last 
parenthetical to the active voice: 
When (if) ~ considers everything,~ 
( tl 2R t2 )~ 
(then) the truth will out. (4.5) 
( a F ) 
The above solution may seem dubious to some readers, but it illustrates, 
at least, some of the problems involved in interpreting parenthetical 
expressions. 
In the following sentence, the parentheticals may not be deleted 
at all, if the entire sentence meaning is to be retained. The meaning 
seems to be something like The evidence (currently available) con-
tradicts me, but I do not accept the decision based on it (i.e., a 
conjunctive sentence). 
In spite df ] 
Despite 
Notwithstanding 
the evidence, I disagree. (4.6) 
Too much -Information has been deleted from the above parentheticals 
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to allow one to attempt a logical analysis with any degree of confidence. 
1f one is willing to accept the par~phrased conjtinct:Lve sentence cited 
above, then the analysis accords with those formulas cited in many 
previous cases. All contrastive parentheticals such as those above 
and others too numerous to mention (e.g., on the one hand, on the 
other hand, contrariwise, etc.) imply information in a context; if the 
context is not available, either the sentence must remain unanalyzable, 
or a suitable (probable) context must. be supplied. Any other approach 
is nonsensical. 
Compound Sentences 
Conj Unction 
Comi>ound sentences, traditionally, are two or more independent 
(main) clauses added on to each other. One type of compound sentence 
contains clauses joined by so-called coordinating conjunctions, of 
which the most connnon are and, but, .£!:_, ~' for, ~'· and Y!:.!· 
Ignoring internal structure, this type of sentence, when it is truly 
conjunctive, can be symbolized by simply joining the clauses by the 
logical symbol for and(&), as shown below: 
I'm not going, but you are. 
He arrived early, Y!:.! he still has not finished his work. 
I am going, and so are you. 
( x ) &( y ) 
As in Chapter III, capital X (etc.) labels a clause which is not 
analyzed internally. All three of the above sentences can be 
schematized as in (4.9), for all the conjunctions are more or less 
equivalent to and, if one ignores the contrastive connotations of 
(4. 7) 
(4. 8) 
(4.9) 
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but and ~· In wtitten English, the connna may replace and in a 
series: 
I came, I saw, I conquered. (4. 10) ( x )& ( y )& ( z ) 
• 
Sentence (4.10) is said to achieve also a better "aesthetic balance" 
by omitting the conjunctive words implied by the commas. Sometimes 
both and and commas appear, as in I came, I saw, and I conquered, 
where usage permits omission of the last comma. If only one and 
appears, multiple clause structure is implied. For example, in I 
bought a dozen eggs, a loaf of bread, and a pound of butter, the 
expression I bought is inferred for both of the last two elements of 
the series. Obviously, some conjunctions (e.g., and, but, or, and nor) 
can occur almost anywhere in a sentence, and when they do, multiplk 
propositions are usually indicated. A compound such as I own a dog and 
a cat, for instance, implies I own a dog and I own a cat; I sent 
letters to my brother and my sister implies I sent a letter to my 
brother and I sent a letter to my sister; and so on. The shorter forms 
are transformations of the longer forms. 
The semi-colon (which ought to be called a "semi-period," since 
it separates independent clauses) can also be substituted for the 
conjunction in written English: 
I'm not going; you are. ( 4 .11) 
-( x )& ( y ) 
Implication 
No sentences containing for or so were included above, for these 
are usually not coordinating words, as is often claimed; they are 
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usually implicational in sentences where coordination is said to be 
operating. The sentence. I'm .going, for it is late, for example, is 
equivalent to 
Since it (= the time) is late, I am going. (4 .12) 
( a F )-?> (b G ) 
Likewise, The car was cheap, so I bought it may be interpreted as 
Since the car was cheap, ..!. bought it. 
( · a · F )~ (t1 2R t 2 (= a)) 
(4 .13) 
Disjunction 
Logically speaking, sentences containing or or nor are not con-
junctions, but disjunctions. The Latin vel (v) is used to symbolize 
disjunction, as below: 
I must hurry EE I' 11 be late. (4.14) 
( x ) v ( y ) 
He's not g~ing, nor are you. (4.15) 
-~ x )v ( y ;J 
In English, either ••• or and neitheF .•. nor function rather like 
parentheses in that they introduce separate clauses. The sentence 
Either you or I will go contains two propositions symbolized thus: 
Either you will go, ( x ) or I will go. v ( y ) (4.16) 
Neither and nor could have been substituted, respectively, for either 
and or, except that nor requires subject and verb inversion, and 
negation would also have to be inserted. 
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Traditional Conjunctive Adverbs 
A second type of compound is one which contains clauses joined by 
so-called conjunctive adverbs. (In written English, the semi-colon 
is usually written after the first clause.) In all the following 
examples, the underlined conjunctive adverbs can be interpreted, more 
or less equivalently, as and: 
I'm going to call her; however, she won't answer. 
You are ill; moreover, you are ill due to negligence. 
I'm hunting for a job; furthermore, I'll find one. 
She's beautiful; also, she's clever. 
We're too late for supper; besides, we don't want any. 
I'm sick; nevertheless, I'm going to school. 
Rome burned; likewise, Atlanta burned. 
He drove too fast; accordingly, he was fired. 
I will pay my fees; then, I will go home. 
( x )& ( y ) 
( 4 .17) 
(4.18) 
( 4. 19) 
(4.20) 
(4.21) 
(4.22) 
(4.23) 
(4.24) 
(4.25) 
Sentence (4.17) contains a connective which could mean "but"; however, 
it is symbolized like (4. 25) ~ as are the others in this group. (The 
comma is often omitted after the conjunction.) 
Some sentences employ conjunctive adverbs which appear to be dis-
junctive; 
He should bundle up; otherwise, he'll catch cold. (4.26) 
You'll have to do better (than that); else you will 
not succeed. (4.27) 
Both adverbs seem equivalent to or, but this is illusory. They are 
implicational forms: 
If he doesn't bundle up,~ 
-( a F ) 
he'll catch cold (=become ill). (L1.28) 
(-:;- G ) 
If you don't do better, you'll not succeed. (4.29) 
-( x >-7-< y ) 
The following conjunctive adverb sentences are all of the same form as 
the schematized instance in (4.29), except for lack of negation. 
He's a genius; hence he's an "A" student. 
She won the prize; consequently, she won recognition. 
You are tardy; therefore, you'll get a zero 
Ill-Defined Clause Categories 
(4.30) 
(4. 31) 
(4.32) 
Sometimes an implicational sentence is disguised because the con-
junction and separates the clauses, and a conjunctive adverb is buried 
in the sentence: 
I've been a bad 
Since I've been ( x 
boy and I will therefore get a spanking. 
a bad boy, I'll get a spanking. 
)~( y ) 
Likewise, the disjunctive or can be confused with implication: 
You'd better leave, or (else) I'll scream. 
If you don't leave, Tthen) I' 11 scream. 
-( x ) --j- ( y ) 
The if-clause in (4.36) is traditionally called a dependent, or 
( 4. 33) 
( 4. 34) 
(4. 35) 
(4. 36) 
subordinate, clause because of the subordinating conjunction if; many 
such clauses are actually implicational, as will be shown later. For 
now, it is enough to notice that the distinction between independent 
clauses and subordinate clauses is certainly ill-defined when impli-
cationals enter the picture. It should be recalled that the terms 
"coordinate" and "subordinate" are essentially semantic, for they 
imply, respectively, that the clauses are on a meaning par or that one 
clause depends on the other to make its meaning clear. The fact that 
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implicationals can take coordinating conjunctions, conjunctive adverbs, 
and subordinating conjunctions is very damagihg to traditional theory. 
In·fact, simple sentences connoting causation are actually 
implicational too, from a logical point of view. Such a sentence 
is An "A" requires study, which implies a logical structure something 
like 
If one desires an "A", (then) ( x ) ~ 
one is required to study, (4. 37) 
( y ) 
which, traditionally, is a complex sentence introduced by a sub or-
dinate clause. In other words, much is left out of the original 
sentence which is assumed. Such an instance further proves that the 
distinction between simple and more complicated senttinces is not 
always clear because the second (independent) clause actually requires 
the first clause in the situational context in which it is uttered. 
Semantic Conjunction 
If two clauses are alike--i.e., declarative, imperative, yes-no 
questions, WH-questions--they may be conjoined, providing they are 
semantically related. However, the rule seems to be broken in the 
following pair of sentences, both of which contain an initial impera-
tive clause and a final non-imperative clause: 1 
Get out of here or I'll scream. 
Get your coat and we'll go to the movies. 
(4. 38) 
( 4. 39) 
TheAe sentences appear to be disjunctive and conjunctive, respectively. 
But appearances are deceiving, for they are both implicational sentences: 
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If you don't get out of here, (then) I'll scream. 
-( x ) -7' ( y ) 
(4.40) 
If you get your coat, (then) we.' 11 go to the movies. 
( x ) ~ ( y ) 
(4.41) 
Thus, the rule stated above continues to hold; and this fact proves 
that if grannnatical theory is to be consistent, implicational sen-
tences should perhaps be assigned to a sentence category separate from 
other categories, as they are in mathematical logic. On the other 
hand, in view of the transformational possibilities suggested by the 
different versions of the above examples (plus gerund implicationals, 
infinitive implicationals, etc., discussed earlier in this work), it 
seems reasonable just to set up an "Embedded Sentences" category, of 
which implicationals and their non-implicational transformations are 
subcategories. There are merits and drawbacks to both of these 
alternatives. Here, it is merely essential to note that implicationals 
span the various sentence types. 
Restrictive and Nonrestrictive Clauses 
Implicit in the foregoing discussion and in pages to follow is 
the fact that there are different kinds of implication in natural 
languages such as English. Some, for example, assert a causal 
relationship, such as If he hits me, I'll strike back. Others express 
something more akin to contingency, such as If I get sick, I'll miss 
my exams and Unless you shape up' you I 11 have to ship out. Still 
others seem to express the reason for something happening, such as 
Because of the tornado warning, we retreated to our storm cellar; such 
a sentence seems to express both reason and ca-use-effect: The tornado 
warning was the reason (= stimulus) for our retreating to our storm 
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cellar. There can be, thus, some "overlapping" of implication types 
because there can be some "overlapping" of interpretations. It is 
possible that a word such as because can simultaneously mean both 
cause-effect and reason; in such cases, the description of the process 
as "overlapping" may be somewhat incorrect, unless the term is used 
in a rather broad sense. 
It has been pointed out by rule and example that any two or more 
structures can be conjoined, whether they be sentences or sentence 
constituents, as long as they are structurally alike. But it was 
pointed out that they must be semantically compatible. Being "alike" 
and being "semantically compatible," however, are conditions that are 
difficult to define exactly in some situations. A case in point is 
the difference between sentences containing non-restrictive relative 
clauses and those containing restrictive relative clauses, such as 
the following: 
Professors, who teach psychology, are odd. 
Professors who teach psychology are odd. 
(4.42) 
(4.43) 
These two sentences are not structurally alike, though they appear to 
be quite similar. The commas in the non-restrictive relative are 
written representations of pauses in an oral utterance; the sentence's 
meaning is thus, not conveyed by words alone--i.e., lexically--but 
stress and intonation do play significant roles in interpretation. 
It is usually claimed that non-restrictive relative clauses derive 
transformationally from underlying ("deep structure") compound 
sentences. 2 While th~re seems to be no need to posit a deep level of 
grammatical structure, it must be admitted that Professors, who teach 
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psychology, are odd is most easily explained (structurally), if one 
assumes its close "kinship" to the following compound sentence: 
Professors teach psychology and professors are odd, (4.44) 
' 
wherein there has been deletion of .and and substitution and movement · 
of the redundant second instance of professors. The semantic compati-·· 
bility criterion is met, but in a rather strange way. Both forms 
"mean" the same thing, but both are nonsensical! That is, both the 
non~restrictive relative and the compound imply all professors are odd 
and also that all professors teach psychology. Hence, both forms of 
sentence are false with respect to facts in the normal; everyday world. 
Such sentences reveal the flexibility of language, for they do make 
sense in special contexts (what logicians call "possible worlds"). 
For example, there are, no doubt, many students who do believe that 
all professors are odd (it is a matter of opinion, anyway, rather than 
precise definition) and that these professors teach psychology (in 
the sense that they use psychological methods and principles) in 
teaching their classes. 
In view of the above considerations, the restrictive relative 
sentence cannot derive transformationally from the aforementioned 
compound sentence; it differs structurally (no pauses ~ commas) and 
semantically from the non-restrictive relative sentence which is 
synonymous with and structurally similar to the compound sentence. 
Even if one assumes a context where, say, a student does believe that 
all psychology professors are odd, this still does not explain from 
what form(s) the restrictive form derives. Those transformational 
grammarians who claim that "nonrestrictive relatives ••. come from 
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conjoined sentences" in deep structure also claim:, on the other hand, 
I 
\ 
that nrestrictive relatives come from sentences embedded inside noun 
phrases" in deep structure.3 The sentence under discussion, then, 
would be analyzed thus: 
fErofessorsNP2 (who teach psychology) 5J NPl are od~l (4.45) 
Such an interpretation could imply that people carry around with them 
sen_tence structures such as s2 , NP1 , and so on in their heads. Such 
a solution is elegantly neat, but unconvincing, to the present writer. 
Why not, on the contrary, approach the problem from a more 
semantic standpoint? For instance, a professor is one who .teaches--he 
is a teacher. It is possible that the restrictively stated version of 
the proposition derives from something such as 
Psychology teachers (= professors) are odd, (4.46) 
a F 
where the logical argument is a proposition not further analyzed, but, 
apparently, means something rather like (They) teach psychology = 
Teachers (professors) of psychology. In logic, one could state the 
whole .molecular proposition thus: "For all x, if xis a professor 
(= college teacher), and if x teaches psychology, then x is odd." The 
• 
complex if-part of the proposition is "collapsed" grammatically into a 
modificational structure (called "noun adjtincts" by some analysts) in 
the English expression Psychology teachers (professors), where the 
noun-verb distinctions in the usage of teach are blurred. Hence, some 
provision must be made to create both a subject and a verb out of the 
conception (idea) of teach. The semantics of ranking also enter the 
picture; one can say Teachers teach psychology, but not Professors 
*prof psychology--which is merely an idio-syncratic fact of English 
usage. Therefore, Professors is chosen to fulfill the role of "For 
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all x, if x is a professor. • • "; who teach • fulfills the role of 
"x teaches psychology" (where who substitutes for Professors to avoid 
redundancy of form and possible misunderstanding); and these two 
clauses form an antecedent of a conditional (implicational) expression 
of which are odd is the consequent. This solution• concerning the 
source of Professors who teach psychology are odd n)ay seem more com-
plicated than the transformationalist' s solution, but it accords 
better with known facts and seems more reasonable, in that it also 
accords rather well with logic. The transformational solution seems 
to view the manipulative processes of transformation as almost purely 
mechanical--i.e., unaffected, to a large extent, by sense and meaning. 
Restrictive relative sentences are not amenable to a unary classi-
fication, as is done by most grammarians, regardless of their 
theoretical persuasions. In the previous pair of relative sentences, 
it was shown that the restrictive version could be explained by 
reference to an implicational proposition. This is not true of the 
sentence You may consult the dictionary which is on the table (as will 
be seen presently). Transformationalists claim that "the most im-
. portant fact about sentences in English is that each has both a deep 
structure, which conveys the meaning of the sentence, and a surface 
4 
structure, which describes the actual shape or form of the sentence." 
One difference between this theory and the conception employed in this 
work is that the transformationalist actually conceives of sentence 
forms in deep structure, whereas the present writer speaks of unordered 
ideas forming larger "combinatory ideas" (proposi.tions) which mny, 
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often, be expressed in a variety of syntactic forms. It is important 
to note that what appears to stand for an embedded proposition (e.g., 
a relative clause such as • • • which is on the table) may not be a 
proposition at all. It may, for example, derive transformationally 
from a locative expression, as in the following sentence: 
You may consult the dictionary on the table. (4.47) 
tl 3R t2 t3 
This non-relativized· sentence is closer to the propositional "form" 
(in that only the essential ideas are represented by the syntactic 
structure) than the synonymous sentence 
You may consult the dictionary which is on the table. (4.48) 
The symbolized version is less preferable in an utterance because it 
can be ambiguous to the hearer: it is not clear who or what is on 
the table--~ or the dictionary. The relativized version, constructed 
on analogy to non-restrictive sentences where double, identical 
reference is also made, is more preferable because which can only 
apply to inanimate things (the dictionary), so the question of You 
being on the table never arises. The relativized version has also 
expanded a non-sentence (on the table) locative expression to a 
sentence by adding the red\llldant which and the semantically unnecessary 
copula, thus giving the appearance of a proposition. Other ambiguities 
apart, the non-relativized version has the virtue of being spoken in 
one intonation contour, thus reinforcing the idea of ,only one propo-
sition being intended by the speaker; otherwise, one could speculate 
that there is incomplete predication involved: You may consult the 
dictionary (lying) on the table, which is comparable to ••• which 
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is (lying) on the table in the relativized version. The intonation 
contour and pauses (cotnlnas) are useful criteria, for they also serve 
to distinguish the restrictive sentence from the non-restrictive 
sentence 
You may consult the dictionary, which is on the table. (4.49) 
which is obviously equivalent semantically to two propositions; it is 
a transformation of 
You may consult the dictionary, 
(tl 2R t2 ) 
and it 
----
is (lying) on the table. (4.50) 
& (ul 2S Uz ) 
(=tz) 
In this case, one can assume incomplete predication in the second 
clause, or not assume it, as one wishes--for there are two common 
intonation contours (just as in the relativized version) separated by 
and; and two propositions are definitely intended. That is, the 
restrictive version is merely concerned to restrict dictionary choice 
to the one on the table (and no other in some different location), 
whereas the non-restrictive version adds the second clause as an 
"afterthought" (a point of added information as to where the dictionary 
may be found) . 
It is, of course, possible to say You may consult the dictionary, 
(lying) on the table--i.e., non-restrictively with which deletion. 
But the second clause here (ignoring the possible ambiguity) cannot 
be interpreted as a simple locative expression as it can in the 
restrictive version without which, for the inton~tion contours of the 
two forms are different. That is, the pitch pattern of on the table 
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in the which-less restrictive sentence is part of a connnonly recognized 
sentence contour pattern which spans the whole utterance; but there are 
two commonly recognized sentence contour patterns in the which~less 
non~restrictive sentence. The pitch of the voice between dictionary 
and on in the which-less restrictive version is sustained at a high (3) 
level with no pause juncture; whereas the pitch of the voice in the 
which-less non-restrictive sentence lowers (1) at the end of the 
pronUn.ciation of dictionary, and then there is a pause juncture which 
substitutes, apparently, for medium-pitched (2) deleted which, after 
which the pitch rises (3) again at ori. Thus, the structures are 
different, signaling a difference in meaning. The pitch pattern of 
the restrictive, non-relativized sentence forms a sentence contour of 
2-3-1, but the non-restrictive, non-relativized sentence contains 
two sentence contour patterns: 2-3-1 and (2)-3-1, where the paren-
thesized second 2 indicates possible deletion of which from the 
relativized form. Thus, the evidence strongly· suggests that the 
speaker of the restrictive sentence intends one proposition, whether 
or not a which-clause is present; in the non-restrictive sentence, 
on the other hand, the speaker intends two propositions, whether or 
not a which-clause is employed in the utterance. 
Questionable Conjunction 
A final instance of possible conjunction is the sentence 
She was right, he was sure; (4.51) ( x )&( y ) 
where the comma (pause) is equivalent to and, not but, for contrast is 
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not intended. However, a reasonable paraphrase of the second clause 
raises some doubt, for it refers to the entire first clause and is 
therefore a kind of object functioning in a single, complex proposition. 
Reversing the order of the clauses supports this view: 
He was sure (= knew) (that) she was right. 
t 1 2R ( b G ) 
t2 (= "it") 
(4.52) 
The sentence is still unclear. For purposes of simplification, it will 
be assumed that the intended meaning is not that she was right about 
something, namely that he was certain of something. This example 
illustrates, again, the distinction between sentences that seem to be 
propositions in their own right whereas one is actually dependent on 
the other to get across the speaker's total meaning. That is, He was 
sure implies something about which he was certain; hence, the clause 
is incomplete without its "object." The logical connective (= that) 
indicates that a more complete specification is to follow--in this 
instance, of what he knew or was certain about. The colon notation 
is used just as it might be used in regular English written prose:, 
He was sure of (=knew) it: she was right, where it anticipates the 
second clause; and the second clause is a complete specification of 
it with which it is in apposition. 
Complex Sentences 
Problems in Subordination 
Just as traditional grammar defines compound sentences as those 
which contain coordinate clauses that are essentially independent, so 
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subordinate sentences are said to be those which contain one inde-
pendent clause and one or more clauses which depend upon some element 
in the ind~pendent clause. Dependent clauses, then, are not just 
added on to the main clause; they are included in, it; and are therefore 
considered as lower-level modifications which perform nominal, adjec-
tival, or adverbial functions. (It should be noted that restrictive 
sentences fit this definition, but non-restrictive sentences originate 
as independent clauses.) The most connnon subordinating conjunctions 
are: (al)though, unless, if, because, ~' that, how, whether, and all 
WR-question words, though the latter also occur in main sentences •. 
A subordinate clause may occur in different parts of the same 
sentence sometimes, but without changing function. For example, the 
sentences below are both the same implicational: 
We left because he came. 
Because he came, we left. 
( ~ -F-)~(b G ) 
(4.53) 
(4.54) 
The word because implies consequence. Because is occasionally equivalent 
to the so-called coordinating conjunctions for and so, and when it is, 
it is impossible to distinguish (semantically) whether the sentence 
containing it is compound or complex: 
He left because it was late. 
He left, for it was late. 
Since it C:-the hour) was late, he left. 
( a F )~ (b -G-) 
Likewise, the following sentences imply consequences: 
Unless he comes, I'll quit. 
If he comes, I'll quit. 
(Al)though he'll come, I'll quit. 
( ~ F )'7-(h G ) 
(4.55) 
(4.56) 
(4.57) 
(4.58) 
(4.59) 
(4.60) 
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Since a clause is clearly not a noun, adjective, or adverb 
(by definition) , when one says that a clause is functioning as a 
nominal (etc.), the statement infers that the clause occurs in positions 
where nouns (etc.) occur and this may be proven by substitution of' a 
noun (etc.) equivalent. For example, the noun clause is said to 
function as the subject in 
Whoever has not paid his dues should pay now. (4.61) 
If a plural subject is suggested then the plural may be considered 
as a single unit (each and every one), as the grammatical agreement 
of the verb has implies. The sentence would then be symbolized as 
He who has not paid his dues, should pay tljem now. 
[E1-<t1 2R t2 ) 3R t2 t3] 
(4.62) 
The symbolism of the various elements in the two clauses has not been 
differentiated so that the essential sameness of the two clauses (not 
just the "subject" of the sentence by substitution) might be clearly 
shown. Since only one clause is negated, the above formulation must 
be a transformation of the following compound sentence: 
Some have not paid their dues, and [(t;" 2R t2 ) & 
they should pay them~· 
( tl 3R tz t3 )~ 
(4.63) 
The probiem illustrated above by the Whoever-clause, as opposed to 
the He (who)-"clause," is that traditional grammars classify the former 
as a noun clause (because, e.g., They can be stubstituted for the whole 
clause) and the latter as a relative adjective clause (because the 
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who-clause modifies He). Yet, all that has been done here is to sub-
stitute the semantically equivalent He (who) for Whoever (=they}! 
One cannot say, by substitution, *They have not paid their dues should 
pay now; thus, the first (Whoever) clause is not the subjeet of 
should pay now. Neither does it make sense, logically, to interpret 
the who-clause as an adjective modifier of He in the first symbolized 
formula, for only He is "modified" (substituted for) by who, not the 
entire predication in the who-clause. The predications of the two 
clauses are different too; one is negated and the other is not. How, 
then, could the negated who clause modify He (the subject of shouid 
pay them now), which is not negated, when they are otherwise the same? 
The only conclusion that is possible is that there are two different 
clauses which have been conjoined, and the relative pronoun who is 
the conjoiner, substituting not only for He, but also for and (as 
shown overtly in the second symbolized formula). 
In logic and mathematics, if one counterexamp1e can be found for 
a universal claim, then that belief is wrong. If the same precision 
is desirable in syntax, then the ideas of relative adjective clause 
and noun clause, as usually distinguished from one another, need to be 
abandoned, as the above discussion proves. At least, the concept of 
relative adjective clause modifier can easily be disproved in view of 
the above findings, for all such clauses, if they are not restrictive, 
are merely transformations of compound sentences; the conjunction in 
the compound sentence is replaced by the relative pronoun which also 
substitutes for a noun in the so-called independent clause. It is 
interesting that Conlin, though he primarily uses traditional methods 
for the analysis of verbals and compound and complex sentences, agrees 
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with what has just been said, except for the transformational claim. In 
relative clauses, he says, "the relative pronoun has a function in its 
clause besides that of connective: It may be the subject of the clause, 
a complement, the object of a preposition, or a possessive adjective. 115 
So far so good, but Conlin's explanation disagrees logically with his 
own previous statement: "A subject-predicate wotd group may be 
substituted for an adjectival modifier. It is called an adjective 
clause. 116 Now, there is a good deal of difference between saying, 
e.g., that a pronoun may be a subject in its clause (which is true) 
and saying that the whole clause headed by a pronoun is adjectival 
(which is false), which is based on substitution. This is tantamount 
to saying that the pronoun is an adjective! For if the whole pronoun-
clause is adjectival, so is the pronoun which heads it. The point 
can be seen better, perhaps, visually by examining a few sentences: 
The man, who (=that) was here, left. 
The girl, whom (=that) you detest, 
(subject) 
is coming to v1s1t us. 
Some books, in which you 
have arrived. 
(direct object) 
may be interested, (object of 
Some books, that you may be interested in, 
have arrived. 
p reposition) 
(object of 
preposition) 
(possessive 
adjective) 
The boy, whose grades are low, is ill. 
(4.64) 
(4.65) 
(4.66) 
( 4. 6 7) 
(4.68) 
In each case above, the underlined pronoun "modifies" the underlined 
noun in the main clause, but only in the sense that the referents are 
the same. The pronouns, with two exceptions, do perform the traditional 
functions indicated in parentheses--i.e., subject of dependent clause, 
object of independent clause and possessive adjective modifier of 
noun grades. In (4.66) and (4.67), the active verb is interest, as 
in These books may interest you; hence, interested in is a verb + verb 
particle construction, and that or which (= books) is a direct object, 
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not an object of a preposition. However, the pronouns in (4.64-4.67) 
are not aijjectives by the traditional definition; they are pronouns 
which are repetitious referents of the underlined nouns; in the last 
example, ~hose is an adjective modifier (of grades) within the dependent 
clause, but not outside of it. The dependent clauses do not describe 
the nouns that they are said. to modify; they make additional predi-
cations about them; to call these clauses adjectival functions because 
they occur positionally beside the head nouns is patently absurd. 
Substitution is equally absurd, for the whole dependent clauses may 
not be substituted for the head nouns; only the pronouns can. The 
substitution critera are based on pairs such as The ugly killer 
stabbed the lady I The killer, who was ugly, stabbed the lady, but. 
two things are wrong here: (1) the first is restrictive, the second 
non-restrictive, and (2) such a procedure won't work with pairs such 
as The man, who was here, left / *The here man left. Conlin cites, 
in the sentences below, (4.70) as a substitution instance of (4.69) 
with respect to the underlined portions: 7 
This is the new house. 
This is the house that Jack built. 
(4.69) 
(4.70) 
Surely, this structural maneuver is invalid, for new does not equal 
that Jack built in any modificational sense; new describes the house; 
that Jack built it describes his actions--i.e., it predicates, perhaps, 
that the house he built was, in fact, the same new house noted in the 
first example. If one merges these sentences and says, This is the new 
house that Jack built, surely new does not equal that Jack built. All 
of these sentences containing "adjective clauses" are, thus, sentences 
containing two (or more) propositions which have been conjoined, and 
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this conjoining is done by means of the relative pronouns. If the 
pronoun is art object, it may even be deleted: 
• 
The girl (whom) you detest is coming. 
Some books (that = which) you may be interested in 
have arrived. 
(4. 71) 
(4. 72) 
Now, it is impossible to tell whether these are restricti;ve or non-
restrictive, except that the whole sentence meaning may make it clear. 
In these cases, the juxtaposition of two subject-predicate word g:foups 
indicates separate sentences that are conjoined, similar (but not 
identical) to 
She was right, he was sure, (4.73) 
where one (compound) formulation was offered as a possible suggestion 
(at the end of the section on compounds). 
In the above discussions it was noted that the relative pronouns 
did not modify the nouns they are usually claimed to modify because 
they were, in fact, two expressions with but one referent in each 
instance. There is a term in traditional grammar, namely "apposition," 
which could be (but never is) applied to such cases. Conlin, e.g., 
defines apposition this way: "From the standpoint of structure, it is 
usually a side-by-side relationship between words or word groups 
having the same function within the sentence. 118 Thus, in a sentence 
beginning The girl, who. , there is apposition, for both the noun 
and the pronoun are subjects of clauses in the sentence, and both 
girl and who are the same person side by side structurally. The 
strange thing is :that apposition is always used with reference to nouns 
(noun "substitutes")--e.g., Mark Twain the author ... and The_C~H.:t 
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that I knew • • • , but not relative clause pronou.ns and the nouns they 
substitute for. Nor is the similarity noted in ekpressions such as 
The month when they graduate is June. 
The city where I was born is Chicago. 
The reason why is my business. 
(4. 74) 
(4. 75) 
(4. 76) 
In spite of the fact that time, place, and cause expressions are 
defined as adverbials by traditional grammarians, 9 they are viewed as 
introducing adjective clauses in sentences such as those above. 10 The 
when- and where-sentences, nevertheless, are to be interpreted in their 
present forms somewhat as the restrictive relative sentences were, not 
as two conjoined propositions. Thus, logically, there is only one 
clause. For example, in (4.74), when is a temporal expression equal 
to June; so how, in traditional terms, could when (an adverbial) 
modify the noun month? Such an analysis goes counter to the traditional 
definitional functions of what m~y modify nouns, and what adverbs may 
modify. Mere juxtaposition, apparently, is the criterion. How 
convenient! Yet, there is the hint of an insight in the traditional 
view. Since the noun month is semantically equivalent to the adverbs 
when and June, why not interpret them as "co-modifiers" in the sense 
that they are logical equalities? That is, they are three variables 
for the same referent. The symbolization would look something like 
this: 
The month is June when they graduate, (4.77) 
t1 t1 t1 tz zR 
which originates in the simplified expression 
Then (= in the month of June) they will graduate. (4. 78) 
ti tz zR 
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(The temporal expression above, of course, may be placed at the end 
of the sentence rather than at the beginning.) The copula is not 
symbolized in the first case above (by =) because equality of the 
referents is shown by the numeral one on the first three subscripted 
terms; moreover, to use the equivalence sign would infer an equality 
of everything on the right side to the first term, which, of course, 
would be incorrect. 
The same kind of analysis applies to the where-sentence. The 
where-sentence is logically analyzed as: 
The city is Chicago where .! was boTil, (4. 79) 
t1 t1 t1 tz 2R 
which is equivalent to 
There I was boTil (4.80) 
tl t2 2R 
or 
I was boTil there, (4.81) 
t2 2R tl 
where city and Chicago are variants of there. 
The why-sentence causes more difficulty because why stands for 
deleted information. In its present form, it does not seem to be a 
proposition at all unless one interprets is as an equivalence relation: 
The reason why is my business. 
tl tl = tl 
(4.82) 
But the equivalence sign is redundant; the term subscripts indicate 
the equality obtaining between the referents. Hence, these terms 
,, 
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are cases of true apposition~ there is no need for a predicate symbol, 
for there .is no overt predicate, If one supplies a possible predicate, 
the formula is symbolized in the same fashion as the when- and where-
sentences: 
The reason why .!. am leaving is my business. (4. 83) 
tl tl t2 2R tl 
However, this is still not quite correct, for why is not exactly on 
a par with the other two relata similarly subscripted. The two under-
lined portions below indicate a possible equality, if one specifies 
precisely the meaning of my business: 
The reason why I am leaving is (that) I am angry. (4.84) 
( x ): ( y ) 
This specification is meant to establish an intended interpretation of 
my business to imply, e.g., none of your business. It disallows 
because of my business. That is, I am angry, and that is why I am 
leaving, and it is none of your affair. Now, it can be seen that why 
is merely a connective equal to that: The reason (that) I am leaving. 
Thus, the meaning of the whole first clause is explained by 
the second clause, though the two meanings are obviously not seman-
tically equal. There are affinities between this kind of sentence and 
an implicational sentence for because could have been substituted for 
the optional that in the last symbolization: 
Because (= since) I am angry, .!. am leaving. (4. 85) 
( a F )~(a G ) 
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However, the force of the original sentence does not seem t6 be 
implicational, so it should be symbolized as: 
The reason why is my business, (4. 86) 
tl tl 
which, more or less, accords with traditional analysis, except that 
why (or a why-clause) is not an adjective (or adjectival in function) 
for it ·does not describe something of The reason; it tells (i.e., 
predicates) what the reason is more explicitly. That is, the why-clause 
when made explicit is in apposition to The reason, and might be symbo-
lized, alternatively, as 
The reason why (. • • ) ~ my business, (4. 87) 
tl tl t1 
where the internal structure is shown more accurately. This use of 
the colon, as a lgoical sign, is similar to normal written English--
e.g., He ~ought three things: a shirt, a tie, and a suit. It is 
an equality in the sense that the set meant by the first clause is 
specified in terms of its separate members on the right side of the 
colon. Mathematical set notation is avoided because in many sentences, 
such as the above symbolization, the "equality" is semantically 
slippery; for instance, sometimes the colon anticipates an "object": 
He knew (it): You were coming/ He was aware of the fact (that): you 
were coming. Thus, the distinction between equality and objective 
functions is blurred when apposition enters the picture. 
Grammatical Functions of Clauses 
Early.in this section on complex sentences, it was shown that 
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noun clauses as sentence subjects can easily be interpreted as adjective 
clause modifiers, whell' ~raditional analysis is used. The discussion 
of why-clauses above proves that these so-called adjective modifie.rs 
(of subject nouns in the cited examples) can also be confounded with 
the traditional concept of a noun clause in apposition to a subject 
noun, for why is equivalent to that; thus, the analysis of The reason 
(why) I am leaving • • . is logically the same as the analysis of 
The reason (that) I am leaving .. And these two are analyzed ju8t 
the same as The fact (that) I was leaving • • 
The earlier discussion of the colon also explains why one can 
symbolize a noun clause as a kind of "direct object," even though a 
"sentence object" obviously does not receive the action of the verb: 
He was aware (of) (the fact) (that) you loved her. (4.88) 
tl 2R t2 (ul 2s uz ) 
"---Y-J 
C= tz) 
The formulation of (4.88) collapses into one explanation three separate 
uses of noun clauses, as described in traditional grannnars. First, if 
the fact is deleted, the that-clause functions as a kind of "complete 
direct object" in its place; second, if the object the fact is retained, 
it is in apposition to its more complete specifi~ation; third, in this 
l~tter case, the that-clause is also called an objective complement. 
The only distinction between appositional clauses and objective com-
plement clauses seems to be that apposition is reserved to subject noun 
apposition and objective "complement" replaces objective "apposition," 
thus establishing the close relationship between "equality" and "objec-
tive" functions noted earlier. Closely related is still a fourth 
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traditional function of noun clauses--namely, objects of prepositions. 
The verb above is was aware of. The preposition is actually a post-
position, a verb particle. the verb complex equals the verb knew: 
I knew it = I was aware of it. That of is a particle can be supported, 
thus, not only by substitution, but also by paraphrasing: He knew what 
I was aware of, where most people would place of in terminal position 
with the verb and not before what. Therefore, object and object of 
preposition fall into the same category. Even if one insists the of 
goes with what "follows" it (i.e., what or the fact), it is logical to 
interpret the prepositional phrase as a direct object in traditional 
terms. 
Noun clauses are said to function also as indirect objects, as in 
in 
He related the news to whom(m)ever would listen. 
t 1 3R t 2 ( a F ) 
(4.89) 
The third term clause, of course, is not exactly "a noun or pronoun 
identifying the party receiving the action in verbs of asking, giving, 
telling, and receiving," as the indirect object function is defined. 12 
Only the pronoun whoever fits this definition; would listen does not 
"modify" whoever in the sense that "modification" is usually defined; 
it is predication of whoever. However, it does no serious harm, in 
traditional terms, to call the whoever-clause a noun-headed clause 
which functions as an indirect object which, in turn, is specified by 
further predication. 
The noun clause functioning as a so-called predicate complement is 
also a case of logical apposition, though the apposite portions do not 
always occur side by side grammatically: 
This house is 
This house is 
tl 
(the pl.ace) where 
where I· live. 
---
tl tz 2R 
This is the house where I live. 
----- ---- --
tl t1 t1 tz zR 
I live in this house. 
---
tz 2R tl 
I live. 
Thus, the so-called adjective where~clause discussed earlier is 
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(4.90) 
(4.91) 
(4.92) 
( 4. 9 3) 
actually the same logical construction as the predicate complement;. 
noun clause. 
The noun clause as the object of a participle was discussed 
previously. It usually turns out to be an implicational: 
Considering what you should know, 
you are making a mistake. 
If one [<I considers what you should krtow, ~ 2R ( u2 ul 2s _JI~ \.......',~---~---------~ 
t 2 (= "it") 
you are making a mistake. ( x . ) 
(4.94) 
(4.95) 
The noun clause as the object of the infinitive has also been 
met with before. The following is typical, and it, too, usually turns 
out to be an object: 
He commanded me to fight whoever showed up. (4.96) 
Converting to subjunctive mood with an appropriate verb produces 
He demanded 
tl 2R 
(that) .!.. fight (wi.th) whoever showed up. 
rl zS (, :2 (= .~:em7') j 
t (= "it") 2 
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(4.97) 
Other possibilities for participles and infiniti..\:res may be seen by 
substituting subordinate clauses in the examples in Chapter II. 
Adverbial clauses are said to be capable of modifying verbs, 
infinitives, participles, adjectives, and adverbs. In the case of 
verb modification, the modifying clause is usually a temporal or 
locative expression. These latter expressions do not logically modify 
verbs, however; they set the time or place for the whole sentence 
situation. Examples are: 
He ordered supper before (= when) I arrived. 
tl 3R t2 ( u2 ul 2S ) 
t3 (= "then") 
The plane landed where the runway was slick. 
ul zS ( tz tl zR ) 
u2 (= "there") 
(4.98) 
(4.99) 
The "then" and "there" interpretations accord with traditionalist and 
structuralist views. In reality, the clauses do much more than 
indicate time or place; a more precise logical interpretation would 
be the complex propositions without the "then" and "there" paraphrases. 
An example of infinitive modification by an adverbial subordinate 
clause is 
The aardvark asked the ant to wait until he could catch up. (4.100) 
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Converting to the subjunctieve mood for easier formulation, the result 
is 
The aardvark asked (that) 
\ 2R 
the ant wait until he could catch (4.101) 
ul T< vz vl 2P [ u2 (= "then") 
tz (= "it") 
The subordinate clause does not modify wait, but the ant wait; it is 
possible that until should be included in the ant wait until, but it 
is here interpreted to mean until such time, for it seems to be a 
connective belonging to both of the last two clau$es. In any event, 
the main relationships are not changed, no matter how until is handled. 
The adverbial clause as a modifier of a participle may be illus-
trated in the following sentence: 
I saw him running as if his life were in danger, (4.102) 
which, paraphrased, becomes 
I saw that 
---
tl 2R 
he was running as if (something) endangered his life. 
r:__ F ) - ( 1~_zs ____ t_z_J 
(4.103) 
t 2 <= "it") 
The subordinate clause does not modify running, but rather his running 
(i.e., the fact that he was running)~ in the sense that one clause is 
operating on another clause. The unsymbolized expression as if 
258 
implies comparis9n; hence, the last two parenthesized clauses are 
juxtaposed as a kind of compound object representing what I saw. 
Structuralists would interpret the last clause as a manner substitute 
(e.g., swiftly), but this ignores the subject he (his running). When 
two propositions are juxtaposed without an overt connective, it is 
assumed one is acting as a kind of argument, the other as a kind of 
function: 
He was running as if (something) endangered his life. (4.104) 
..... (_a __ __,..F_·_--'-) ( ~l 2 S 
[ b 
tz ) 
G J 
(English often juxtaposes sentences this way--e.g., I know you will; 
the so-called "object" clause is really a higher-level "function," 
and the "subject" clause is a higher-level "argument.") 
Adverbial clauses that modify adjectives are usually misinterpreted 
by traditionalists (and others). The adjectives are usually disguised 
verbs. Conlin cites two such cases: 13 
The decision of the jury made him more angry 
than we had expected. 
The l.ittle boy was sorry that he hit his brother. 
Paraphrasing produces 
(4.105) 
(4 .106) 
The jury's decision angered him~ than ~had expected. (4.107) 
( t 1 Rl t 2 R2 ) (a F ) 
2 
b G ] 
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That he 
~ t;: 
(had) hit his ~rather saddened the little boy. 
_,,2~Ry---__;..t_z_ ) zS ("--~--~)] 
u1 (= 11it") u2 (= "him") 
(4.108) 
Sentence (4.107) is similar to the one concerning participial modifi-
cation. Than is a comparative connective expression (comparing two 
propositions), and more is merely a quantifier-"adverb" modifier of 
angered. The sentence, for example, might be re-paraphrased, changing 
the meaning comparison to a definite expression to show the link-up 
of the two clauses: 
The jury's having angered him • • • . (4.109) 
or 
The jury's making him angry was what we had expected, (4.110) 
tz tz t1 zR 
which is tantamount to The jury's angering of him was • • . . or We had 
expected it: The jury angered him--a form that has been met with 
before in this chapter. Example (4.108) is like several cited in 
Chapters II and III, and needs no further explanation other than to 
reiterate that made plus adjective equals verb (or quasi-verb). The 
verb, that is, in (4.108) made (understood) plus sorry. The verb 
sorrowed does exist, but is not much used in standard English, hence 
the change to the synonymous verb saddened. In non-standard English, 
however, one can sometimes hear an expression such as The jury's 
decision sorrowed him. 
Adverb modification by adverbial clauses involv~s comparison 
such as (4.105) above: 
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The package arrived 
The package arrived 
more quickly than we expected. 
quicker than we expected. 
(4.111) 
(4.112) 
( a Fl F2 ) (b G ) 
Quicker has absorbed the quantifier-"adverb" more in this formulation. 
Again, one proposition can be said to operate on the other. Para-
phrased, the connection is clear: We didn't expect the package to 
arrive so quickly. Such comparisons are more complex forms of 
sentences such as John is bigger than Max, described in Chapter II, 
where more was implied in the suffix -er but was not symbolized. In 
English, than acts as a comparative connective of two clauses, the 
second of which need not be completely overt. 
A peculiar sort of complex sentence ·is that which is termed 
"cleft." Its formation is used as a test by some transformational 
grammarians to identify possible notms or noun phrases, though the 
method is admitted to be fallible at times .14 The idea that cleft 
sentences can help to identify notms is misconceived, but the purpose 
here is not (exactly) to disprove this idea. The purpose is to show 
that even though the cleft sentence is an expansion of a smaller 
sentence, the dependent clause in a cleft sentence is not dependent 
in the usual sense. 
Cleft Sentences and Similar Forms 
To form a cleft sentence, one takes a sentence such as He likes 
to play (= playing) ball and adds what in front of it and also adds a 
form of be at the end of it: 
*What he likes to play (= playing) ball is; (4.113) 
then one· transposes some expression within this string to the end; if a 
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grammatical sentence results, then everything to the right of be is a 
"noun": 
What he likes. (to do) is to play (= playing) ball. (4.114) 
It will be noted that aft'er performing the aforesaid operations, 
nothing can be moved to the end of the sentence without sacrificing 
grammatically, so it is impossible to identify any noun in this 
sentence by this method) 
However, the following transformations can be made: 
To play (= playing) ball is what he likes (to do). 
Ball is what he likes to play (= playing).· 
What he likes to play (= playing) is ball. 
(4 .115) 
(4.116) 
(4.117) 
In all four possible formulations listed above, (4.114-4.117), the 
"dependent" what-clause seems, in traditional terms, to be functioning 
as a predicate nominative or as a subject (4.114). But in no case is 
the proposition on the left semantically equivalent to the proposition 
on the right; in fact, in two cases, (4 .116-4 .117), dnly ball occurs 
either as a subject or as a predicate nominative. Thus, one cannot 
tell whether the subject is Ball or to play (= playing) ball. One can 
only assume, however, that the true subject is To play (= playing) 
ball because this whole proposition is what is referred to by the 
what~clause. 
Of all the infinitive (and participle) examples cited in this 
work, sentence (4.115) is, perhaps, the best one illustrating the 
traditional idea that infinitive and participial clauses may function 
as nouns. One knows this is an incorrect anlaysis, however, for the 
construction began with a sentence in which even traditionalists 
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would say that He is the subject of both likes and the infinitive: 
He likes (himself) 
( ~l 
to play (= playing) ball. (4.118) 
ul i8 2R t2) 
(= ul) 
u2 (="it," "what") 
Formulation (4.118), though it lacks stylistic smoothness because of 
possible ambiguity, expresses the traditional view fairly we11. (Him-
self is being used in its emphatic sense.) But the "object" propo-
sition is not acted upon by the verb likes; it refers to What he 
likes (to do). Still, one cannot deduce that what he likes to do is 
equivalent with the description of what he likes to do; a kind of 
apposition is, in fact, what is implied. In answer to the question, 
"What does he like (to do)?", the answer might be 
He likes what? (Why,) to play (=playing) ball (of course), (4.119) 
which is equivalent, once the topic is known, to the sentence 
He likes that (= what he likes): to play (=playing) ball. (4 .120) 
The underlined portion in (4.120), just like the colon, indicates 
the connection purpose of what as well as the fact that what is 
standing semantically as a one-word substitution instance of the 
following proposition; hence, the topic (subject) of the sentence--
i.e., the logical argument--is a proposition. Thus, the "argument" 
is a higher-level abstraction. If one does not wish to extend the 
logical notation into greater complexity, the proper formulation of the 
sentence, when the topic (argument) is in its normal first-slot position, 
is 
What he likes (to do) is 
c---u;- ul 2 s ) 
a 
(for) (himself) to play (= playing) ball. 
( -t'1 2R ~) 
F 
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(4 .121) 
What fonnulation (4.121) amolints to is a side-by-side apposition 
of sorts; i.e., the last clause predicates more specifically the topic 
only suggested by the first clause (that he likes to do something). 
It is a juxtaposition just like Mark Twain the author, except that 
while predication exists in the author (equality), it exists above not 
as an e.xact equality, but as a more complete specification of he likes 
(something). This formulation also allows one to ignore the problem 
of whether ball or to play (= playing) ball is a major unit because of 
the idea of logical relationship. Thus, fonnula (4.i21) iliustrates 
that What he likes is dependent on the last clause; and that the last 
clause is also dependent upon the first clause! In such a sentence, 
the clauses are mutually dependent. 
Though similar in appearance to cleft sentences, the following 
examples are quite different: 
How Mary did it I don't know I 
I do not know how ~ did it. 
- ~l 2R tz( u1 ZS u2)J 
When 
I do 
- [t~ 
Mary did it I don't know I 
not know when ~ did it. 
2R ~( ul T u2>J 
Who Mary is I don't know I 
.!. do not know who~ is (=can be). 
- [tl 2R t 2 ( a F 0 
(4 .122) 
(4.123) 
(4.124) 
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Where·· Mary. is I don't know I 
I do not know where ~ is (= can be). (4.125) 
- C:1 2R t 2 ( a · F 
Why Mary lives here, I don't know I 
I do not krtow why ~ lives here. 
- [:~ 2R t2 ( ul 2s u;->J 
>] 
Whose house Mary bought I don't know/ 
I do not know whose house ~ bought. 
-[tl 2 R t 2 ( a F · 3 
(4.126) 
(4.127) 
In each case above, (4.122-4.127), the WR-question wdrds refer to a 
time, place, etc. connnon to both clauses; i.e., each could be a term 
in the last clause instead of the first clause. Thus, they are 
connectives which "compound" two clauses that are mutually dependent. 
Furthermore, none of the last clauses may be interpreted as an "object" 
of know because of the meanings of the connectives; yet know implies 
~thing ("object"). Also, the scope of negation in each sentence 
spans both clauaes, proving that I do not know is not an independent 
clause. In (4.127), it is interesting to note, the connective also 
contains a· .noun (whose house) • 
Compound-Complex Sentences 
The s'o-called compound-complex sentence is merely a sentence 
which contains at least two independent clauses and one dependent 
clause; although more complicated, the compound-complex sentence is 
analyzed along the same lines as other examples given throughout this 
section. In a sentence such as 
He sold his house and, unless I miss my guess, 
he made a profit, (4.128) 
the extreme clauses are independent, and the meun c.1 uuse I H dL•p1:~11dcnL. 
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The last two clauses are, however, logically connected, as the para-
phrase below dembnstrates: 
He sold his house and 
Ct;:° ---;-R tz ) & 
if I don't miss my guess, he made a profit, (4.129) 
l(u~ z5 uz )~(vl 2P v2 ) 
which is semantically equivalent to 
He sold his house and, unless .!._misjudge, he profited. 
(tl 2R tz ) & [ (a . F )~(b G . >] (4 .130) 
In (4.130), b = t 1 and negation has been absorbed by the verb; (4.129) 
is thus an expansion of (4 .130). The main logical problem in either 
case is the scope of the implication. An alternate possibility is 
If I don't miss my guess, he sold his house and 
-<u1 28 u2 )~rtl 7 t2 ) & 
he made l! profit. 
(vl 2p Vz rr 
(4 .131) 
Example (4.131) demonstrates the fallibility of the concept "compound-
complex," for the example shows that all the clauses are dependent 
upon each other for the complete meaning--and a sentence traditionally 
is said to convey a "complete thought." 
A similar problem can be shown in disjunctive compound-complex 
sentences: 
Either he or you will go, or when I am done, I will go. (4.132) 
Paraphrased, (4 .132) becomes implicational: 
If he doesn't go or you don't go, then l will 
[-<~ F )v-( b G )~ [u1 28 
go when I finish. (4.133) 
<~:J 
u2 (= "then") 
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The ne~ations in (4.133) seemed implied by (4.132). If one insists 
that negation is not meant, then other problems of logical scope 
arise, and the whole sentence becomes a disjunction, not an implication: 
f (Either) he will go or you will ( a F )v ( b G 
f 
go or 
) v 
(4 .134) 
However, as in previous sentences dealing with when-clauses, when 
seems also to be a connective. For example, the dependent clause may 
be essentially inseparable from the main clause with which it is 
related: 
(Either) he will go or you will go or 
( a F ) v( b G ) v 
I will go at the time when I finish. 
Eu! 28 u2 ) <-UZ "t;l 2R a (4.135) 
The same symbols (:£1 s) have been re.tained in both of the last two 
clauses in order to visually show their interconnection more closely. 
Since the last two clauses are so clearly interconnected (by the time 
and subject terms), and since the last bracketed expression is ·in 
equal disjunction with the other two "independent" .clauses, the dis-
tinction between independent and dependent, if not lacking, is at 
least extremely blurred. 
In the above example, one formulation (4.133), showed that the 
disjunction could imply a consequence containing a complex sentence. 
The reverse is also possible: 
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An accident may result in death or injury 
when one is careless. (4.136) 
In (4 .136), while when (= whenever) may refer to time, it also carries 
the force of if: 
If (=when) one is careless, an accident or 
death may result, 
. where the last clause is a disjunction: 
When (= if) one is careless, 
( a F )7 
an accident may result or death may result. ~ b G ) v ( c G il 
(4.137) 
(4.138) 
The function G (= result) has been retained in both of the last two 
clauses to show that they are not independent of each other; i.e., 
two propositions are not necessarily implied, for the vel (v) means 
and I.£!_; hence, if the carelessness of someone results in an accident 
which causes death, then none of the clauses are logically independent, 
for each depends upon the other. Further, since accident may (= if) 
result in (= cause) death, sentence (4.138) could be interpreted as a 
double implicational, thus re-enforcing the mutual inseparability of 
the three clauses: 
{!When (= if) one is careless, ( 7 F ) E (then) death may resultil 
·~ ( c G J 
(then) if an accident results, (4 .139) 
-7' ( b G 1J 
The outer braces, which are optional, have been $Upplied to visually 
stress the interdependency of the clauses. 
Loose and Periodic Sentences 
Category Overlapping 
Still di~ferent complications arise in the analysis of other 
compound-complex sentences, but enough examples have been adduced 
so far to show that the conception (definition) of such a sentence 
type is ill-conceived. This contention is further proven by a brief 
analysis of an example of a "simple" sentence cited by Crews: 15 
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Seeing the sign announcing a half-price fire sale on 
"Win with Wilkie" buttons, Sam leaped up and pulled 
the cord so as to get the bus driver to let him off 
at the next corner. (4 .140) 
Logically, the first clause contains two subordinate clauses, for it 
is equivalent to When he saw the sign which announced. . The 
second clause contains two obvious independent clauses: Sam leaped up 
and Sam pulled the cord; also, there are two infinitive clauses 
embedded in the Sam-clause, the first of which has Sam as subject and 
the second of which has the bus driver as subject. Moreover, there is 
compound modification in a half-price fire sale which implies two 
propositions for the announcing (= which announced)-clause. Yet, this 
sentence is said to be a simple sentence because "there is only one 
independent clause, Sam leaped up and pulled the cord, and there are 
no subordinate clauses. rrl6 
From a logical point of view, Crews' example of a "simple" sen-
tence might seem about as compound and complex as a sentence could 
getl Such is not the case, however. Two writers, who profess to 
accept the traditional sentence type classifications, nevertheless 
begin their book on literary style with "The Loose Sentence" (hence, 
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the title of this section), for which they cite the ;:allowing example: 17 
I remember one splendid morning, all blue and silver, 
in the summer holidays when I reluctantly tore myself 
away from the task of doing nothing in particular, and 
I . 
put on a hat of some sort and picked up a walking-stick, 
and put six very bright-coloured chalks in my pocket. 
--G. K. Chesterton, A Piece of Chalk (4.141) 
Not counting the separate propositions implied by the many modifications, 
this sentence contains four independent clauses joined by ands and 
one subordinate (when) clause. It is therefore a traditional compound-
complex sentence. Except for its greater length, one cannot really 
see the distinction between the "simple" sentence cited by Crews and 
this "loose" sentence. Certainly, the traditional idea that a sentence 
expresses a complete thought has gone by the board. 
That the distinction between compound and complex is vague or 
nonexistent has already been shown in a number of instances involving 
logical scope; but what of a sentence containing a series of dependent 
clauses? The following is such a sentence: 18 
When the struggle with somnolence has been fought out 
and won, when the world is all-covering darkness and 
close-pressing silence, when the tobacco suddenly takes 
on fresh vigour and fragrance and the books lie strewn 
about the table, then it seems as though all the rubbish 
and floating matter of the day's thoughts have poured 
away and only the bright, clear, and swift current of 
the mind itself remains, flowing happily and without 
impediment. 
--Christopher Morley, On Going to Bed (4.142) 
Within each when-clause there is compounding by ands; in the first two, 
they are re-inferences of further when-clauses; in the third, there 
is not only a second when-clause inferred (by and fragrance>, but also 
an independent clause (the books lie .•• ); and all three of these are 
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construed traditionally (as a unit) to be the subordinate portion of 
the sentence. Yet, how can this be? For the connnas which separate 
these when-clauses imply two conjunctive ands to joiri them. Further, 
discounting modification, the then-clause contains at least four 
"independent" clauses (five if the participial phrase is interpreted 
as two clauses); but these are not really independent, for the then-
clause is an obvious series of consequences which are dependent on 
the antecedent when-clauses (where when = if + time). Ignoring 
compounds implied by adjectival modifications, the complete sentence, 
logically, looks something like this, where each X stands for a dif-
ferent unanalyzed clause: 
t Ex) • cxiJ • Ex) & ex~ & Gxl & cxJ & (JO]}-~ 
{Gx) & rx3 & fx) & <~ •Ex) & ex~} (4.143) 
The schema suggests that calling such a sentence "complex" (subordinate 
plus independent clauses) is certainly gratuitous. It is an impli-
cational sentence· in which the "independent" clause is conditional 
upon the completion of the events cited in the "dependent" clauses. 
Read in words, it says" If such and such, and if such and such, and 
if such and such and such; then so and so, and so and so, and so and so. 
Sentence Versus Paragraph 
The last two sentences, (4.141-4.142), raise a further question: 
What is the difference between a sentence and a paragraph? Some 
analysts claim that "while a sentence makes a grammatically complete 
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statement [whatever that means!], it usually cannot be as comprehensive 
or self-sufficient as a. paragraph," because the latter is "a flexible 
rhetorical convention," not a definite granunatical unit. 19 Yet, the 
same analysts would also claim that "the master sentence" below is 
"magnificent, • , loose and long, constituting an entire para-
h 1120 grap . • . • 
I was born in a large Welsh town at the beginning of the 
Great War--an ugly, lovely town (or so it was and is to 
me), crawling, sprawling by a long and splendid curving 
shore where truant boys and sandfield boys and old men 
from nowhere, beachcombed, idled and paddled, watched the 
dock-bound ships or the ships streaming away into wonder 
and India, magic and China, countries bright with oranges 
and loud with lions; threw stones into the sea for the 
barking outcast dogs; made castles and forts and harbours 
and race tracks in the sand; and on Saturday afternoons 
listened to the brass band, watched the Punch and Judy, 
or hung about on the fringes of the crowd to hear the 
fierce religious speakers who shouted at the sea, as 
tho.ugh it were wicked and wrong to roll in and out like 
that, white-horsed and full of fishes. (4.144) 
--Dylan Thomas, Quite Early One Morning 
If (4.144) is a sentence-paragraph because it is "grammatically 
complete" and "rhetorically flexible," then a sentence, apparently, 
can be a rhetorical unit, and a paragraph can be grammatically complete! 
What this seeming paradox demonstrates is the need for more precise 
definitions of "sentence" and "paragraph." Yet, it also demonstrates 
perhaps, that no such absolute division can be established. As Frege 
said, words are defined by their uses in sentences--i.e., the meanings 
of words derive from social situations. So do meanings of sentences. 
If a sentence is a "complete thought," it is so only by virtue of the 
fact that its meaning is supported by information which is understood 
by the hearer (or reader). It seems quite prob ab le that most t ra<li tlonaJ 
grammarians have known this; for their own classifications of sentences 
(see Chapter r.I) have been shown to overlap inexorably from the most 
simple, through modified forms of various degrees of intricacy, up 
to and including compound-complex; and the latter type has just been 
shown to merge into the paragraph category. 
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While there is a good deal of inaccuracy in traditional grammatical 
analysis, the idea that a sentence can, in some instances, be a 
paragraph is insightful, even if it is not clearly explained. The 
basic grammatical unit, in other words, may not be the word or the 
sentence, or the paragraph; it may be the topic of discussion, plus 
any and all predications applied to it. Thus, a relatively long 
stretch of discourse on some general topic is subdivided into chapters, 
sections, and paragraphs; but each of these parts simply deal with 
smaller areas of the same or related topics; and within the paragraphs 
of these parts, the sentences--complete or incomplete--tend to re-
enforce each other by further subdividing the already subdivided 
topic(s) and they do this by predications that ultimately impinge on 
one another. 
Of course, it is impractical to accept a very general topic as 
the basic grammatical unit because it is unmanageable. However, if 
one accepts the word-sentence continuum as the basic workable unit, 
it still is necessary to realize that such a decision is a compromise; 
almost any sentence implies (or leads to) further information, hence 
further logico-grammatical entanglements. Thus, within the word-sentence 
continuum, as the basic grammatical unit, the predication reigns supreme 
over the various "topics" contained in the sentence (subject, objects, 
etc.), but not necessarily over the other sentences with which it is, 
nevertheless, related. The following sentences from the Bib Le wLLl 
help to make this problem of predicational scope clear: 21 
And the whole multitude of them arose, 
and led him unto Pilate. 
And they began to accuse him,· saying 
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(4.145) 
(4.146) 
Both (4.145) and (4.146) are traditional one-sentence-paragraphs; 
. . 
(4.145) is conjoined to a similar conjunctive one-sentence-paragraph 
which comprises the end of Chapter 22 in St. Luke; (4.146) is conjoined 
to (4.145) and to another conjunctive sentence which follows it (not 
cited) in the next paragraph of the Biblical text. Thus, all these 
sentences and paragraphs are "related" rhetorically because the same 
arguments (terms) occur in each; but these sentences are all predicated 
differently, and each sentence is merely tacked onto the other in turn. 
Given the truth of each sentence, it makes little difference whether 
they occupy one paragraph (as one long sentence or several short 
sentences) or several paragraphs. All of the paragraphs in Chapter 23 
of St. Luke, in fact, deal with one topic: the events .leading up to 
the condemnation and consequent crucifixion. The style of paragraphing 
is, therefore, one of personal choice--the choice being dictated by 
such things_as emphasis and the style of writing current at the time. 
(How or whether the style of the King James Version differs from that 
of its non-English sources is not known to the present writer.) The 
essential difference between the Dylan Thomas sentence-paragraph, 
(4.144), and the multi-paragraph passage cited from St. Luke, (4.145-
4.146), is one of "smooth continuity" versus "dramatic separation." 
They are both just a long series of conjunctions on a single, general 
topJc. Wl thin each conjunctive clause (sentcnn~) • howPver, the 
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predicate contained therein operates only on the terms therein, despite 
the fact that the same terms occur elsewhere as well. 
Logico-Grammatical Confusion 
What has been said of conjunctions (ands) does not apply to all 
logical words; hence, in non-conjunctive, molecular (non-simple) 
sentences, the predications are not so neatly contained. This situation 
has been met with before. For example, disjunctive sentences con-
taining the inclusive or are tantamount (according to logicians) to 
if-then implicational sentences, as the following case shows: 22 
Either you stop or you'll get hurt. 
.!.!. you do not stop that, then you' 11 get hurt. 
(4 .14 7) 
(4.148) 
Assuming the truth of all the component (atomic) propositions above, 
the complex (molecular) propositions are also true, just as in conjunc-
tive sentences. However, in logic only one of the atomic propositions 
needs to be true for the whole molecular disjunctive proposition to 
be true. On the other hand, in the implicational sentence, it is only 
necessary that a false consequent not result from a true premise; i.e., 
even if both atomic propositions are false, the molecular proposition 
is sti11 true. In fact, the first proposition can be false and the 
second one true for the whole molecular proposition to be regarded as 
true. Many logicians have long been dissatisfied with this intuitively 
objectionable state of affairs with regard to the implicational (even 
though it works in mathematics). Part of the problem seems to be 
that few logicians recognize (as do traditional grannnarians with their 
concept of "coordination") that an apparent disjunctive is sometimes 
actually a conjunctive semantically in a natural language such as 
English. That is, (4.147) and (4.148) could be re-phrased as 
Stop that and you'll not get hurt. 
If you stop that, then you'll not get hurt. 
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(4.149) 
(4.150) 
As can be seen by comparison, the negation-scope elements (either and 
not) in the first pair (4.147-4.148), have been shifted to the last 
atomic propositions in the second pair, (4.149-4.150), above. In 
(4 .149-4 .150), since the implicational form is obviously a transformation 
·of the conjunctive form; and since a conjunctive form requires both 
atomic propositions to be true for the molecular proposition to be 
true; the conjunctive form should be given primacy in establishing 
truth-values. 
For rhetorical effect, a series of disjunctions could be written 
(or spoken) as separate sentences, just as conjunctive sentences were 
in the passage from St. Luke, but closer attention must be paid to the 
possibility of overlapping predication: 
Caesar will come, or we will lose the battle. 
Or if he doesn't bring a large army, we will lose. 
Or if the gods are against us, we will lose. 
Schematically, these may be stated as 
[- (W) v-(X) v (~~ (Z), 
which, translated, becomes 
If Caesar doesn't come, or if he doesn't bring 
a large army, or if the gods are against us, 
then we will lose the battle. 
(4.151) 
(4 .152) 
(4.153) 
(4.154) 
(4 .155) 
The Chesterton (4.141) and Thomas (4.144) sentences are called 
"loose" by some traditional grammarians. (So would the Crews sentence 
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(4.140) be callE!d "loose," if it had not been classified as "simple" by 
traditionalists.) It is said that "in a loose sentence the basic 
grammatical form and meaning are completed near the beginning or the 
middle; qualifying phrases and clauses follow. 11 23 The Morley sentence 
(4.142) is closer in form to the so-called "periodic" sentence of 
which it is said that "sentence form and meaning are completed only 
near the end. 1124 An example of a periodic sentence is: 25 
To believe your own thought, to believe that 
what is true for you in your private heatt 
is true for all men--that is genius. 
--Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Self-Reliance" (4 .156) 
There are several possible ways to interpret (4 .156), but all inter-
pretations require that the predication (is genius) span more than the 
"sentence" that is genius. First, the sentence is an appositive: the 
two infinitive clauses are specifications in detail of characteristics 
of genius; the sentence could have been written as It is genius to 
believe your own thought and to believe that what is true for you . , 
where the comma in the original version has here been interpreted as 
a conjunction. Second, perhaps either condition represented by the 
first two propositions in the quotation would be sufficient for genius--
i.e. , a disjunction may be meant: One should believe his own thought 
or One should believe that what is true for him is true for others; 
in this case, the inclusive or (= and I or) or the exclusive or 
might be meant, for the second infinitive clause would seem to imply 
the first as part of its meaning. Third, and this seems to the 
present writer to be the intended interpretation, the sentence is an 
implicational-appositive, which may be schematized thus: 
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(If one believes his own thought) and Q x ) & 
(if one believes what is true ..• ), then that is genius. (4.157) 
( Y IJ~ (T = G ) 
T = (X + Y) 
The sent.ence symbolism in (4.157) is interpreted to mean that the 
clauses X and Y are the sum total of the characteristics of genius. 
If one were referring especially to the class of hum~ns who were 
geniuses, then genius, being a subset of humans, would require that 
some person who had the required characteristics would be a member 
of the set of geniuses. However, what seems to be meant here is the 
qualities of genius ("adjective") itself, not people--hence, the use 
of the equality symbol; i.e., X + Y is in some sense "equivalent" to 
(leads to) G Csenius). It would be wrong to interpret the then-clause 
as independent, and the if-clauses (infinitive clauses) as subordinate, 
for the if-clauses are in apposition to genius because they define what 
the term means (according to Emerson). Thus; the same primary predi-
cation (equality) applies throughout the sentence. The Emerson 
sentence (4.156), is actually a mere juxtaposition, where the dash 
serves as a biconditional equivalence relation sign. Implication and 
equality may be one. In strictly logical terms, the equality sign 
would be read "if and only if" and would be symbolized in logic texts 
by a triple bar(~); however, this symbolism will not be further 
mentioned or used in this text. Stated more simply, if the two if-
clauses imply the then-clause, then the then-clause also implies the 
two if-clauses; in the symbolism used in this work, two reversed 
arrows (~) would technically be needed, and, in fact, many books 
on logic use the double-arrow symbol. The single-arrow symbolism has 
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been employed in formula (4.157) to stress the difference between a 
label (T) for genius (G) and a specification (X + Y) for genius; 
anyway, Emerson probably means that the two beliefs must first exist 
before genius.becomes manifest because genius is a composite of the 
two beliefs, not a thirtg-in~itself. 
Loose and periodic sentences are a fitting subject with which to 
conclude the discussion of sentence types, for they, as has been 
demonstrated, span the whole traditional array of forms--from simple 
through compound and complex to compound-complex, artd finally even to 
paragraphs and beyond. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Recapitulation 
Purpose 
In the Introduction, it was claimed that the main purpose of this 
work was to present an elementary logical grammar of English. It was 
also stated that this was not to be considered a theoretical work 
primarily, but a work with a practical, pedagogical bias. However, 
certain ground rules had to be established, and these turned out to 
be tantamount to a use-theory of language, suggested by the work of 
Frege, Wittgenstein, and Hemphill. But in spite of the numerous 
theoretical remarks made in this work presently under investigation to 
further the logico-grammatical exposition, the purpose has not been to 
establish a basis for a new theory of language. Based as it is on a 
use-theory, this work is subject to all the objections that have been 
launched against use-theories by many philosophers and linguists. 
That is~ for example, nothing herein will be sufficient (but it may be 
necessary) to explain how a child acquires language; nor what exactly 
is the relationship between sense and reference; nor the relationship 
of understanding to language use. The most that has been theoretically 
claimed so far is that sufficient data has been adduced to suggest a 
possible logical model for communication. Iri that which follows, a 
281 
282 
few additional factors will be discussed concerning theory and method; 
and a few hints for possible future investigations will be taken up. 
Linguistic Theory 
It is this writer's .view that a theory of language (versus com~ 
munication) would have to encompass a~tual speech situations such as 
has been studied by Searle (Speech Acts) and Austin (How To Do Things 
With Words); it would also have to encompass the total socio-cultural 
continuum as attempted by Pike's tagmemic approach (Language in Rela-
tion to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Bepavior); 
biological factors would have to be considered, as in the work of 
Lenneberg (Biological Foundations of Language); and, finally, neuro-
logical and cybernetic approaches would have to be taken into account, 
as in the work of Lamb (Outline of Stratificational Grammar). A 
comprehensive theory of language based upon the above mentioned kinds 
of data would have to be composed jointly by philosophers, psycholo-
gists, and linguists who were sufficiently conversant with the data 
and the philosophy of science. Thus, a linguistic study, which seeks 
only to establish a model for communication (not language), has more 
modest goals. The method used in the present work--in an extremely 
elementary way--most nearly resembles those used in the discipline 
known as formal semantics, as exemplified by the works of Montague 
(Formal Philosophy), Cresswell (Logics and Languages), and the new 
journal of Theoretical Linguistics. The formal semanticist does not 
seek to explain how we know what (we think) we know. He merely tries 
to set up a logical model which best explains what we do when we use 
language; i.e., what we must know in order to explain how language is 
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used. The view of the present writer is that a merging of the tools 
'·' 
and methods of formal semantics and transformational analysis would go 
a long way toward establishing a formal theory of communication. 
Barbara Partee, who has tried to correlate Montague (M) grammar, 
i.e., formal semantics, with transformational grammar (!), puts it 
like. this: 1 
The goal of T grammar is the characterization of all and only 
the possible human languages, in hopes of developing hypo-
theses about structural properties of the brai11. Every 
aspect of a T grammar is supposed to have "psychological 
reality," in-some sufficierttly abstract sense. The goal of 
~ grammar is a theory of syntax and semantics of all 
languages, with no special priority given to human ones. 
Success is defined in terms of formal elegance rather than 
psychological reality. · 
The formal semanticist's goal, as portrayed above by Partee, is a 
bit extravagant. Montague in hi's several articles on the subject only 
claimed to have formally represented "fragments" of English. He made 
no claims of having revealed universal qualities of language. He did 
not try to determine what the human mind is or how it works, in contra-
distinct.ion to Chomsky who speaks of "the particular branch of 
cognitive psychology known as linguistics. 112 
Empirical Adequacy 
The approach taken in the present work represen·ts an attempt to 
synthesize some ideas from the logic of relations (influenced by formal 
semantics) and Chomsky's earlier, more modest programme outlined in 
Syntactic Structures (1957). That is, the emphasis is on kernel 
sentences (atomic propositions) to begin with, and the ways in which 
they can sometimes be combined to form more complex sent<:•nces (mo 1 Pc11 lar 
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propositions). And these combinations (transformations) are explained 
in terms of surface structures. In his more recent work, Chomsky 
himself has deserted, to some extent, the stress plac~d on the 
importance of deep structure (as developed in hiS Aspects of the Theory 
of Syntax, 1965). He now admits that surface structure and "shallow 
structure" also play a role in transformational manipulation. 
In a recent, very provocative article, George Bedell says:3 
As a final observation on the.force of the lexicalist hypo-
thesis, we may well question the necessity of deep structure 
for Chomsky's proposals. After all, the work dorie by the 
lexicon in his framework is essentially independent of deep 
structure. 
This has been exactly the contention of the presertt work. Regardless 
of where words come from or how they relate to the world, they may be 
considered in any linguistic problem as "given." 4 Bedell further says: 
We have now concluded our examination of the substantive argu-
ments in support of the existence of deep structure. The 
only conclusion we can draw is that these arguments are com-
pletely inconclusive. There is no generalization which 
will be lost; or explanation which cannot be made, if deep 
structures . • • are not provided for in our graiitmatical 
theory. 
Therefore the question of whether deep structures exist or 
not--though apparently basic, with far-reaching implica-
tions for our appreciation of the nature of language--is 
one which we are quite unable to connect with any of the 
myriad known or otherwise currently accessible empirical 
facts about language. ; 
Bedell's reference to "accessible empirical facts about language" 
has been a major consideration in the formation of the present work. 
No one, of course, would say that all thoughts represented by words 
nre ~mpirical. The square root of minus one, for instance, is not an 
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empirical fact. But the words used to express the idea are public 
property. Thus, in a sense, words are empirical things. If one says 
I have a.desire to leave instead of I desire to leave, one has ex-
pressed the same thought by means of two different structures. Such 
an example illustrates three things: (1) One must first know what 
intangible thought is expressed by the sentences (though how one knows 
it may be impossible to answer); (2) one must further note that the 
thought (meaning) is not necessarily equivalent to semantics (of which 
more will be said .presently)--in this case, the first sentence speaks 
of possession of a desire, while the second sentence speaks only of 
desiring; (3) yet the two sentences express the same propositional 
meaning despite the difference in linguistic semantics, which forces 
one to. recognize that the variety of syntactic stfuctures available to 
express the same meaning must simply be accepted as empirical facts 
(i.e., no undue emphasis should be placed on linguistic semantics as 
opposed to formal, philosophical semantics). (At this point, the 
reader should recall the discussions concerning the variant usage of 
pronouns--subjective, objective, and possessive--to convey the same 
meaning.) Therefore, regardless of the linguistic structure used to 
express any particular proposition, the sentence is logically a 
function of its component meanings, as Frege long ago declared, for it. 
is by means of the completed structure that the hearer knows what is 
on the mind of the speaker; with the proviso, of course, that both the 
speaker and hearer share similar cultural and human conditions which 
the words label. Thus, meaning, linguistic semantics, and syntax are 
interacting parts as far as language is concerned. 
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Sentences Versus Propositions 
The priority assigned to "logical structure'1 (as opposed to syn-
tactic structure) so often in this paper was. first inspired by the 
seemingly trivial realization that the so-called simple sentence 
patterns .·are just the most frequently occurring forms that sentences 
may take; but the same proposition, using virtually the same words, 
may often take quite various forms. It is a relatively "simple" matter 
to explain the variations by means of transformations. But how does 
one know that these different forms do express the same proposition? 
For example, how does one know that the following (differently ordered) 
groups of sentences are each (within its group) the "same"? 
Not one spetk of dirt did she find. 
She did not find one speck of dirt. 
She found not one speck of dirt. 
She didn't find a speck of dirt. 
Find a speck of dirt, she didn't. 
A speck of .dirt she didn't find. 
He didn't go, and she didn't either. 
She didn't go, and he didn't either. 
He didn't go, and neither did she. 
She didn't go, and neither did he. 
Neither he nor she we.nt. 
I went, and she went too. 
She went, and I went too. 
I went, and so did she. 
She went, and so did I. 
We both went. 
Went we both did. 
I must go. 
Go I must. 
She certainly is beautiful. 
Beautiful she certainly is. 
She is certainly beautiful. 
She is beautiful, certainly. 
Certainly, she is beautiful. 
Beautiful she is, certainly. 
( 5. 1) 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
(5.6) 
(5. 7) 
(5.8) 
(5.9) 
(5. 10) 
(5.11) 
(5.12) 
(5. 13) 
(5.14) 
(5.15) 
(5.16) 
(5.17) 
(5.18) 
(5.19) 
(5.20) 
(5.21) 
(5.22) 
(5.23) 
(5.24) 
(5.25) 
Beautiful, certainly~ she is. 
Beautiful is she, certainly.· 
Certainly beautiful is she. 
He should read the book carefully. 
Carefully, he should read the book. 
He should catefully read the book. 
The book he should read carefully. 
He should read carefully the book. 
To carefully read the book is what he should do. 
Carefully is the way he should read the book. 
He should read the book with care. 
With care he should read the book. 
He should, with care, read the book. 
I am not unprepared. 
Not unprepared am I. 
Prepared I am. 
Prepared am I. 
Christ is risen. 
Christ has risen. (Easter prayer) 
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(5.26) 
. (5.27) 
(5.28) 
(5.29) 
(5.30) 
(5.31) 
(5.32) 
(5.33) 
(5.34) 
(5.35) 
(5.36) 
(5.37) 
(5.38) 
(5.39) 
(5. 40) 
(5. 41) 
(5. 42) 
(5.43) 
(5.44) 
The above list could be extended much more with further examples; 
and many of the cited sentences could also be expressed in the passive 
voice and in other ways. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that 
none of these sentences are deep structures from which the others (in 
its group) have been derived. Why not consider them all as surface 
structures obtained by means of surface transformations? The only 
thing "deep" in each sentence is the proposition--i.e., how does one 
know (innately?) that each group represents a single proposition? The 
syntactic clues are extremely scanty, as the great variety of ordering 
indicates; and there are almost no morphological alterations. Thus, 
"logical structures" (i.e., propositions--whatever they are) are the 
closest things to what Chomsky calls "competence," if one also rules 
out cases of memory lapses, interruptions, stuttering, and the like from 
examples of sentences; the o~ert sentences are what Chomsky calls 
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"perfori:nance." Accordingly, to speak of deep syntactic structure in 
any mentalistic sense seems unwise, for the itevidence" is inconclusive. 
Meaning and Performance 
In the long run, performance also includes the socio-cultural 
heritage and so on, for there is no doubt that the context in which an 
utterance is made determines to a 
!f 
large degree the logic of the 
sentences in a language; and sinc·e this is the case, it is impossible 
to establish an exact boundary which separates meaning from performance 
(life). A proposition concerning irrational numbers, for example, 
would mean nothing '(innately) to an African Bushman--or anyone un-
familiar with mathematics, for that matter--so the concept must be; at 
least partially, a case of cultural integration. If it were not for 
the fact that most people are "apathetic" (not innovative) and, hence, 
usually content to stick to a few well-established "patterns" of speech 
as a matter of easy practicality, it would almost be a joke to speak 
of syntactic "structures" at all. This remark, of course, is re-
stricted to those "analytic" languages such as English where inflection 
has been reduced to a minimum in modern times. 
Semantics Versus Meaning 
The terms "semantic" and meaning" have been used interchangeably 
in the body of this work. In actuality, however (as suggested earlier 
in this Conclusion), a more subtle distinction needs to be made if one 
is going to theorize about language and communication. The point of 
view accepted here is similar to that expressed by the psycholinguist 
5 James Deese, who says: 
Grammar is the essential link in communication between 
meaning and sound or meaning and symbol. Grammar provides 
the means whereby one person's thoughts may become 
another's. Meaning itself exists apart from and prior 
to particular sentences. The sounds and the written 
symbols that express meaning, on the other hand, .are 
always parts of sentences. Once meaning has been mapped 
onto a sentence, that sentence has some semantic interpre-
tation. It says something. Thus, another way of looking 
at grammar is to say that it is the system of rules where-
by more or less arbitrary strings of sounds or symbols 
can occur in such a way as to mean something. When mean-
ing is made manifest in language it may be said to be 
semantic. Thus the concepts meaning and semantics are 
not synonymous. 
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In discussing propositions, then, it is Deese' s "meaning' which has 
been intended. As Deese further points out, 6 
. . . the grammatical structure of language functions only in 
the interest of something else. In itself, the study of 
grammar would be only a kind of idle game, or perhaps an ob-
scure branch of mathematics. It derives its humanistic 
importance because of the function it serves. It is a power-
ful and very general device for converting ideas into 
sentences. It has the function of making communication and 
organized, abstract thinking possible. The content of 
language resides both in ideas and in sentences. The con-
tent must exist prior to and outside of the sentences of 
language, or these sentences would make no sense. The re-
lation between ideas and sentences provides the main problem 
of psycholinguistics. It is the problem of meaning. 
In a very thought-provoking chapter on meaning and semantics, 
Deese offers many examples to justify his comments that have just been 
quoted.7 The results of many investigations in experimental psycho-
linguistics are also alluded to in support of his (admittedly 
controversial) views. For example, how can the content of sentences 
exist prior to and outside of them? There are several possibilities. 
Perception and imagery are two that immediately come to mind. Anthro-
pological linguists have long noted that the ways in which the people 
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of different cultures perceive the world seems determined largely 
before they are born. An instance is a child born into a ctilture 
wherein the people use color words differently from, for example, 
English people. Some cuitures divide the color spectrum into only two 
or three parts. Does this mean that these people can only see two or 
three colors? No. It means that their cultural life-style is such 
that they ordinarily feel no need to express subtle distinctions of 
color in words. English speakers have a broader band of color words 
than do speakers of some other languages, but the English language, 
too, is "deficient." A person may refer to something (in English) as 
"pinkish" or "blackish" (="rather pink" or "rather black"), but what do 
these expressions mean? Does "blackish" mean not black, but verging on 
gray? If so, what is "gray"? Is it "rather black and rather white"? 
Of course,. artists may establish more color categories than most people 
do, but the problem does not disappear. How does "azure" differ from 
"blue"? How does "deep blue" differ from "light blue"? What do "deep" 
and "light" meanin these expressions? And so it goes. Yet, with some 
ingenuity, a sentence containing a color expression in one language may 
be translated into another language whose speakers use different 
categories for subdividing the color spectrum. When hearing such a 
translation, do the hearers understand exactly what the speaker meant 
to convey? It is not likely (as any foreign language specialist will 
attest), but the general meaning seems, often, to be sufficiently 
clear. Hence, the general meaning may be a universal (or nearly 
universal) semantic category, depending on how many languages the 
.sentence may be successfully translated into. This general meaning is 
what Deese calls ''meaning," and he says it may be due to both the 
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world outside man and to factors which are species-specific to man 
(e.g., innate tendencies of a biological-neurological nature). If a 
hearer does not understand almost exactly the meaning intended by the 
speaker, then one can say, obviously, that there is not a one-to-one 
correspondence of understanding and meaning existing between the 
speaker and the hearer. Yet, the semantic distinctions may not differ 
too greatly; and communication may, iri fact, be carried on sometimes 
without any knowledge on the part of the participants that the 
speaker's semantic intent and the hearer's semantic realization of the 
speaker's intent are not on balance--they are a bit asymmetrical. 
These are examples of what Deese calls "linguistic semantics" as 
opposed to what he calls "meaning." (They are not his examples, 
however.) 
The foregoing discussion avoids defining "understanding" and 
"translation," for nobody, it seems, has been successful in doing this 
(to everybody's satisfaction). Intuitively, however, if one has 
"understood" the above discussion, he has probably "grasped" the fact 
that the idea of levels of abstraction is also an issue, often, where 
problems of understanding and translation are concerned. For example, 
it is possible that a speaker's intent in a sentence he utters is to 
convey just an abstract idea--such as "snow." The first white people 
who came into contact with the Eskimo people near the Arctic Circle 
had this problem. The Eskimo could use many words for different kinds 
of snow (grainy, soggy, etc.), but expressing the conception of "snow" 
was impossible. Every language seems to have such dilemmas embedded 
in it. For example, physicists and mathematicians have proposed 
several definitions for "time." Most are based on some system of 
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measurement between items in space, but not all are. Some thinkers 
have said that time is infinite, and others' have said that it does not 
exist at all. What, then, is "time"? Is it the case that, t¥hile 
references to time occur in every knoWn language, no one knows what it 
is? In any event, "time" does seem to be a universal semantic 
category, and is often used universally in its abstract sense (what-
ever that is). If "time" is defined in terms of "space," and the 
latter in terms of the former (as in Einstein's theory of relativity), 
then both defy further definitional clarification. Yet, people use 
these terms successfully, for they play an impo.rtant tole in the 
ordering of people's lives. For them, there is no "abstraction." If 
they are right, then Deese is wrong, apparently, about separating 
"meaning" from "linguistic semantics," even in the sense of recognizing 
levels of meaning ranging from concrete 'to abstract. 
Linguists usually try to avoid (ignore) all these problems that 
have been discussed. They oniy resort to context when there seems to 
be no other way of interpreting a sentence. For them, most words have 
a general meaning in isolation (based on their us~ge in various 
sentences); but they maintain that sentences can also be said to 
possess "structural meaning." For example, in John swallowed the fish 
the interpretation differs from that in The fish swallowed John, even 
though the same words are used in both sentences. Hence, word distri-
bution itself carries meaning. On the other hand, it has been shown 
in the present work that changed word forms and distributions in 
sentences often do not change the basic, general meanings. Following 
are a few cases in point: 
He was fool enough to go. 
He was foolish enough to go. 
He had lunch at the Ritz. 
He lunched at the Ritz. 
He feared the bear. 
He was afraid of the bear. 
He desired great wealth. 
He had a desire for great wealth. 
Not one dime did he spend. 
He did not spend one dime. 
He left hastily. 
He left in haste. 
To be, or not to be, that is the question: 
whether 'tis nobler. • --Shakespeare 
The question is (whether) to be or not to be: 
whether 'tis nobler. 
The question is whether to be (or not): whether 
'tis nobler. 
The question is whether (or not) to be: whether 
'tis nobler. 
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(5.45) 
(5.46) 
(5.47) 
(5.48) 
(5.49) 
(5.50) 
(5. 51) 
(5.52) 
(5. 53) 
(5.54) 
(5.55) 
(5.56) 
(5.57) 
(5.58) 
(5.59) 
(5.60) 
Therefore, the present writer concludes that while there is much that 
is debatable in Deese's theory, there must be some truth to his con-
tention that meaning exists prior to and outside of sentences; and 
that, in some sense presently beyond explanation, meaning is mapped 
onto sentences. Such a contention, of course, does not deny the 
possibility that the speaking of sentences (and the meanings they 
convey) stimulate or direct the hearer toward certain lines of thought, 
speech, and action. But such a possibility does not necessarily imply 
that speech is thought, or even that thought is totally dependent on 
speech, as many people claim. It has long been noted, for example, 
that it is impossible (or nearly so) to express certain logical and 
mathematical conceptions in a natural language. Isaac Newton, for 
instance, found it impossible to express his theory of universal 
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gravitation in any then known mathematical language; so he invented 
the calculus. Did the thought precede the map (=the calculus)? It 
would seem so. One might object and say that his theory could have 
been expressed, if circuitously, in English (or in the Latin used for 
scholarly works at that time), but it was his visual and logical 
observations which led to the final formulations in the calculus (and 
in English and Latin). Finally, it should be noted that many mathema-
ticians (and others) claim to have had unexplainab"le "insights," 
which it took them a long time to express in sentences, and when they 
were so expressed, the sentences seemed somehow less than semantically 
satisfactory. One can, for example, speak of "topological space," 
but does English really convey the mathematician's conception? The 
present writer feels that the answer is in the negative. 
While it is not the linguist's province to ascertain how 
the mind works or how understanding takes place, it is his province to 
interpret sentences; and in so doing, he cannot just concern himself 
with words and sentences as words and sentences. He must concern 
himself with the relation between "logical structure" (ideas) and 
syntactic structure; and, in Deese's sense, he must attempt to show 
the relation between linguistic semantics and meaning ("logical 
structure") on the one hand, and between linguistic semantics and 
syntax on the other hand. In order to do these things, the present 
writer believes that intracultural categories need to be set up for 
the semantics of each language. Then psychologists, philosophers, 
and linguists, etc. need to pool their efforts to determine if there 
are any universal meaning (as opposed to semantic) categories which 
are species-specific to humans; if there are, then perhaps a 
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meaning-semantic match-up can be established. In view of the evidence 
in this work, it seems likely that the simplest syntactic structures 
are determined by such a meaning-semantic match-up; more complicated 
syntactic Structures are merely the result of tratisformational manipu-
lations on simple structures. If a model can be constructed based on 
the aforesaid programme, then a true idea of. generative capacity,·in 
the sense of Chomsky, may be worked out~ Only by such a method will 
it be possible t.o define what is meant by "possible human language." 
FOOTNOTES 
1Barbara Hall Partee, "Connnents on Montague's Paper," Approaches 
to Natural Lanauage K. J. J. Hintikka, J. M. E. Moravcsik, and P. 
Suppes, eds. (Dordrecht,. Holland, 1973), p. 243. 
2Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind (New York, 1968), p. 1. 
3George Bedell, "The Arguments About Deep Structure," Language, 
L (1973), p. 442. 
4rbid., pp. 442-443. 
5James Deese, Psycholinguistics (Boston, 1970'), pp. 1-2. (Present 
author's italics.) 
6rbid., p. 83. (Present author's italics.) 
7rbid., pp. 83-114. 
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